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LOAN PARTICIPATIONS AND BANK
FAILURES: THE PENN SQUARE
DECISIONS
Kevin B. Fisher*
Banks that make it to the problem bank list gain sudden recognition
by the Comptroller's Washington bureaucracy. Just for the fun of it,
one Washington official took a pencil to Penn Square's balance sheet
and figured that if the bank kept growing at the current rate, it would be
the third largest bank in the country by the end of the century. Awe-
struck by the phenomenal growth, a senior official of the Comptroller of
the Currency in Washington remarked to a colleague, "There's some-
thing in Oklahoma City that's growing. It's weird. It's just weird."'
I. PENN SQUARE AND DEPOSITOR SETOFF: AN OVERVIEW
KLAHOMA City's Penn Square Bank certainly did gain recogni-
tion. Its growth in the late 1970s and early 1980s, fueled by the oil
and gas boom and the supply of money provided by money center
banks eager to share in the riches of energy lending, was nothing short of
phenomenal. 2 Few people, and even fewer banks, realized at the time that
* Associate, Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, San Francisco, California.
This Article was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master
of Laws at The University of Pennsylvania Law School. I express my thanks to Professor
Robert H. Mundheim and Alan W. Armstrong for their helpful reviews of and comments on
this work. The views expressed in this Article are completely my own. I alone am responsible
for any errors herein.
I also thank Gary H. Baker for educating a young would-be banking lawyer about the va-
garies of loan participations and the intricacies of oil and gas finance. To him I owe a large
debt of gratitude.
Most of all, I thank my wife, Robin. To her I owe a debt that can be neither expressed nor
repaid. Yet I plan to spend the rest of my days attempting to do just that.
1. P. ZWEIG, BELLY UP: THE COLLAPSE OF THE PENN SQUARE BANK 122 (1985).
2. In 1976 Penn Square listed total deposits of $30 million. At the time of its closing in
1982, Penn Square's deposits had mushroomed to $470 million and its assets had grown to
$517 million. See id.; Isaac, The Role of Deposit Insurance in the Emerging Financial Services
Industry, I YALE J. ON REG. 195, 205 n.31 (1984).
Among banks, Penn Square was regarded as a maverick energy lender willing to fund the
unorthodox and take a risk. It would "bank" a borrower that other banks would not. It was,
to say the least, aggressive in lending to the new oil and gas exploration firms, production
companies, and promoters created by the halcyon days of Middle East embargoes, gas lines,
and skyrocketing petroleum prices.
The bank's explosive growth was due largely to the equally explosive growth in its energy
loan portfolio and its loan participation network. When it was closed, Penn Square had loans
for its own account of approximately $325 million. But more importantly, Penn Square also
had generated $300-400 million in loans that it had participated "downstream" and an aston-
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Penn Square's collapse would be even more spectacular.3
Although bank failures frequently occur,4  the Penn Square failure
ishing $2 billion in loans that it had participated "upstream." When this shopping mall bank
closed, it was managing a loan portfolio of approximately $2.7 billion - over 85% of which
consisted of participations sold to other banks. See P. ZWEIG, supra note 1; Penn Square Bank
- Twelve Months of Agony, Okla. Bus., July 1983, at 40-48; Powell, Thrifts Exposed by the
Collapse of Penn Square, Wall St. J., July 23, 1982, at 3, col. 1, at 398; Zweig, Oklahoma Penn
Square Bank, Maverick Oil Patch Lender: Some Say It's Bet Too Heavily on Energy, Am.
Banker, April 26, 1982, at 1, col. 1; The Stain from Penn Square Keeps Spreading, Bus. Week,
Aug. 2, 1982, at 60-62.
By way of contrast to other Oklahoma banks, when Penn Square was closed, Oklahoma's
largest bank, First National Bank of Oklahoma City, had a loan portfolio of approximately
$1.5 billion - just slightly over half of the amount managed by Penn Square. The state's
second largest bank, Liberty National Bank of Oklahoma City, had a loan portfolio of approxi-
mately $1 billion and less than two percent of it had been sold to participants.
Amazingly, over 80% of the Penn Square loan portfolio was energy related. Spurred on by
projections estimating that petroleum prices would reach $70 to $100 per barrel in the 1980s
and the typical oil and gas borrower's willingness to pay almost any price for money, energy
lending in the early 1980s at Penn Square, and other banks as well, reached a frenzied pitch.
See M. SINGER, FUNNY MONEY 64 (1985); P. ZWEIG, supra note 1, at 108; Wilson, Oil Disas-
ter No Immediate Threat, Tulsa World, Aug. 4, 1985, at 1, col. 1 (Department of Energy
projected crude prices reaching $100 a barrel in 1990 and $246 a barrel in the year 2000);
Gigot, Banks Hurt by Penn Square Collapse Were Victims of Oil Slump, Greed, Wall St. J.,
July 19, 1982, at 17, col. 4; Hill, Penn Square's Failure Bodes Losses for Many, Wall St. J., July
7, 1982, at 2, col. 3.
3. Penn Square Bank, N.A. of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma was declared insolvent and
closed on July 5, 1982. For a general discussion of the Penn Square insolvency, see M. Singer,
supra note 2 at 142; P. ZWEIO, supra note I at 398; Bayless, Bank's Problems Called Unique,
Daily Oklahoman, July 7, 1982, at 1, col.1; Bayless, Penn Square Bank Declared Insolvent,
Daily Oklahoman, July 6, 1982, at 1, col. 1; Gigot, Banks Hurt by Penn Square Collapse Were
Victims of Oil Slump, Greed, Wall St. J., July 19, 1982, at 17, col. 4; Hargrove, OC Bank
Insolvent; Uninsured Deposits Total $190 Million, Tulsa Tribune, July 6, 1982, at Al, col. 2;
Government Takes Over, Reopens Failed OC Bank, Tulsa World, July 7, 1982, at A 1, col. 1. In
the year following the bank's failure, over sixty articles discussing Penn Square and its effect on
the nation's banks were published in the Wall Street Journal alone. Mullins, supra note 2, at
40.
Penn Square's participants were crippled by the problems that helped cause the Oklahoma
bank's demise and those that were caused by the Oklahoma bank. Unlike the Exxons, the
Shells, or even the Ewings of the energy world, many of Penn Square's borrowers were small
independents, old and new "oilies" alike, unable to withstand the vicissitudes of the industry
and crushed between slumping oil and gas prices and mounting indebtedness. See P. ZWEIG,
supra note 1, at 111; M. SINGER, supra note 2, at 111. Largely as a result of the downturn in
the oil and gas industry and the Penn Square failure, the number of new filings in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma reached record highs. Bank-
ruptcies Hit Record in State, Daily Oklahoman, Dec. 21, 1985, at 23, col. 5. See also M.
SINGER, supra note 2, at 106 (discussing gridlock in oil patch); Stott, Bust Economy Means
Boom in Foreclosures, Daily Oklahoman, Jan. 5, 1986, at 18, col. 7 (attributing rapid rate of
increase in foreclosure actions to falling petroleum prices and Penn Square failure).
The Penn Square Bank failure has also been the subject of Congressional investigations. See
Penn Square Bank Failure: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Penn Square Bank Hearings].
4. Although the highly publicized closings of Penn Square and United American Bank
in Knoxville greatly enhanced the public's awareness of the possibility of bank failures, the
closing and liquidation of banks is hardly new or unusual. The largest commercial bank fail-
ures in the history of the FDIC occurred in the last thirteen years. E. SYMONS & J. WHITE,
BANKING LAW: TEACHING MATERIALS 621 (2d ed. 1984)(listing ten largest failures, year
bank closed, amount of deposits held by failed bank, and method by which FDIC closed
bank). See also Skillern, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Failed Bank (Part I),
99 BANKING L.J. 233, 233-34 (1982).
In just the past three years there has been an almost exponential increase in the number of
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uniquely presents the insolvency of a bank almost entirely dependent on loan
participations 5 for its existence.6 At the time of its closing, Penn Square had
sold over $2 billion in oil and gas loan participations to financial institutions
throughout the United States.7 Lending officers from some of the nation's
bank failures throughout the nation. Speaking in December 1985, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Chairman L. William Seidman estimated that between 120 and 130 banks would
fail in 1985. Seidman also stated that the FDIC expects a comparable number of bank failures
in 1986. FDIC Chief Predicting Bank Failings, Daily Oklahoman, Dec. 13, 1985, at 35, col. 1.
In December 1985 the FDIC catagorized 1,100 banks as problem banks. That number is only
slightly higher than that of December 1984. Id. These figures can be contrasted with those of
1982 when a then record high number of banks, 42, failed, see Hill & Schmitt, Bank in Mid-
land, Texas, Has Assets Sold by FDIC, Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 1983, at 2, col. 2, and the FDIC
had 320 banks on its "problem list." Hargrove & Ward, Fraud and Abuse Cited in Bank
Failures, Tulsa Tribune, Oct. 26, 1982, at IC, col. 1. It certainly appears that the public's
awareness of and involvement in bank failures will be enhanced even more in the coming years.
See generally Salamon, U.S. Aides See Additional Bank Failures, Sharp Increase in Problem
Loans in 1983, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1982, at 15, col. 1; Bank Overseer Quits, Predicts More
Failures, Daily Oklahoman, Dec. 28, 1985, at 19, col. 1; Chittum, Bank Failure Rate in '84
Could Reach Historic U.S. High, J. Rec., Aug. 30, 1984, at 8, col. 1; Furlow, 61 Banks and
S&Ls Fail in 1984's First 7 Months, Tulsa World, Aug. 26, 1984, at G3, col. 1; McCue, No
Immediate Dropoff in Failure Rate, Am. Banker, Jan. 6, 1984, at 1, col. 1; Chittum, More State
Bank Failures Seen, J. Rec., Oct. 11, 1984, at 1, col. 1 (discussing national trend of increasing
bank failures).
5. A loan participation represents the division of a loan between the originating lender,
the lead bank, and one or more other banks, the participants. See infra text accompanying
notes 73-165 (discussing loan participations).
6. Essay, The Aftermath of Penn Square Bank- Protecting Loan Participants from Setoffs,
18 TULSA L.J. 261, 263 (1982).
7. M. SINGER, supra note 2, at 153; P. ZWEIG, supra note 1, at 372; Bennett, Bankers See
Tighter Oil-Loan Policy, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1982, at Dl, col. 3; Lowenstein & Schmitt, Penn
Square Bank Starts to Pressure Some Smaller Banks, Exploration Firms, Wall St. J., July 15,
1982, at 20, col. 3; Gigot, supra note 2, at 17, col. 4; Hill & Drinkhall, Penn Square's Failure
Raises Questions on Whether Loan Buyers Exercised Care, Wall St. J., July 8, 1982, at 4, col. 1.
Continental Illinois alone purchased over $1 billion in Penn Square participations. Bennett,
supra. Other major Penn Square participants include such money center banks as Seattle-First
National Bank ($400 million), The Chase Manhattan Bank ($212 million), Michigan National
Bank ($200 million), The Northern Trust Company ($125 million), and Hibernia National
Bank in New Orleans ($24 million). See Penn Square Bank Hearings, supra note 3, at 392;
Bennett, Bigger Banks Are Hurt By Failure in Oklahoma, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1982, at D 1, col.
4; Hill, Penn Square Failure Bodes Losses for Many, Wall St. J., July 7, 1982, at 2, col. 3.
In the late 1970s a malaise afflicted most of the nation's economy. Smoke stack industries
were dying out in the Northeast. The Pacific Northwest was caught in a seemingly intermina-
ble slump. Interest rates were a stifling twenty percent or more. Businesses were fleeing the
Frostbelt.
In the Southwest, however, things were much different. On the road to self sufficiency,
domestic oil and gas exploration and production surged. When the federal government de-
regulated certain areas of the law governing oil and gas production, prices soared. Given the
apparent certainty of the inexorable rise in energy prices, it did not seem to matter how much
money a borrower wanted or what rate of interest it had to pay to get it. Through the use of
financing techniques such as the "evergreen" revolver, both the borrower and the lender could
profit. The traditional rules of the energy lending game had been suspended. It was precisely
this climate that drew banks from New York, Chicago, Seattle and elsewhere, eager to share in
the spoils of the oil and gas boom, to Oklahoma in general and Penn Square in particular. See
generally P. ZWEIG, supra note 1, at 106; M. SINGER, supra note 2, at 54.
For an analysis of the changing energy regulatory environment of the late 1970s, see Allison,
Natural Gas Pricing: The Eternal Debate, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1985) (excellent study of
changing economic and regulatory environment prompted by energy crisis of 1970s co-spon-
sored by the ABA and the National Energy Law & Policy Institute and conducted by Profes-
sor Gary Allison of The University of Tulsa); Allison, Energy Sectionalism: Economic Origins
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largest and most venerated banks anxiously courted Penn Square's favor and
regularly called on the little bank, hoping that Penn Square might have an
energy loan or two that it had not already upstreamed to a money center
competitor.8 Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of
Chicago, once the nation's sixth largest bank and touted at one time as the
best managed bank in America, 9 actually leased space from Penn Square in
order to smooth the process of participating in the Oklahoma bank's energy
loans.' 0 Penn Square Bank essentially became a loan production office for
several of the nation's largest banks.
After the Oklahoma bank was closed, the FDIC was appointed as receiver
to liquidate the Penn Square estate and pay off the closed bank's creditors."
To lighten this burden, the FDIC began to reduce the amount of the failed
bank's liabilities by setting off the deposits Penn Square borrowers had in the
bank against the amounts of their outstanding loan indebtedness owing to
Penn Square.' 2
As a result of the participation network constructed by Penn Square, how-
ever, a participation in a Penn Square borrower's loan probably had been
sold to a money center bank. The participant bank then argued that the
and Legal Responses, 38 Sw. L.J. 703 (1984) ("Freeze a Yankee! Not since the Civil War have
citizens of the South wished such ill health on their Northern brethren. In return Yankees
from all walks of life have labelled residents of the petroleum provinces of the Southwest 'blue-
eyed Arabs.' "); Fischer, The New Synthetic Fuels Program: Boomlet or Bust, 16 TULSA L.J.
357 (1981) (creation of the Synthetic Fuels Corp. and the development of new sources of en-
ergy); Pannill, Reform of the Natural Gas Policy Act, 17 TULSA L.J. 54 (1982) (gas sales der-
egulated haphazardly); Forum, National Energy Forum 1978: Government - Helping or
Hurting, 13 TULSA L.J. 659 (1978); Solomon & Mitchell, Development of Synthetic Fuels: A
Legal and Policy Analysis, 17 TULSA L.J. 375 (1982); Natural Gas Regulation and Market
Disorder, 18 TULSA L.J. 619 (1983) (regulation under the NGPA); Williams, Natural Gas and
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 13 TULSA L.J. 761 (1978); Note, The Market
Value Controversy: Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 16 TULSA L.J. 550 (1982) (effect on determining
comparable sales).
8. For entertaining discussions of the banking practices involved in brokering Penn
Square participations, see P. ZWEIG, supra note 1 at 260; M. SINGER, supra note 2, at 58. An
interesting apology of sorts for Penn Square and "what it stood for" was recently written by
Oklahoma Congressman Mickey Edwards. Edwards, Banking Attitudes Restrictive, Daily
Oklahoman, Jan. 4, 1986, at 8, col. 6. In this editorial Congressman Edwards laments the
demise of the wildcat spirit and questions whether Oklahoma can survive the "easternization
of the West." Id.
9. P. ZWEIG, supra note 1, at 67.
10. See id., at 73. This arrangement, however, may have helped lead to allegations of
fraud and self-dealing being lodged against some of the Chicago bank's employees. At present
the Continental banker in charge of the bank's Oklahoma City office and its correspondent
relations with Penn Square is under indictment by a Chicago grand jury on charges of de-
frauding Continental's shareholders. Id.; see also Bennett, Suit Charges Fraud at Continental,
N.Y. Times, July 31, 1982, at D2, col. 1.
11. The bank was dissolved and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was ap-
pointed as receiver under 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1982), which provides in part that "whenever the
[C]omptroller [of the Currency] shall become satisfied of the insolvency of a national banking
association, he may, after due examination of its affairs . . . appoint a receiver, who shall
proceed to close up such association."
12. See Jones, Louisiana Bank Sues to Protect Interest in Penn Bank Loans, Daily
Oklahoman, July 16, 1982, at 2, col. 1; Hibernia National Challenges FDIC Plan on Penn
Square Loans, Wall St. J., July 19, 1982, at 6, col. 5; Michigan National Sues US. Receiver of
Penn Square Bank, Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1982, at 10, col. 3.
[Vol. 44
LOAN PAR TICIPA TIONS
participated portion of the borrower's outstanding loan indebtedness no
longer constituted an obligation owned by Penn Square; rather, it repre-
sented an obligation now owned by the participant bank that purchased 13
the loan from Penn Square. Therefore, the argument continued, to set off a
Penn Square borrower's account balance against its loan indebtedness meant
canceling debt no longer owned by Penn Square, but debt owned instead by
the participant. 14 Unpersuaded by this argument, the FDIC concluded that
the Penn Square depositor/borrower setoff arrangement was an efficient and
expedient method for assisting it to fulfill its obligations as receiver of the
insolvent Penn Square.
As a result of the FDIC's actions, several of the participant banks filed
suit to enjoin the setoffs. Although many of the participant suits involve
different participation contracts, the two central issues in each case remained
the same: (1) the propriety of borrower/depositor setoffs against the partici-
pated loans; and (2) the right of the participant to an undiminished pro rata
share of any such setoff.' 5
Prior to the Penn Square failure, very little law existed to delineate a de-
positor's right of setoff and the concomitant rights of a loan participant.' 6
The courts deciding these Penn Square participation suits thus faced ex-
tremely complicated legal issues bearing enormous economic consequences
without the benefit of precedent. The rulings resulting from these cases
therefore, substantially affect not only the participants17 but also the finan-
cial world in general. This Article, therefore, analyzes these issues in the
context of the disastrous collapse of the Penn Square Bank and criticizes the
legal conclusions drawn by the courts. Further, this Article advances a dif-
ferent rationale for permitting borrower/depositor setoff, one that protects
the interests of both the borrower/depositor and the participant. Most im-
13. See infra notes 87-165 (discussing nature of relationship between lead and participant
and whether participation transaction involves sale to participant).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 284-427 (discussing suits filed by participant
banks).
15. Id.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 73-165 (discussing classification of loan
participations).
17. The full effects of the Penn Square failure are still being felt. Many of the money
center participants were staggered by their investment in Penn Square energy loans. Some of
the participants, most notably Seafirst and Michigan National, sustained losses from which
they could not recover. See P. ZWEIG, supra note 1 at 113; M. SINGER, supra note 2, at 155;
BankAmerica Corp.'s Takeover of Seafirst Took Effect Today, Wall St. J., July 1, 1983, at 2,
col. 3 (Seafirst's losses hurt bank so badly that regulators negotiated emergency merger with
Bank of America.); Zonona, Seafirst to Sue Former Official and Audit Firm, Wall St. J., Aug.
21, 1984, at 4, col. 1; Zonona, Seafirst Still Has Many Obstacles to Hurdle a Year After Near-
Insolvency and Merger, Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 1984, at 4, col. 1.
Continental Illinois's highly publicized failure was largely attributable to its relationship
with the Oklahoma bank. It took a monumental and unprecedented move into the private
sector by the federal government to avert the insolvency of the nation's sixth largest bank. See
P. ZWEIG, supra note 1, at 439-40; Regulators Charged With "Timid" Action on Continental
Illinois in House Hearings, Wall St. J., Sept. 19, 1984, at 12, col. 1; Comptroller Will Face
Tough Queries by House Panel on Continental Illinois, Wall St. J., Sept. 17, 1984, at 12, col. 1.
For a discussion of the effect one bank's problems can have on other financial institutions,
see P. ZWEIG, supra note 1, at 409; M. SINGER, supra note 2, at 153; Hill, One Bank's Difficul-
ties Can Hurt Many Others Because of Loan Links, Wall St. J., June 1, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
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portantly, this rationale seeks to further the commercial expectations and
realities of the participation relationship.' 8
To that end, this Article first examines the role of the FDIC as receiver of
the insolvent Penn Square Bank estate, its statutory rights and duties, and
the legal and factual background that led the FDIC to offset Penn Square
borrowers' deposit accounts against their loan indebtedness.19 Next, in the
context of the Penn Square participations, this Article analyzes the structure
of loan participations and the correlative rights and duties of the lead bank,
participant, and borrower.20 Finally, this Article analyzes the Penn Square
decisions, criticizes the courts' construction of the legal relationships created
by the Penn Square loan participations, and discusses the commercial rela-
tionships and expectations created by the Penn Square participations. 21
II. THE FDIC AND BORROWER/DEPOSITOR SETOFF
When Penn Square Bank's serious trouble became apparent, many observ-
ers assumed the government would assist another bank22 in acquiring the
ailing Oklahoma City bank.23 But the enormous uncertainty surrounding
Penn Square's total losses and liabilities,24 meant that no other banks were in
18. See infra text accompanying notes 428-82. Not incidentally, my proposed view of
setoff severely and purposely limits the precedential impact of the Penn Square courts'
analyses.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 22-72.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 73-283.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 284-484.
22. Several observers believed that Continental Illinois would be involved in the acquisi-
tion of Penn Square.
23. See P. ZWEIG, supra note 1, at 342. When acting as receiver of a failed bank, the
FDIC has two options: first, merging the insolvent bank with a solvent one; and, second, a
deposit payoff. See E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, BANKING LAW: TEACHING MATERIALS 620 (2d
ed. 1984); Brainsilver, Failing Banks.- FDIC's Options and Constraints, 27 AD. L. REV. 327
(1975). The FDIC uses the first of these two options whenever possible. Penn Square Bank
Hearings, supra note 3, at 57-58 (statement by then FDIC Chairman William Isaac).
24. At the time of the bank's closing, the FDIC estimated that between $2.5 and $2.9
billion in contingent claims already existed against Penn Square. Moreover, then chairman of
the FDIC, William Isaac, stated that he was aware of other irregularities that could give rise to
additional claims. Penn Square Bank Hearings, supra note 3, at 58.
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a position 25 to acquire the institution. 26 Unable to effect a purchase and
assumption 27 transaction with a healthy bank, the FDIC elected to close
Penn Square, establish a Deposit Insurance National Bank to assume Penn
25. The FDIC's unwillingness to support a possible merger or purchase and assumption
transaction has been sharply criticized. See Chittum, Closing Penn Square Bank Only Choice,
Says Isaac, J. Rec., Oct. 31, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
The Comptroller and the Federal Reserve, both fearing a general crisis of confidence in the
nation's banking system, argued that Penn Square should not be allowed to fail. The FDIC,
however, insisted that Penn Square's unascertainable liabilities made it legally impossible for
the FDIC to keep the bank afloat. Mr. Zweig and other writers attributed the FDIC's course
of action to then FDIC Chairman Isaac's insistence on using the Penn Square failure as a
means of disciplining the financial markets. P. ZWEIG, supra note 1, at 395; Inter-agency Feud-
ing and the Penn Square Fiasco, 14 INT'L CURRENCY REV. 31 (1982).
In testimony before a House Committee investigating Penn Square and discussing the ripple
effects of the Oklahoma bank's failure, Mr. Isaac stated:
Much has been said and written about the impact of the Penn Square failure
on other financial institutions that either participated in loans originated by
Penn Square Bank or provided funding to the bank in amounts in excess of the
[deposit] insurance limit.
Simply stated, a number of financial institutions regrettably have learned an
expensive but important lesson. These financial institutions were attracted by
the opportunity to obtain high yields on their investments but failed to take into
account the degree of risk being undertaken. As a result some institutions will
sustain losses.
It is indeed fortunate that these institutions have the ability to withstand these
losses. If one can identify a silver lining behind the dark cloud of the Penn
Square affair, we should expect that all financial institutions will be more pru-
dent in the future.
Penn Square Bank Hearings, supra note 3, at 63; see also Isaac, The Role of Deposit Insurance
in the Emerging Financial Services Industry, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 195 (1984) (discussing re-
sponses to the changing structure of the financial services industry and the role of insuring
agencies).
In light of the government's efforts to save the failed Continental Illinois, the attempt to use
the Penn Square liquidation as a means of disciplining the market lost much of its punch.
Some believe that Continental and Penn Square taught borrowers not do business with a
sound, well-managed bank, but with a bank likely to be bailed out in a time of crisis. See Inter-
agency Feuding and the Penn Square Fiasco, supra, at 32; US. Won't Let 11 Biggest Banks in
Nation Fail, Wall St. J., Sept. 20, 1984, at 2, col. 2.
26. See P. ZWEIG, supra note 1, at 388.
27. The merger or purchase and assumption transaction represents the most efficient and
least disruptive form of liquidating a failed bank. To the extent that the purchasing bank
acquires most of the failing institution's assets, accounts at the failed bank remain intact and
the existing relationship between loans and deposits is preserved. Moreover, a merger pre-
serves the going concern value of the failed bank. Most important of all, a purchase and
assumption almost always provides depositors with complete protection for even those
amounts on deposit above the insured maximum, thus minimizing the inevitable losses that
accompany a bank failure while shoring up public confidence in the banking system.
Normally, it is the FDIC's goal to arrange a purchase and assumption transaction, which
often gives the acquiring bank financial assistance in its acquisition of the failed bank. See E.
SYMONS & J. WHITE, supra note 23, at 623; Brainsilver, supra note 23, at 331. Such was not
the case, however, with Penn Square.
Before it can proceed with a purchase and assumption, the FDIC must first find that the
purchase and assumption will likely be no more costly than a deposit payoff. According to
then Chairman William Isaac, the FDIC estimated its "maximum cost [for a Penn Square]
deposit payoff would be as high as $240 million but would likely be very substantially less
depending on recoveries from the receivership." Penn Square Bank Hearings, supra note 3, at
58. Isaac also said that the FDIC estimated Penn Square's contingent liabilities to be well in
excess of $2.5 billion. Since the cost of indemnifying a purchasing bank, in the FDIC's view,
would cost more than a deposit payoff, it was impossible for the FDIC to arrange a purchase
and assumption transaction. Id. at 58-59.
1990]
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Square's insured deposit liabilities,28 and liquidate the failed bank's estate to
pay its creditors.29
A. The National Bank Act
The National Bank Act 30 provides the statutory blueprint for liquidating a
national bank. The National Bank Act imposed several statutory obligations
on the FDIC as Penn Square's receiver. The duty to liquidate the failed
bank's assets, pay each depositor the amount of its deposit up to the insured
maximum, and pay all creditors of the failed bank a "ratable dividend" from
the liquidation proceeds ranks first among these obligations.3' For purposes
of calculating insured deposits and reducing the number of creditors with
valid claims against the estate, the FDIC set off the amounts a Penn Square
borrower had on deposit at the bank when it was closed against the indebt-
28. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(h) (1982). The creation and use of a Deposit Insurance National
Bank is a form of deposit payoff. At Penn Square, all the insured deposits were transferred to
the DINB, which continued to honor checks drawn on Penn Square accounts up to the insured
limit and to facilitate an orderly payoff of insured deposits. Uninsured depositors were issued
receiver's certificates for the balance of their accounts over $100,000. Penn Square Bank Hear-
ings, supra note 3, at 60; Martin, Penn Square: The Residue, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1982, at col.
1.
DINB's have been rarely used in the FDIC's recent history. Brainsilver, supra note 23, at
330-31. Typically, the FDIC organizes a DINB when continuation of banking services within
a community is necessary. "An example of such a situation is a bank controlled by and serving
a racial or other minority group." Id. at 331.
29. On this point the FDIC's actions were also harshly criticized. See Inter-agency Feud-
ing and the Penn Square Fiasco, 14 INT'L CURRENCY R .31 (1982); Chittum, Closing Penn
Square Bank Only Choice, Says Isaac, J. Rec., Oct. 31, 1984, at 1, col. 1. The Penn Square
Bank failure was also unusual for the reason that the Oklahoma bank had an extremely high
number of deposits in amounts over the insured maximum. See, e.g., P. ZWEIG, supra note 1,
at 411 (some depositors with over $100,000 had their life savings wiped out); Penn Square
Bank Hearings, supra note 3, at 270 (chart of federally insured credit unions with uninsured
deposits in Penn Square). By deciding to liquidate the bank, the FDIC reversed its long-
standing policy of insuring that depositors did not suffer losses when their depository bank
failed. In effect, the FDIC decided that those depositors with amounts in Penn Square over
the insured maximum lost money. See P. ZWEIG, supra note 1, at 411; see generally FDIC
Action on Bank Failures Continues Step to Make Big Depositors Pay for Errors, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 21, 1984, at 14, col. 2 (discussing effects of FDIC action on larger depositors); Big Depos-
itors at 2 Failed Banks May Lose Some Funds Due to New FDIC Approach, Wall St. J., Mar.
19, 1984, at 3, col. 2 (blaming FDIC's new approach for large depositors losses).
30. National Bank Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (current version codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 21-216b (1982)). This Article was written prior to the enactment of the Financial Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA") and expresses no opinion
on the rights and powers created by FIRREA.
31. See 3 W. SCHLICrrIN & J. COOPER, BANKING LAW §§ 49.02 - 49.03, 49.05 (1985).
Section 194 of the National Bank Act provides:
From time to time, after full provision has been first made for refunding to the
United States any deficiency in redeeming the notes of such association, the
Comptroller shall make a ratable dividend of the money so paid over to him by
such receiver on all such claims as may have been proved to his satisfaction or
adjudicated in a court of competent jurisdiction, and, as the proceeds of the
assets of such association are paid over to him, shall make further dividends on
all claims previously proved or adjudicated; and the remainder of the proceeds,
if any, shall be paid over to the shareholders of such association, or their legal
representatives, in proportion to the stock by them respectively held.
12 U.S.C. § 194 (1982).
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edness these borrowers owed on Penn Square loans. 32 For example, if Penn
Square loaned a borrower $5 million and that borrower had $1 million on
deposit in Penn Square when the bank closed, the FDIC would calculate the
insolvent bank's estate by setting off the full amount on deposit against the
outstanding indebtedness the borrower owed the bank. As a result of this
setoff, the FDIC extinguished the liability to the borrower for its deposit and
reduced the borrower's obligation on the loan to the sum of $4 million.
Nowhere in the National Bank Act, however, does it specify that the
FDIC enjoys the authority to make such borrower/depositor setoffs.
Although the Federal Deposit Insurance Act calculates the amount of an
insured deposit after deducting setoffs, 33 the National Bank Act makes no
such determination. On the contrary, the National Bank Act implicitly pre-
cludes such setoffs. The principal goal of the National Bank Act is to en-
sure that the assets of the receivership are used to pay the insolvent bank's
creditors a pro rata amount of their claims. 34 The Act clearly charges the
receiver with the duty of distributing the failed bank's assets ratably among
all creditors. 35 The legislative intent clearly suggests that no one creditor is
to be preferred over another. 36 Moreover, any transfer or preference in der-
ogation of this purpose is "utterly null and void."' 37
The National Bank Act does not specifically mention setoff; moreover, it
does not provide an explicit statutory basis for the FDIC's actions in the
Penn Square liquidation. In fact, under the National Bank Act, the FDIC's
liquidation of Penn Square fundamentally represents a collective proceeding
designed to treat creditors equally, set aside preferences, and pay dividends
ratably.38
32. The Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(m)(1) (1982), defines an insured
deposit as "the net amount due to any depositor... for the deposits in an insured bank (after
deducting offsets) less any part thereof which is in excess of $100,000."
33. Id.
34. See 12 U.S.C. § 194 (1982); 3 W. Schlichting & J. Cooper, supra note 31, at §§ 49.02 -
49.03, 49.05.
35. Id.
36. 12 U.S.C. § 91 (1982) is the anti-preference provision of the National bank Act. Sec-
tion 91 provides:
All transfers of the notes, bonds, bills of exchange, or other evidences of debt
owing to any national banking association, or of deposits to its credit; all assign-
ments of mortgages, sureties on real estate, or of judgments or decrees in its
favor; all deposits of money, bullion, or other valuable thing for its use, or for
the use of any of its shareholders or creditors; and all payments of money to
either, made after the commission of an act of insolvency, or in contemplation
thereof, made with a view to prevent the application of its assets in the manner
prescribed by this chapter, or with a view to the preference of one creditor to
another, except in payment of its circulating notes, shall be utterly null and void;
and no attachment, injunction, or execution, shall be issued against such associ-
ation or its property before final judgment in any suit, action, or proceeding, in
any State, county, or municipal court.
12 U.S.C. § 91 (1982).
37. Id.
38. See infra notes 39-72 and accompanying text.
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B. Setoffs as Preferences
The National Bank Act's blanket prohibition of preferences and goal of
equitable distribution to all creditors mirrors that of the Bankruptcy Code. 39
Arguably under both the National Bank Act and the Bankruptcy Code, set-
off constitutes a preferential transfer in favor of the borrower/depositor that
operates to the detriment of the failed bank's general creditors.40 The fol-
lowing example illustrates this point:
At the time of a bank's insolvency, Borrower A and Borrower B each have
$150,000 on deposit. Borrower A also has a balance of $75,000 outstanding
on a loan it owes the bank. If Borrower A sets off its indebtedness against its
deposit account, then Borrower A receives full and complete recovery.4'
Borrower B, however, fares less well. With no indebtedness owing to the
bank, B receives the maximum insured amount ($100,000) and stands in line
with all other general creditors for its pro rata share of the liquidation pro-
ceeds for the remaining amount of its claim ($50,000).42 As this example
demonstrates, A and B, both having deposits of equal amount in the failed
bank, receive unequal treatment if A sets off its deposit account against its
loan obligations.
Setoffs, therefore, may not be entirely consistent with the aims and pur-
poses of the National Bank Act. The Act specifies that no creditor is to be
preferred over another. Borrower A in the example above, however, obtains
immediate and total recovery on its investment, while Borrower B receives
no more than a proportionate share of the amount of its claim after an inde-
terminate wait.43
This result resembles that under the Bankruptcy Code.44 In enacting the
Bankruptcy Code, Congress recognized that the right of setoff "effectively
elevates an unsecured creditor into a superior class, thus treating [it] as
though [it] held a functional security interest."'45 Congress, nevertheless,
39. Bankruptcy emphasizes equality of treatment. See Comment, Setoff in Bankruptcy:
Is the Creditor Preferred or Secured? 50 U. COLO. L. REv. 511, 514-15 (1979). While not all
creditors are equal, all creditors within a single class are treated equally. Id. at 514.
40. Accord Comment, Bank Insolvency and Depositor Setoff, 51 U. CH. L. REv. 188, 214-
16 (1984); Comment, supra note 39, at 512.
41. When Borrower A sets off its loan debt ($75,000) against its deposit balance($150,000), then its deposit balance falls within the $100,000 insurance maximum. Thus, Bor-
rower A would receive $75,000 from the FDIC.
42. Because Borrower B's deposit balance exceeds the insurance limit by $50,000, the
FDIC gives B a receiver's certificate for that amount. Thus, at periodic times entirely discre-
tionary with the FDIC, B would receive dividends from the liquidation proceeds on its re-
ceiver's certificate.
43. By bank failure standards, the payment of dividends to Penn Square depositors pro-
ceeded fairly swiftly. In slightly under four years after the bank was closed, those creditors
holding receiver's certificates received dividend payments totalling 55% of the amount of their
claims. See Bank's Creditors to Get Funds, Daily Oklahoman, Dec. 19, 1985, at 35, col. 3("The payment is the third in the liquidation of Penn Square Bank and raises recovery to date
to 55 percent. Ultimate recovery of 65 percent has been projected.").
44. See Comment, supra note 39, at 514-15.
45. Comment, supra note 40 at 193 (1984); see also Comment, supra note 39, at 519-26
(discussing implications of § 553 of Bankruptcy Code). In United States v. Morely Constr.
Co., 98 F.2d 781, 790 (2d Cir. 1938), the Second Circuit stated that "the truth is that after
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preserved the setoff remedy in the Bankruptcy Code." Congress' express
preservation of setoff in bankruptcy, however, should not necessarily be ap-
plied automatically to the administration of failed banks.4 7
Although the National Bank Act and the Bankruptcy Code share many of
the same goals and functions, contrasts in purpose and policy between the
two regulatory schemes arguably exist. The Bankruptcy Code collectively
achieves an equitable distribution of a debtor's assets to legitimate creditors.
The same is true of the National Bank Act. But the National Bank Act
constitutes more than just a collection or disbursement mechanism for ad-
ministering insolvent estates: The National Bank Act establishes a federal
legislative scheme designed to maintain the integrity of and the public's con-
fidence in the national banking system.48 Its ultimate goal is the orderly
regulation of the national banking system, the stabilization of the private
sector, and the containment of the possible systemic effects of any one bank
failure.49
The liquidation of a national bank, therefore, has a political purpose quite
different than that of a private liquidation under the Bankruptcy Code. To
analogize that the right of setoff exists when liquidating a failed bank simply
because Congress included setoff in the Bankruptcy Code is, arguably, a bit
tenuous.50 In order to determine the propriety of the borrower/depositor
setoffs, this Article examines the judicial construction given the National
Bank Act's anti-preference provisions."
insolvency the counterclaim becomes the creditor's security for his own claim, a means by
which it can be paid dollar for dollar through his right of set-off."
46. 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
47. See E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, supra note 23, at 655. As Professors Symons and White
explain:
When a bank becomes insolvent, what law governs priorities and the distribu-
tions of assets? .... The one clear thing in this entire area is that the lawyer
cannot simply bring over Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code and apply them to
a bank. In the first place banking corporations are specifically exempted from
the federal Bankruptcy Act.... Thus, any bankruptcy law that is applied to a
bank's insolvency would have to be applied by analogy and not directly. Sec-
ondly, the National Bank Act is not as comprehensive as the Bankruptcy Act or
Article 9, but it does have certain sections that would determine priority and
would provide for example, for the setting aside of preferences.
Id. As with the old Bankruptcy Act, the Bankruptcy Code expressly excludes banks from its
coverage. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) (1982) (banks cannot be debtors under Code).
Despite Professors Symons and White's admonition, when interpreting the National Bank
Act and its application to the liquidation of failed banks, the courts have applied the principles
underlying bankruptcy law, if not the actual Bankruptcy Code. See infra notes 52-70 and
accompanying text. Given the enactment of FIRREA, the massive savings and loan crisis and
the restructuring of the financial services industry, and the need for certainty in transactions, it
is very likely that the Bankruptcy Code will be followed more and more.
48. P. HORVITZ & R. WARD, MONETARY POLICY AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 90, 238-
42, 255 (15th ed. 1983) (discussing regulation under National Bank Act); E. SYMONS & J.
WHITE, supra note 23, at 628.
49. Id.; see also Goodman & Shaffer, The Economics of Deposit Insurance: A Critical Eval-
uation of Proposed Reforms, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 145 (1984) (discussion of banking regulation
and deposit insurance).
50. See E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, supra note 23, at 655; accord Comment, supra note 45, at
197.
51. Section 91 of the National Bank Act, however, is much less extensive than the anti-
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C. Scott v. Armstrong
In Scott v. Armstrong52 the United States Supreme Court addressed the
propriety of setoff under the National Bank Act. The Court recognized that
the equitable right of setoff inures to the benefit of a borrower/depositor in
the event of bank insolvency. 53
In Scott Fidelity National Bank made a loan to Farmers' and Merchants'
State Bank. 54 The loan proceeds were deposited in Farmers' account at Fi-
delity and soon thereafter Farmers' withdrew a portion from that account.
Fidelity failed shortly thereafter, but before the note matured. When the
note became due, Farmers' set off the amount remaining in its Fidelity ac-
count against the total amount owing on the loan and tendered the difference
to Fidelity's receiver as payment in full.
The receiver argued the impropriety of the setoff because when Fidelity
failed, the debt Farmers' owed was not yet due.55 Therefore, no mutual obli-
gations existed that properly represented the subject of setoff.56 Moreover,
the National Bank Act's regulatory provision forbid setoff.57 The receiver
thus believed he was obligated to "hold [Farmers'] note in trust for the gen-
eral creditors, including [Farmers'], to collect it and divide the proceeds rat-
ably among them."58
After reviewing the relevant statutes,59 the Court rejected the receiver's
argument and differentiated between direct preferential conveyances by an
preference provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and "has not been polished with a judicial gloss
in the way the Bankruptcy Code and its predecessor Bankruptcy Act have." E. SYMONS & J.
WHITE, supra note 23, at 658.
52. 146 U.S. 499 (1892) (Fuller, C.J.) (9-0 decision).




57. Id. at 505-06. The receiver argued that:
The parties did not occupy the relation usual between bankers and their deposi-
tors, where one party deposits a sum in a bank, and borrows money from that
bank, and when this loan is due pays it by checks on the money so deposited.
The State Bank borrowed this money not to let it lie in the Fidelity Bank, but to
be used by it in its own business. It paid a discount upon the entire amount, for
the entire time the note had to run. The note and the deposit account were
therefore wholly independent claims and were not the subject of set-off.
Id. at 504. In other words, the receiver believed that the Farmers' account at Fidelity was not
a normal deposit account that created a mutual obligation that could be the subject of setoff
even if setoff were permissible.
But where a national bank at the time of an act of insolvency, holds a dis-
counted note not yet due, and the debtor has in the same bank not placed there
on account of, or to meet that note, which the bank cannot take or hold for its
debt, the national banking law . . .prohibits the receiver from receiving the
deposit as payment in whole or in part of the note.
Id. at 505-06.
58. Id. at 506, 510. The receiver argued that equity favored an equal distribution of the
assets of an insolvent bank. Farmers', he contended, was hurt no worse than any other credi-
tor and, therefore, should suffer equally with them. The National Bank Act intended this
result and equity should not stretch to benefit Farmers' and disadvantage the other creditors.
Id. at 506.
59. The provisions of the National Bank Act at issue in Scott were identical to the present
statutes now codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 91, 194 (1982).
[Vol. 44
LOAN PAR TICIPA TIONS
insolvent bank and those liens and equities arising prior to insolvency by
either express or implied agreement. 6° The Court reasoned that an implied
agreement of setoff existed between Fidelity and Farmers' prior to Fidelity's
insolvency. 6' The Court further explained that equity long honored such
agreements and, since they agreed prior to insolvency and not in contempla-
tion thereof, nothing in the National Bank Act precluded Farmers' setoff.62
The Court stated:
The provisions of the [National Bank Act] are not directed against all
liens, securities, pledges or equities, whereby one creditor may obtain a
greater payment than another, but against those given or arising after or
in contemplation of insolvency. Where a set-off is otherwise valid, it is
not perceived how its allowance can be considered a preference, and it is
clear that it is only the balance, if any, after the set-off is deducted
which can justly be held to form part of the assets of the insolvent. The
requirement as to ratable dividends is to make them from what belongs
to the bank, and that which at the time of the insolvency belongs of
right to the debtor does not belong to the bank.63
The Court consequently held that even though the setoff might cause Farm-
ers' to receive a greater payment than another creditor, the setoff failed to
constitute an unlawful preference." Indeed, in the Court's view, the appli-
cation of Farmers' deposit toward payment of its debt could not constitute a
preference because the deposit account was not an asset of Fidelity; rather, it
represented an asset of Farmers'. 65 Since ratable dividends are paid only
from assets of the failed bank, Fidelity's receiver could not claim a right to
those funds.66
The Court's analysis of setoffs in Scott, however, is anything but definitive.
Rather than scrutinizing the results of the preference in favor of Farmers',
the Court focused instead on natural justice, superior equities, and universal
concessions, 67 and thus concluded that the National Bank Act permitted
setoffs. 68 Given the Scott circumstances, 69 the Court's lengthy discussion of
60. 149 U.S. at 510.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 512.




67. The Court was persuaded that
natural justice would seem to require that where the transaction is such as to
raise the presumption of an agreement for a set-off it should be held that the
equity that this should be done is superior to any subsequent existing equity not
arising out of a purchase for value without notice.
Id. at 508.
68. Analogizing the ratable distribution of an insolvent bank's assets to that of any other
entity in bankruptcy, the Court simply concluded that "the set-off of debts due has been uni-
versally conceded. The equity of equality among creditors is either found inapplicable to such
set-offs or yields to their superior equity." Id. at 511. Unfortunately, the Court did not ex-
plain how the plain anti-preference language of the National Bank Act comports with this
universal concession.
69. The Court gave no indication of the circumstances surrounding Fidelity's failure. But
it is possible to infer that the Court, in this pre-deposit insurance bank failure, concerned itself
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equities seems entirely appropriate and its ultimate holding completely cor-
rect. Unfortunately, it did not exhaustively analyze either the facts
presented or the provisions of the National Bank Act. Not surprisingly, the
Court's statements in support of setoffs have proved far more influential than
its narrow holding.70
After Scott, no one has disputed the right of a depositor of a failed bank to
set off the amount of its general deposit account against the amount of in-
debtedness owed the failed bank.7' Yet whether the same bor-
rower/depositor has the same right of setoff when a participant owns all or a
portion of the loan was not addressed. Arguably, if a participant has an
ownership interest in the debt and the collateral securing it, then courts
should not allow a depositor/borrower to use the setoff to extinguish indebt-
edness owned by the participant bank. As in the Penn Square suits, the
participants argued that they owned property rights in the debt and collat-
eral conveyed to them by Penn Square.72 Allowing the depositor to extin-
guish its debt essentially allows the borrower to extinguish the participants'
property rights.
The ultimate decision on the propriety of depositor setoff and the concom-
itant rights of a loan participant depends on the contractual structure of the
particular loan participation, the relationship created between the lead bank
and the participant, and the rights transferred to the participant bank. This
Article suggests that the Penn Square courts misinterpreted the contractual
relationships created by the Penn Square participations. Thus, the courts
failed to recognize the rights of the participants in and to the underlying loan
debt and supporting collateral.
III. LOAN PARTICIPATIONS: THE CLASSIFICATION QUESTION
A loan participation divides a loan among two or more financial institu-
tions. Loan participations are used by:
finance companies, mortgage bankers, banks, insurance companies, and
many other lenders ... as a way of enabling an originating lender to
accommodate large customers which it could not otherwise handle,
consequently increasing the volume of business, diversifying its risks,
and in general improving its liquidity; conversely, those institutions
which "participate" in loans see it as a way to invest profitably with a
minimum of cost, effort, and risk.3
with limiting the adverse effects of Fidelity's failure on Farmers'. This inference clarifies the
Court's superior equities.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 428-82.
71. See W. SCHLICHTING & J. COOPER, supra note 31, at § 49.05; FDIC v. Mademoiselle
of Cal., 379 F.2d 660, 663 (9th Cir. 1967); see also Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction on Behalf of Hibernia National Bank in New Orleans, Hibernia Nat'l Bank v.
FDIC, No. CIV-82-1051-R 1, 34 (W.D. Okla. filed Aug. 11, 1982) ("Hibernia is not seeking to
enjoin any non-party borrowers from asserting even at this stage a right of setoff").
72. See infra text accompanying notes 284-427 (discussing participants' contentions).
73. Drake & Weems, Mortgage Loan Participations.- The Trustee's Attack, 52 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 23, 23 (1978). Another commentator explains the growth of loan participations as
follows:
Participations have developed rapidly in recent years as a means of developing
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For the originating lender, the participating institution, and ultimately the
borrower, these arrangements prove quite beneficial.7 4
A. Structure
Structurally, the originating lender or lead bank makes the loan to the
borrower. Concurrently with or subsequent to the closing of the loan, the
lead bank transfers an undivided portion or percentage of this loan to an-
other financial institution, the participant. The terms of a participation
agreement then govern the relationship between the lead bank and its
participant. 75
In the Penn Square Bank participations, the Oklahoma bank originated
and consummated the loans.76 All debt instruments, security documents,
and accompanying loan documents showed Penn Square as the sole creditor
in their writing and recordation.77 The note evidencing the borrower's in-
debtedness was payable to Penn Square, and all mortgages and financing
statements named Penn Square as the secured party.7 8 Once the parties con-
summated the loan, Penn Square then transferred an interest in the loan to
correspondent bank relations as larger banks share attractive loans with smaller
country banks, join country banks in making large loans to country bank cus-
tomers, and as a means of servicing the credit needs of factors, financing institu-
tions and banks anxious to satisfy their customers' credit demands but unable to
do so fully for reasons of lending limit ceilings, shortage of available cash, risk-
spreading and the like. By "participating" their larger loans these institutions
can continue to serve valuable customers on a more-or-less exclusive basis. Sim-
ilarly, as purchasers of participations these same institutions can share in attrac-
tive loans which might not come to them in the usual course of their business.
Armstrong, The Developing Law of Participation Agreements, 23 Bus. LAW. 689, 689 (1968).
74. The loan participation benefits the lead bank by allowing it to:
1. meet the needs of its borrowers without violating lending limit regulations;
2. spread its risks and avoid excessive exposure to a particular borrower or industry;
3. provide increased liquidity and lending capacity; and
4. provide a higher return on invested assets by enabling the lead bank to retain deposits
and management or other front end fees based on the full amount of the credit.
The loan participation assists the participant by allowing it to:
I. enter a new geographic market or expand into a new industry in order to diversify its
portfolio or establish a base for further expansion;
2. obtain a more favorable return on assets than would otherwise be available;
3. employ capital with minimal administrative costs;
4. enhance correspondent and deposit or loan relationship with the originating bank; and
5. conduct lending activity in a geographic area in which it might otherwise be prohibited
from conducting business.
See Baker, Okla. B. Assoc./CLE Banking Law 11-2 to -3 (1985). See also Revised Banking
Circular 181 (Aug. 2, 1984) ("The purchase and sale of loans and participations in loans are
established banking practices. These transactions serve legitimate needs of the buying and
selling banks and the public interest.").
75. See Armstrong, supra note 73, at 689; Hutchins, What Exactly Is a Loan Participa-
tion?, 9 Rur.-CAM. L.J. 447, 449 (1978); Simpson, Loan Participations: Pitfalls for Partici-
pants, 31 Bus. LAW. 1977, 1977-78 (1976); see also Revised Banking Circular 181.
76. See Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. FDIC, 554 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. Okla. 1983);
Order, Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, No. CIV-82-1051-R (W.D. Okla. filed April 5, 1983),
aff'd, 733 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1984); Order, Northern Trust Co. v. FDIC, No. CIV-83-506-R
(W.D. Okla. filed Oct. 15, 1985); Order, Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, Case No. CIV-82-
1385-R (W.D. Okla. filed Oct. 15, 1985); see also Essay, supra note 6, at 264.
77. Chase Manhattan Bank, 554 F. Supp. at 255-56.
78. Id.
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one or more of its participants. 79
The borrower typically remained ignorant of the participation arrange-
ment.80 The financial institutions never recorded the documents' evidenc-
ing the upstreaming of the loan. Furthermore, they never filed financing
statements reflecting the interest of the participant.8 2 The public, therefore,
received no notice of the participation transaction. Moreover, all the debt,
security, and other loan documents remained in the possession of Penn
Square.8 3 For all appearances, Penn Square was the only lender involved in
making the loan. 84
To complicate the situation even further, the participation agreements and
certificates documenting and governing the transaction between Penn Square
Bank and the upstream banks did not explicitly define the nature of the par-
ticipation relationship.85 This proved a critical factor in the courts' exami-
nation of the nature of the legal relationship that existed between Penn
Square and its participants. 86 Ultimately, the characterization of that con-
tractual relationship determined the propriety of the Penn Square deposi-
tor/borrower setoffs and the rights of the participant banks.
B. The Lead - Participant Relationship
Although the financial world regularly employs loan participations, prior
to the Penn Square failure the law left this type of relationship largely unde-
fined. 87 The financial world tolerated this laxity in legal definition because of
the perceived invulnerability of national banks.88 Penn Square, however,
radically altered that misperception.
The classification of the relationship between the lead and participant es-
sentially determines the rights of the participant in the event of the lead
79. See id.; infra text accompanying notes 284-427 (discussing Penn Square decisions).
80. Even though no Penn Square borrower received formal notice of the participation
transaction, that does not mean that the borrowers were uninformed about Penn Square's
participation practices. Quite to the contrary, many of Penn Square's largest borrowers solic-
ited participant involvement. See infra text accompanying notes 284-482.
81. See, eg., Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. FDIC, 554 F. Supp. 251, 256 (W.D. Okla.
1983). The nature of the participation transaction, Oklahoma's Article Nine of the Uniform
Commercial Code, and insolvency law arguably meant that the participants were not required
to make any type of filings in order to protect their interests in the loans. See infra text accom-
panying notes 166-265.
82. Typically, the participant bank received only a participation certificate. See infra text
accompanying notes -.
83. Id.
84. These arrangements are all fairly standard for the typical loan participation. See
Armstrong, supra note 73, at 689-90; Baker, supra note 74, at 11-2 to -3; MacDonald, Loan
Participations as Enforceable Property Rights in Bankruptcy - A Reply to the Trustee's Attack,
53 Am. BANKR. L.J. 35, 38 (1979); Ryan, Interbank Problems: Buying Participations and Shar-
ing Setoffs, 4 ALI/ABA BANKING AND COMMERCIAL LENDING LAW 355 (1983).
85. See Essay, supra note 6, at 267-68.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 284-427.
87. Essay, supra note 6, at 262; Comment, Classification of Loan Participations Following
the Insolvency of a Lead Bank, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1115, 1121 (1984) (citing Essay, The Aftermath
of Penn Square Bank- Protecting Loan Participants from Setoffs, 18 TULSA L.J. 261, 261
(1982)).
88. Essay, supra note 6, at 262.
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bank's insolvency. A uniform definition of the participation relationship is
impossible because loan participations are contractual arrangements. The
terms of the contract between the parties, therefore, govern the lead - par-
ticipant relationship.89 The terms of the typical Penn Square certificate of
participation, 90 however, did not explicitly describe the nature of the legal
relationship created between it and its participants. 91 The courts thus
turned to the existing body of case law for guidance in construing the Penn
Square participation relationships. Unfortunately, the case law concerning
participations is far from consistent.92
Most of the previous decisions analyzing participations define the relation-
ship under one of three classifications: (1) a sale and assignment of a frac-
tional interest in the underlying loan by the lead bank to the participant; (2)
a trust with the lead bank holding an interest in the underlying loan as
trustee for the participant/beneficiary; or (3) a loan by the participant to the
lead bank secured by the underlying loan.93 The implications for depositor
setoff and the rights of loan participants vary with each of the theories or
characterizations of the participation transaction. 94
1. Sale and Assignment
The language of most participation agreements supports the classification
of a participation as a sale and assignment by the lead bank and a purchase
by the participant of an undivided fractional interest in the underlying loan
made by the lead bank. 95 According to this theory, the participation agree-
ment represents an assignment of an interest in the underlying loan and col-
lateral from the lead bank to the participant. 96 Therefore, the participant
possesses an ownership interest in the underlying loan and collateral.97 The
rights accorded that ownership interest, however, remain uncertain because
the cases seemingly conflict. A comparison of the decisions in Small Busi-
ness Administration v. McClellan 98 and In re Yale Express System, Inc. strik-
89. See infra Appendices A, B, C, D, E (containing participation agreements).
90. See infra Appendix A (containing printed form participation certificate often used in
Penn Square participation transactions).
91. See also Order, Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, No. CIV-1051-R (W.D. Okla. filed
April 5, 1983), aff'd, 733 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1984); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. FDIC,
554 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. Okla. 1983); Order, Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, No. CIV 82-
1385-R (W.D. Okla. filed Oct. 15, 1985); Order, Northern Trust Co. v. FDIC, No. CIV 83-
506-R (W.D. Okla. filed Oct. 15, 1985).
92. See infra text accompanying notes 93-254.
93. See Baker, supra note 74, at 11-2 to -3; Hutchins, supra note 75, at 463, 472 (discussing
these and other possible classifications for participations); Ryan, supra note 84, at 355.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 95-164.
95. Baker, supra note 74, at 11-4; Hutchins, supra note 75, at 463; Ryan, supra note 84, at
368.
96. See Hutchins, supra note 75, at 463; Essay, supra note 6, at 266-67.
97. See Small Business Administration v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446 (1960); Franklin v.
Commissioner, 683 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1982); Delatour v. Prudence Realization Corp., 167
F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1948); MacDonald, Loan Participations as Enforceable Property Rights in
Bankruptcy - A Reply to the Trustee's Attack, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 35 (1979); infra text
accompanying notes 166-265 (discussing applicability of Article 9 to energy loan
participations).
98. 364 U.S. 446 (1960).
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ingly illustrates this conflict. 99
In McClellan 100 the Small Business Administration ("SBA") purchased a
seventy-five percent participation interest in a loan. As in the Penn Square
participations, the promissory note was made payable to the lead bank only
and it retained the note. 101 After the borrower was forced into bankruptcy,
the SBA argued that as a governmental entity that was a creditor of the
debtor it was entitled to priority over the claims of other creditors. 10 2 The
lower courts, however, denied the SBA's claim to priority, reasoning that the
borrower owed no debt to the SBA at the time of the commencement of the
bankruptcy proceeding. 103
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the trustee in bankruptcy
argued that the borrower was not indebted to the SBA when it filed bank-
ruptcy. The Court, however, rejected this contention and held that:
the debt due the Administration arises out of a loan made jointly by the
[lead] bank and the United States nine months prior to the petition in
bankruptcy. Since beneficial ownership of the three-fourths of the debt
for which priority is asserted belonged to the Administration from the
date of the loan, it is immaterial that the formal assignment of the note
evidencing the debt was not made by the [lead] bank until after the
filing of the petition. 104
The Supreme Court thus concluded that the SBA's participation interest
amounted to beneficial ownership of its participated portion of the loan and
held that the SBA was a direct creditor of the borrower. 0 5 The SBA, there-
fore, could enforce its interest in the loan' 6 directly against the borrower.
99. 245 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
100. 364 U.S. 446.
101. Id at 447.
102. Id
103. Id. at 448. The referee in bankruptcy rejected the priority claim of the SBA by deter-
mining that the SBA was not a legal entity "entitled to the privileges and immunities of the
United States." Id. The district court rejected the priority claim by determining that "since
the bankrupt's note evidencing the loan was not assigned by the [lead] bank to the [SBA] until
after the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings, the debt is not entitled to priority." Id.
In other words, no debt was owed the SBA until it became the actual holder of the note. The
circuit court rejected the priority claim by determining that the SBA's obligation to pay the
lead bank, which had been "reverse participated" into the role of participant, 25% of any
distributions that the SBA received vitiated governmental priority.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to determine whether the denial of priority
limited the SBA's ability to perform its legislatively imposed duties. 364 U.S. at 448.
Justice Black framed the issue presented as follows:
The basic question this case presents is whether, when the Administration has
joined a private bank in a loan and the borrower becomes a bankrupt, the Ad-
ministration's interest in the unpaid balance of the loan is entitled to the priority
provided for "debts due to the United States....
Id. at 447.
104. 364 U.S. at 450.
105. Id.
106. If the loan were secured, the McClellan reasoning would grant the participant an
ownership interest in the debt obligations and the collateral securing those obligations. Pre-
sumably, this interest would allow the participant to set off the borrower's assets held by it in
order to reduce the indebtedness owed to it. But see In re Yale Express System, Inc., 245 F.
Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (disallowing setoff by participant because bank was not creditor).
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Implicit in the Court's opinion is the rationale that a participant has a sepa-
rate and cognizable property right in the underlying loan to the borrower.
The ruling in In re Yale Express System, Inc. 107 completely contrasts with
that of the Supreme Court in McClellan. In Yale Express, Marine Midland
Trust Company of New York purchased a forty percent participation in a
loan made by First National City Bank to Yale. Yale also maintained a
deposit account at Marine Midland. When Yale filed bankruptcy,108 Marine
Midland attempted to set off Yale's account against the balance of the loan
debt owed Marine Midland. After examining the terms of the loan docu-
ments' ° 9 and the participation agreement," 0 the district court concluded
without extended discussion"' that Marine Midland was not a creditor of
Yale." 2 Therefore, the court disallowed the setoff." 3
This decision makes no effort to distinguish McClellan. Instead, the dis-
trict court simply stated that Marine Midland advanced money only to the
lead bank, First National City Bank, which was the only creditor of Yale in
the lending relationship." 4 "Repayment of any amount advanced to [the
lead bank] by [Marine Midland] under the participation agreement was
made or to be made by [the lead bank], and [Marine Midland's] right to
repayment would arise only upon the receipt by [the lead bank] of payment
from Yale."' "15 In the court's view, Marine Midland was not a creditor of
107. 245 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
108. The corporate reorganization aspects of the case are considered in Rosenberg, Beyond
Yale Expres." Corporate Reorganization and the Secured Creditor's Rights of Reclamation, 123
U. PA. L. REv. 509, 509 (1975).
109. The loan agreements were executed by only the lead bank, First National City Bank,
and the borrower, Yale. The loan documents neither referred to the participation nor did
Marine Midland sign them.
110. Unfortunately, the court did not include in its opinion the complete text of the partici-
pation agreement. The court did say, however, that Marine was obligated to "take 'an undi-
vided 40% participation' in each advance" made to Yale Express and that the participation
agreement provided that First National City Bank retained sole discretion to agree to amend-
ments or extensions or to the loan terms (except for changes in terms of payment of principal,
interest, premiums, or fees) and to exercise any collection remedy in the event of default. 245
F. Supp. at 791-92.
111. Unfortunately, the district court did not explain its decision. Either the court deemed
an explanation of its rationale unnecessary or it believed the matter so simple that it did not
need explanations. In its brevity the district court not only failed to distinguish McClellan, but
it also failed to acknowledge the Supreme Court's opinion. The Yale court, therefore, never
analyzed the issue central to this question - that of the nature of the participant's ownership
interest in the loan. Unfortunately the Yale court is not alone in its failure or inability to make
this critical determination. The Penn Square courts were similarly afflicted.
112. Id. at 792. The court stated that neither the loan documents nor the participation
agreement gave Marine Midland any right to receive payments directly from Yale. "Essen-
tially, Marine's only right was to be paid by [the lead bank] an agreed share of whatever funds,
if any, were paid or repaid by Yale to (the lead bank]." Id.
113. Id. The Yale court concluded:
Without extended discussion, therefore, I hold that Marine was not and is not
a creditor entitled to set off the bank account in the amount of $361,739.71
which Yale had with Marine at the time of the filing of the petition for
reorganization.
Id.




Yale and therefore had no right to direct relief against Yale.1" 6
On this point Yale Express directly conflicts with the Supreme Court's
finding in McClellan that the participation transaction conveyed a beneficial
ownership interest in the loan debt to the participant." 7 McClellan and
Yale Express appear irreconcilable because the two courts disagree on the
nature of the property rights created and conveyed by a participation ar-
rangement. The issue necessarily becomes whether the property right trans-
ferred to the participant is an undivided right in and to the loan, all debt
instruments evidencing the loan, and all collateral securing the loan or
whether it is merely a right to a portion of the future payments made by the
borrower in repayment of the loan." 8
In a third case, Franklin v. Commissioner, "9 the Fifth Circuit specifically
addressed this issue and concluded that the participants involved owned
property rights in the underlying loan. In Franklin the lead bank, Capital
Bank, sold a number of other banks participations in a loan it made to
Franklin. As is common in participation transactions, Capital Bank re-
tained the note and all other loan documents. The participation certificate,
which referred to the transaction as a sale, specifically limited Capital Bank's
responsibility to its participants to that of exercising the same care that it
exercised in handling loans exclusively for its account and accounting to
each participant for its pro rata share of all payments made on the loan. ' 20
116. As in the Penn Square loan participations, the participant argued that at the very least
it was an "equitable creditor" of the borrower because the borrower was aware of the partici-
pant's involvement. In Yale, Marine Midland produced evidence showing that "Yale was
aware of, acquiesced to and indeed applauded Marine's participation." Id. Yet, the court
believed that these circumstances did not elevate Marine Midland to the status of creditor. Id.
at 792-93.
If Yale had permitted First National City Bank, the lead, the remedy of setoff as a presuma-
ble condition precedent to the making of the loan, then it is arguable that in acquiescing to and
applauding Marine Midland's participation, Yale permitted Marine Midland the same right.
This seems particularly true when the borrower knows that its loan depends on the funding of
a participant bank. To permit otherwise, as did the Yale court, allows the borrower to vitiate
its implied agreement with the participant. See infra text accompanying notes 428-482 (dis-
cussing commercial expectations behind setoff).
117. 364 U.S. at 450 ("Since beneficial ownership of three-fourths of the debt for which
priority is asserted belonged to the Administration from the date of the loan ... .
118. See infra text accompanying notes 284-427.
119. 683 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1982). Franklin was decided just one month after Penn Square
Bank was closed and the participation certificate involved in this case, see infra note 120, is
very similar to Penn Square's printed form participation certificate used by, among others, The
Northern Trust Company and Hibernia National Bank in New Orleans.
120. The participation certificate provided:
This certificate evidences your participation with us in a $-- note to - dated -.
Said note matures - at the rate of-% from -. We have this date sold to you
a participation in the amount of $- *** [at] -% with - accrued interest -.
The execution of this participation agreement shall not limit or affect our discre-
tion in exercising without notice to you any and all rights afforded to us by the
above mentioned note or any other document relating thereto, our sole responsi-
bility to you being to exercise the same care that we exercise in the making and
handling of loans for our own account and to account to you for your pro rata
share of the net amount of all payments actually received by us with respect to
the said note. The right to repurchase all, or any part of this Participation is
reserved to the Capital National Bank in Austin, Texas.
683 F.2d. at 128 n.8.
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The issue of the nature of the participants' interest in the loan arose because
Franklin paid the interest due on the participated loan with the proceeds of a
subsequent non-participated loan from Capital. 121
Under the applicable tax laws, a debtor cannot deduct interest payments
made to a creditor with funds borrowed from the same creditor. If, how-
ever, the debtor borrows from one creditor to pay interest to another credi-
tor, the debtor can deduct the interest payment. 122 Franklin deducted the
portion of his interest payment that passed through Capital Bank to the par-
ticipants. 123 The Tax Court determined that the participants did not own
the debt, and thus Franklin was not entitled to the deduction. 124
The Fifth Circuit, however, determined otherwise. The circuit court
concluded that Capital Bank no longer owned those portions of the loan sold
as participations in the Franklin loan. 125 Regardless of the fact that Capital
Bank still held the note, the sale of the participations converted Franklin's
creditors from one bank to a group of banks.' 26 Each of the participants
held an ownership interest in the loan and Capital Bank merely acted as the
participants' servicing agent. 127
Like the Supreme Court in McClellan, the Fifth Circuit found that the
sale of the participation assigned ownership interests in the underlying loan
to the participant. 1 28 "It is immaterial whether the payments were collected
directly by the banks to whom they were, in fact, legally due." 129 The Fifth
121. The proceeds of the second (non-participated) loan were deposited in Franklin's ac-
count at Capital Bank. Franklin then drew a check on that account, payable to Capital Bank,
to pay the interest on the first (participated) loan. Capital Bank then disbursed these funds to
the participating banks in accordance with their percentage interests in the loan. Id. at 126
n. 1.
122. The Fifth Circuit explained:
Interest paid to one lender by a cash basis taxpayer with funds borrowed from a
second lender is deductible when the interest is paid. When, however, the tax-
payer gives the lender his note, he has paid nothing; he has merely promised
again to pay. Thus if the taxpayer has borrowed from Peter to pay Paul, the
deduction is allowed; if he has borrowed from Peter to refinance what is due
Peter, there is no real payment and hence no deduction.
Id. at 127.
123. Id.
124. 683 F.2d at 127.
125. "In effect, the participants purchased an ownership interest in the loan, although the
lead bank continued in possession of the note." Id. at 128 n.9.
126. Id. at 129. "Under the terms of the participation agreement in this case . . .the
participant is an assignee of a percentage interest in the loan and the lead bank is the agent for
servicing the entire loan." Id. at 128 n.9.
127. 683 F.2d at 128 n.9.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 129.
The Tax Court opinion states that, in terms of tax policy, it is difficult to see
why the deductibility of the taxpayer's interest should be affected by whether
Capital Bank chose to sell participations. This myopia results from failure to
perceive that this sale of participations was not an illusion or paper transaction.
The sale of participations converted Franklin's creditors from one bank to a
group of banks. Franklin could not have prevented Capital Bank from selling
the entire loan to another bank and thereafter acting as merely servicing agent.
683 F.2d at 129. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Franklin was not engaging in mere "'pa-
per-shuffling'" and was entitled to the interest deduction. Id.
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Circuit thus determined that, regardless of which bank held the note, all the
banks involved owned property interests in the loan.
The distinction between whether the participant has purchased a property
interest in the underlying loan or whether it purchased merely a contractual
expectation of repayment can be critical. If a participant has a direct owner-
ship interest in the debt and security instruments, then it also has a direct
relationship with the borrower. As stated in the McClellan and Franklin
decisions, the participant bank is a direct creditor of the borrower.130 If,
however, a participant holds a right to a pro rata portion of the payments
made to the lead bank by the borrower to retire the debt owing exclusively to
the lead bank, then no direct debtor-creditor relationship can exist between
the borrower and the participant. Therefore, as stated in Yale, the partici-
pant cannot directly seek relief against the borrower. 131 As demonstrated by
McClellan and Yale, the economic consequences wrought by these two com-
peting lines of thought can be significant. Determining which of these two
characterizations of the assigned property right should prevail, therefore, be-
comes of considerable importance.
2 Trust
Courts have also characterized a participation as a partial assignment cou-
pled with a trust wherein the lead bank acts as trustee for the participant. 132
In some instances the participation agreement or certificate expressly pro-
vides for a trust.1 33 Thus, the lead bank remains obligated to hold the debt,
security instruments and all payments in trust for the participant.134
The classification of a participation as a trust often results in two major
consequences. First, the lead bank, as a trustee, will be held to a higher
standard of conduct in administering the loan. 1 35 Second, under a trust rela-
tionship the participant's interest would not be subordinated to the lead
bank's trustee or receiver in the event of the lead bank's insolvency. 136
130. McClellan, 364 U.S. at 450; Franklin, 683 F.2d at 129. See supra notes 100-129 and
accompanying text.
131. 245 F. Supp. at 792. See supra notes 107-118 and accompanying text.
132. See Baker, supra note 74, at 11-6; Hutchins, supra note 75, at 472; MacDonald, Loan
Participations as Enforceable Property Rights in Bankruptcy - A Reply to the Trustee's Attack,
53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 35, 54-66 (1979); Ryan, supra note 84, at 382.
133. See Women's Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Nevada National Bank, 811
F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1987); MacDonald, supra note 84, at 54 (discussing historical background
of trusts, their express and implied formation, and their applicability to loan participations);
Ryan, supra note 84, at 382-83 ("A participation agreement or certificate may provide for such
a trust, requiring the lead bank to hold the evidences of debt and payments thereon 'in trust'
for the participant.").
134. See, Seafirst Participation Agreement.
135. See Hutchins, supra note 75, at 472. Typically, a loan participation agreement obli-
gates the lead bank to exercise only the same degree of care that it exercises when dealing with
non-participated loans.
136. A trustee or receiver acquires an interest in only the property of the debtor. See Scott
v. Armstrong, 146 U.S. 499, 507 (1892); FDIC v. Mademoiselle of California, 379 F.2d 660,
663 (9th Cir. 1967). The lead's trustee, therefore, would not acquire an interest in the partici-
pated portion of the loan. Section 541(d) of the Bankruptcy Code achieves the same result:
Property in which the debtor holds, as of the commencement of the case, only
legal title and not an equitable interest, such as a mortgage secured by real prop-
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Therefore, any payments made on the loan would be held in trust for the
participant and the participant would be entitled to receive those funds from
the lead bank's receiver.137
In Stratford Financial Corp. v. Finex Corp. 138 the Second Circuit deter-
mined that a participation arrangement created a trust relationship between
the lead bank and the participant. In that case the participant, Finex,
purchased a one hundred percent participation interest in a loan made by
Stratford.1 39 After Stratford filed bankruptcy, it continued to remit the bor-
rower's payments on its loan to Finex.140 As a result, the debtor in posses-
sion and the creditors, committee attempted to reclaim these payments to
erty, or an interest in such a mortgage, sold by the debtor but as to which the
debtor retains legal title to service or supervise the servicing of such mortgage or
interest, becomes property of the estate.. . only to the extent of the debtor's
legal title to such property, but not to the extent of any equitable interest in such
property that the debtor does not hold.
11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (1982).
The Bankruptcy Code recognizes and protects the participant's interest. When discussing
the secondary mortgage market, a form of loan participations itself, the legislative history
specifically demonstrates Congress's intent that the trustee would be required under § 541(d)
to turn over the mortgages or interests in mortgages to the purchaser of those mortgages (i.e.,
the participant).
The seller of mortgages in the secondary mortgage market will often retain
the original mortgage notes and related documents and the seller will not en-
dorse the notes to reflect the sale to the purchaser. Similarly, the purchaser will
often not record the purchaser's ownership of the mortgages or interests in
mortgages under State recording statutes. These facts are irrelevant and the
seller's retention of the mortgage documents and the purchaser's decision not to
record do not change the trustee's obligation to turn the mortgages or interests
in mortgages over to the purchaser. The application of section 541(d) to secon-
dary mortgage market transactions will not be affected by the terms of the serv-
icing agreement between the mortgage servicer and the purchaser of the
mortgages. Under section 541(d), the trustee is required to recognize the pur-
chaser's title to the mortgages or interests in mortgages and to turn this property
over to the purchaser. It makes no difference whether the servicer and the pur-
chaser characterize their relationship as one of trust, agency, or independent
contractor.
The purpose of section 541(d) as applied to the secondary mortgage market is
therefore to make certain that secondary mortgage market sales as they are cur-
rently structured are not subject to challenge by bankruptcy trustees and that
purchasers of mortgages will be able to obtain the mortgages or interests in
mortgages which they have purchased from trustees without the trustees assert-
ing that a sale of mortgages is a loan from the purchaser to the seller.
Thus, as section 541(a)(1) clearly states, the estate is comprised of all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.
To the extent such an interest is limited in the hands of the debtor, it is equally
limited in the hands of the estate except to the extent that defenses which are
personal against the debtor are not effective against the estate.
124 Cong. Rec. S17,413 (Oct. 6, 1978).
137. The Seafirst Agreement contains this type of provision. But see infra notes 399-427
and accompanying text (discussing Seafirst).
138. 367 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1966).
139. Stratford made a $50,000 loan to a borrower that was evidenced by ten promissory
notes of $5,000 each, payable at monthly intervals. Stratford then entered into a letter agree-
ment with Finex "whereby Finex was purportedly given an interest in the [borrower's] notes in
return for an advance to Stratford of $40,000." Id. Stratford, however, retained the notes.
140. When the borrower made the payments required by the note to Stratford, Stratford's
president endorsed the borrower's check and delivered it to Finex.
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Finex as assets of Stratford.' 4' After considering the nature of the contrac-
tual relationship between Stratford and Finex,' 42 the terms of the letter
agreement evidencing the participation 143 and the course of dealing between
the parties,'" the court concluded that the participation arrangement cre-
ated a trust.' 45 Therefore, the court recognized Finex's beneficial ownership
of the funds and protected its interest from the claims of the debtor in pos-
session and Stratford's creditors.146
The creation of a trust carries with it significant consequences, conse-
quences possibly unintended by the parties to the typical loan participation
arrangement. 147 Moreover, the heightened duties and obligations imposed
on a fiduciary could impose impracticalities for both the lead bank and its
participant. 148
3. Debt of the Lead Bank
The third theory construes a participation arrangement as an extension of
credit by the participant to the lead bank. 149 In re Alda Commercial
Corp. 15o is the leading case supporting the argument that a participation cre-
ates a debtor-creditor relationship between the lead bank and its participant.
In Alda the participants purchased undivided interests in secured loans that
141. Stratford received, endorsed and delivered five $5,000 checks to Finex after Stratford
declared bankruptcy. The debtor in possession and the creditors committee argued that the
participation arrangement simply represented a loan from Finex to Stratford. Therefore,
Finex had no right to receive the borrower's checks (i.e., payments on the loan to Stratford)
once the bankruptcy commenced. 367 F.2d at 570. In determining the impact of Stratford's
bankruptcy on this arrangement, the Second Circuit was determined "whether the arrange-
ment between Stratford and Finex created a trust for the benefit of Finex." Id.
142. The court found that Stratford had experience in the financing business and that Finex
had none. Finex therefore relied on Stratford to draft the documents "to create and carry out
a trust." Id. at 571.
143. The participation letter agreement provided that "[t]he loan shall be conducted solely
in [Stratford's] name .... However, we shall hold all notes pertaining to this transaction 'in
trust' for our mutual benefit." Id.
144. Among the other indicia of a trust relationship, the court included the fact that the
borrower did not commingle its checks with Stratford's other funds, Stratford always remitted
the checks to Finex promptly, two prior Stratford - Finex agreements used the language "in
trust" and no promissory notes from Stratford payable to Finex were ever executed in this
transaction or the two prior participation transactions. 367 F.2d at 570.
145. Id.
146. Stratford, therefore, was Finex's fiduciary, not its borrower. Id.
147. For example, it is unlikely that the lead bank intended to assume a duty of care for the
participant's portion of the loan (as fiduciary) greater than its duty to protect its own interest.
148. However, banks will not easily accept a designation as "trustee." A trustee has formi-
dable duties: fiduciary duties, prudent man duties, common law duties, and statutory duties. A
bank may be willing to accept those duties when it is being paid a trustee's fee and is protected
by extensive administration and exculpatory provisions, like those found in bond indentures.
But a bank is understandably reluctant to accept a trustee's responsibilities in the normal sale
of interbank participations. Further, such duties (like the duty to segregate trust property)
may be impractical.
Ryan, supra note 84, at 384.
149. See Baker, supra note 74, at 11-7; Drake & Weems, Mortgage Loan Participations: The
Trustee's Attack, 52 AM. BANKR. L.J. 23 (1978); Hutchins, supra note 75, at 458-62; Ryan,
supra note 86, at 386.
150. 327 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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Alda agreed to make to two borrowers. 5 1 The participation agreement lim-
ited each participant's investment to a maximum of $10,000 and further pro-
vided that Alda would pay to the participants a specified rate of interest on
their participations.152 The participation agreement also specified that Alda
would pay the participants interest at a rate of twelve percent. If, however,
the interest charged on the underlying loans exceeded that amount, the par-
ticipants would not share in the benefits of that higher interest rate. Instead,
Alda retained all the benefits of the higher rate. Alda received the funds
advanced by the participants and placed them in its general account; the
security instruments collateralizing the loans named Alda as the only se-
cured party. The borrowers, unaware of the participation of their loans,
continued to make their payments directly to Alda.
After Alda's bankruptcy, the participants argued that they were joint ven-
turers with Alda and, consequently, they owned an undivided ten percent
interest in the collateral securing the loans. The referee in bankruptcy, how-
ever, concluded otherwise.
The referee found that the relationship between Alda and the participants
resembled that of debtor-creditor, rather than agent-principal. 153 To protect
their interests, therefore, the referee concluded that the participants should
have filed financing statements in accordance with the Uniform Commercial
Code ("U.C.C."). 54 Since they did not, the entire amount of the partici-
pated loans constituted property of Alda's estate.' 55 On appeal, the district
court agreed with the referee's findings.' 56
The Alda participations differed structurally from the typical participation
arrangement. In fact, everything about the Alda participation relationship
looked like a loan from the participant to the lead.' 57 Alda sold participa-
tion interests in a blind pool of loans, and Alda unconditionally had to pay
interest to its participants and the participants even had recourse against
Alda to collect the amount of their investment. In contrast, the usual bank
participations cover separate and identified loans and do not provide for re-
course against the lead bank. The participant bears the same risk as the lead
151. The loans were secured by the borrowers' accounts receivable and other collateral.
152. The participants purchased a 10% interest in the full amount of the loans up to a
"maximum investment" of $10,000. 327 F.Supp. at 1316.
153. Id. at 1317. The district court stated that if the participation arrangement created "a
partnership for the factoring of the accounts receivable" of the borrowers, then the partici-
pants' interest was that of limited partner. Under New York law, therefore, the participants
were required to file a notice of their interests as limited partners, which they did not do. Id. at
1317-18.
154. Id. at 1317.
155. Id. "The arrangement was not brought to the attention of the creditors of the bank-
rupt, and their rights under the Bankruptcy Act should not be limited by reason of a secret
agreement between [the participants] and the bankrupt." Id.
156. The district court found that there was no basis for determining that Alda was an
agent for the participants in the factoring of the borrowers' accounts receivable; furthermore
Alda was not a trustee for the participants "since there was no segregation of these accounts
and none was contemplated." Id. at 1318. In short, the district court was satisfied that the
participation arrangement represented at most a loan or an investment by the participants. Id.
157. See Baker, supra note 74, at 11-7 ("AIda loses some of its in terrorem effect upon
examining the participation in that case.").
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bank. 158
If a court construed a loan participation as a loan from the participant to
the lead, then the underlying loan represents the security for this extension
of credit. If the lead becomes insolvent, then the interest in the underlying
loan held by the participant/creditor, as demonstrated in Alda, becomes sus-
ceptible to attack by the lead/debtor's trustee and creditors. Therefore, Ar-
ticle Nine of the U.C.C. applies to participation transactions since the
underlying loan constitutes the security for the loan. 15 9
The actual wording of most participation agreements and certificates fails
to support the classification of a participation as an extension of credit to the
lead. 60 For very good business reasons, among them the desire to enhance
its financial statement and avoid violating its lending limits, 16' a lead bank
obviously prefers structuring the participation as a sale.' 62 For equally com-
pelling business reasons, a participant also prefers structuring loan participa-
tions as sales and assignments of assets. If, however, a court deems a
particular participation transaction as creating a debtor-creditor relation-
ship, then the participant faces an additional risk, the lead bank's insol-
vency. 163 Most likely a participant bank would not compound its risk
exposure by making a loan to the lead bank.
C. Participant as Owner or Creditor and Lead Insolvency
Essentially, the above three characterizations construe the participant's
158. The following factors indicate a participation creates a debtor-creditor relationship:
1. The participation contract grants the participant recourse against the lead
bank for payment of the participant's share of the underlying loan;
2. The payment arrangements of the underlying loan and the participation sub-
stantially differ;
3. The participation lasts for a different term than the underlying loan; and
4. A large discrepancy in interest rates exist between that received by the partici-
pant and the lead.
Accord Baker, supra note 74, at 11-8.
159. Ryan, supra note 84, at 355; Drake & Weems, supra note 73, at 45; Essay, supra note
6, at 265 n. 18. Penn Square's Oklahoma energy loan participations, however, did not require
any type of perfective filing in order to recognize and preserve the participants' interests.
160. See Baker, supra note 74, at 11-4.
161. Penn Square originated over $2 billion in energy loans, which far exceeded its lending
limits. It could not legally have originated and continued to carry these loans on its books as
its assets. Furthermore, if these participations were classified as loans to Penn Square, then
Penn Square's financial statements would have to reflect an additional $2 billion in debt.
The debtor-creditor construction neither reflects nor furthers the commercial expectations
and purposes that surround most loan participations. Moreover, when faced with what it
considers a difficult or close decision, as admittedly the Penn Square courts were, the court
should resolve the question or controversy in a way that furthers the commercial realities and
expectations that surround the transaction..
162. See Stahl, Loan Participations. Lead Insolvency and Participants' Rights (Part I), 94
BANKING L.J. 882, 883 (1977).
163. In other words, if the court deems the participant a creditor of the lead bank with the
participation as its security, then its risk has doubled. The participant runs the risk that the
lead may default on its loan obligations to the participant. Moreover, if the underlying bor-
rower defaults on its loan obligations to the lead, then the participant also runs the risk that its
collateral has lost or will lose considerable value.
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interest as either that of an outright owneri 64 of some portion of the loan or
that of a creditor of the lead bank.' 65 If the participant is an owner, then it
possesses a legally cognizable property interest in the underlying loan and its
supporting collateral. Although the lead bank continues to retain the note
and manage the loan after it conveys the ownership interest to the partici-
pant, the lead bank acts for the benefit of the participant as its trustee or
agent. The other view, however, construes the participation not as the
purchase of a property right in the lead bank's loan to its borrower, but as a
separate loan from the participant to the lead bank. In the context of the
lead bank's insolvency and borrower/depositor setoff, this distinction proves
critical. If a participant owns a property interest in the underlying debt,
then the setting off of deposits in the insolvent lead bank should not affect
the portion of the debt owned by the participant. If, however, the partici-
pant is merely a creditor of the lead bank and it failed to perfect its security
interest in its collateral (i.e. the underlying loan to the borrower/depositor),
then the participant arguably remains powerless to stop the setoff.
IV. THE LITMUS AND ACID TESTS: THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO AND THE EFFECT OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE ON THE PENN SQUARE
PARTICIPATIONS
Some commentators view all participations as loans from the participant
to the lead bank.1 66 This author disagrees. The structure and intent of the
participation transaction ultimately determines whether a participation is
either the conveyance of outright ownership of an asset or simply security
proffered for a loan. The Penn Square participations were definitely struc-
tured as and intended to be sales and purchases of ownership of the underly-
ing loan.' 67
Those who believe that all participations constitute loans equally insist
that Article Nine of the U.C.C. requires all participants to perfect their par-
ticipation interests or risk losing them.' 68 This viewpoint is also questiona-
ble. Regardless of whether the Penn Square participation transactions were
sales or loans, the participants were not required to perfect their participa-
tion interests in accordance with Article Nine. 69
Finally, some argue that if the participants have failed to perfect their
interests when the lead fails, then the trustee in bankruptcy can avoid the
164. See supra notes 95-138 and accompanying text (similar conclusion in case of sale and
assignment or trust.
165. See supra notes 139-68 and accompanying text (similar conclusion in the case of clas-
sifying the participation as simply a loan to lead bank); see also Drake & Weems, supra note
73, at 43.
166. See infra notes 238-245 and accompanying text (discussing Drake and Weems's views)
See, e.g., Drake & Weems, Mortgage Loan Participations: The Trustee's Attack, 52 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 23 (1978). Drake and Weems' views are discussed at length in notes 238-245
infra and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 284-427 and accompanying text.
168. See Drake & Weems, supra note 166, at 45.
169. See infra notes 180-265 and accompanying text.
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participants' interests in the loans. 170 Here, too, this author disagrees. By
the express terms of the Bankruptcy Code, the interests of loan participants
in the underlying loans originated by the lead are recognized and
protected. 17
To prove these assertions, the structure of the Penn Square participations
must be analyzed under the U.C.C., particularly Article Nine, and the Bank-
ruptcy Code. To correctly understand the participation transaction, and
therefore, the requirements of Article Nine and the Bankruptcy Code, one
must accurately understand the underlying Penn Square loan transaction.
A. Oil and Gas Finance172
Oil and gas loans represented the majority of the Penn Square participated
loans. 173 The following example reasonably typifies the mechanics of oil and
gas loans in general and the Penn Square oil and gas loans in particular.
Ewing Oil, an independent oil and gas exploration and production com-
pany, has under lease 10,000 "can't miss - you gotta' see it to believe it -
guaranteed to produce - only problem is I need $20 million in a hurry"
acres in Oklahoma's Anadarko Basin. Armed with a phalanx of geological
data and a battery of reserve reports sporting conservative escalation figures
predicated on the latest New York estimates of future gas values which sci-
entifically prove that Ewing Oil's interest in the 10,000 acre leasehold estate
is worth twice the national debt, Ewing Oil approaches Penn Square Bank
for the $20 million. As security for the loan, Ewing Oil agrees to mortgage
its interest in the oil and gas leasehold estate and have the production pro-
ceeds paid directly to the bank. Penn Square, after reviewing Ewing Oil's
data and consulting with an upstream bank, agrees to make the loan. The
parties sign the loan agreements and Penn Square disburses the funds.
As this example demonstrates, a lender bases an oil and gas loan on the
determination that oil and/or gas is in the ground, it can be extracted, and
its value will suffice to repay the loan as scheduled.174 To calculate the loan
value of a borrower's interest in an oil and gas producing property, the bank
and its petroleum engineers and geologists calculate the amount and value of
170. See Drake & Weems, supra note 166, at 57.
171. See infra notes 252-79 and accompanying text (discussing effect of Bankruptcy Code
on loan participation).
172. Because of the special nature of the oil and gas industry and the special nature of the
relationships that are created by substantive oil and gas law, oil and gas finance has many
special aspects. In order to understand the nature of the participants' interest in the Penn
Square energy loans, it is first necessary to understand some of the special aspects of Oklahoma
energy loans.
This portion of the Article is not intended to be an exhaustive discussion of the law of oil
and gas or the law of oil and gas finance. It explains and highlights some of the more
important aspects of oil and gas finance, however, especially as they affect the obligations and
interests of the participants.
173. See P. ZWEIG, supra note 1, at 409; M. SINGER, supra note 2, at 106.
174. See Vagts, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Oil and Gas Mortgage,
43 TEX. L. REV. 825, 827-28 (1965); Brennan, Current Trends in Oil and Gas Financing, 25
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 16-1, 16-2 to -4 (1979); Houghton, Problems Peculiar to Oil and
Gas Financing Transactions, 4 ALI/ABA BANKING LAW 333 (1983).
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the property's recoverable reserves. 175 The borrower often mortgages to the
bank its interest in the oil and gas leasehold estate as security for the loan. 176
The phrase "mortgages to the bank its interest in the oil and gas lease-
hold" appears deceptively simple because that interest really represents a
collection of interests in realty, personalty, tangibles, intangibles, accounts
and contract rights; 177 the bank usually wants it all. Therefore, the bank
first sifts through this collection to determine how to encumber or mortgage
each of these interests. 178 Then it determines how to perfect its security
interest in all these interests in order to secure the transaction. 179
B. Applicability of the U C.C. - The Underlying Loan180
Using the Ewing Oil loan example, some of the rights and interest that
commonly collateralize an oil and gas loan include the following:
1. Ewing Oil's rights and interests in the oil and gas leases, and, there-
fore, its interest in the hydrocarbons in place;
2. Ewing Oil's rights and interests in the hydrocarbons once they have
reached the wellhead;
3. Ewing Oil's rights and interests in the drilling and production
equipment;
4. Ewing Oil's rights and interests in the contractual agreements with
the operator and the other working interest owners; and
5. Ewing Oil's rights and interests in the proceeds of production.
Penn Square must, therefore, classify each of these rights and interests in
order to determine how to encumber them.
1. Classification of Collateral
a. The Oil and Gas Leases and Hydrocarbons in Place
Professor Lowe describes the nature of the oil and gas lease in the follow-
ing way:
A modem oil and gas lease is a unique instrument. Essentially, it trans-
fers a mineral owner's right to search for, develop and produce oil and
gas from leased lands during the leased term. It is difficult to fit into
existing legal categories. It is both a conveyance and a contract, more a
deed than a lease, and it creates rights in the lessee that have proved
hard to classify. 8 1
175. See Brennan, supra note 174, at 16-2 to -4.
176. See id.; Vagts, supra note 174, at 827.
177. See Ryan, Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code on Oil and Gas Transactions, 18
INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 365, 386-422 (1967); Clark & Sachs, Oil and Gas Financing
Under the Uniform Commercial Code as Enacted in Colorado, 43 DEN. L.J. 129, 132-43
(1966).
178. See infra notes 180-213 and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 214-41 and accompanying text.
180. The term "underlying loan" means the loan made to the borrower, Ewing Oil in the
continuing example, by Penn Square Bank.
181. J. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 152 (1983). Professor Kuntz writes:
The oil and gas lease is unique. It is a conveyance of an interest in real prop-
erty, with conditions and special limitations, which creates a continuing rela-
tionship between the parties. It is also an executory contract in that it contains
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This classification confusion regarding the oil and gas lessee's rights seems
particularly true in Oklahoma. 18 2
In the substantive realm of oil and gas law, Oklahoma is a nonownership
theory state.' 83 That is, the owner' 84 of oil and gas rights does not own the
hydrocarbons in the ground. Rather, the owner possesses an exclusive right
to explore for and produce oil and gas from the lands subject to its rights.18 5
elaborate contractual provisions which continue in force between the lessor and
the lessee during the life of the interest granted. In addition, many rights and
duties arise as between the lessor and lessee by virtue of their special relationship
and their common objectives with respect to a fugitive substance, which rights
and duties do not arise between the vendor and purchaser nor between landlord
and tenant. In states which follow the common law, difficulty is encountered in
any attempt to identify the property rights and relationship between the parties
created by the oil and gas lease with any single established concept.
2 E. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 18.2 (1964).
182. See Continental Supply Co. v. Marshall, 152 F.2d 300, 305-08 (10th Cir. 1945) (dis-
cussing confusing nature of Oklahoma oil and gas lessee's interest), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 803
(1946)
In general, the oil and gas lease and the rights created thereby have been variously classified
by the courts for different reasons. 2 E. KUNTZ, supra note 181, § 18.2, at 5; Lowe, The Rule
of Capture and Theories of Ownership of Oil and Gas, FUNDAMENTALS OF OIL & GAS LAW &
TAXATION 43, 56-58 (J. Lowe ed. 1984). These characterizations include:
a profit a prendre, a corporeal hereditament, an estate in land, not an estate in
land, an estate in oil and gas, not an estate in oil and gas, a servitude, a chattel
real, real estate, an interest in land, not an interest in land, personal property, a
freehold, a tenancy at will, property interest, and the relation of landlord tenant.
IA W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 152, at 371-74 (2d ed. 1954).
For extensive discussions of the nature, characterizations, and aspects of oil and gas leases,
see I E. BROWN, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS LEASES (2d ed. 1984); PRINCIPLES OF THE OIL
AND GAS LEASE (J. Lowe & K. Myles eds. 1985).
183. J. LOWE, supra note 199, at 22-23; 2 E. KUNTZ, supra note 181, § 23.23, at 191; 1 E.
BROWN, supra note 182, § 3.02, at 3-8; Emery, Real Property Mineral Interests in Oklahoma,
24 OKLA. L. REv. 337, 338 (1971). Williams and Meyers characterize Oklahoma as a "Quali-
fied Ownership" state, but admit that "[l]ittle if any difference exists between [the qualified
ownership] theory and the nonownership theory as the latter has developed." 1 H. WILLIAMS
& C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 203.2, at 41-43 (1984).
Note, however, that the term "nonownership" does not mean the absence of property rights.
1 E. KUNTZ, supra note 181, § 2.4, at 66.
184. The term "owner" includes both the owner of the mineral estate, if there is no oil and
gas lease covering the property, and the lessee, Ewing Oil in the example, if there is an oil and
gas lease covering the property. See generally J. LOWE, supra note 181, at 171 (mineral owner
who grants lease transfers all rights to property).
185. 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 183, at § 203.2; 2 E. KUNTZ, supra note
181, at § 23.23; 1 E. BROWN, supra note 182, at § 3.02; J. LOWE, supra note 172, at 239;
LOWE, supra note 182, at 51. The Oklahoma Supreme Court explained the significance of the
nonownership theory in the following manner:
[Owners in fee simple have] no absolute right or title to the oil or gas which
might permeate the strata underlying the surface of their land, as in the case of
coal or other solid minerals fixed in, and forming a part of, the soil itself.
But with respect to such oil and gas, they [the owners] had certain rights
designated by the same courts as a qualified ownership thereof, but which may
be more accurately stated as exclusive right, subject to legislative control against
waste and the like, to erect structures on the surface of their land, and explore
therefore by drilling wells through the underlying strata, and to take therefrom
and reduce to possession, and thus acquire absolute title as personal property to
such as might be found and obtained thereby. This right is the proper subject of
sale, and may be granted or reserved. The right so granted or reserved, and held
separate and apart from the possession of the land itself, is an incorporeal here-
ditament; or more specifically, as designated in the ancient French, a profit a
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Title to the oil and gas vests in the owner only when the oil and gas are
reduced to the owner's possession.1 s6
In the Penn Square Bank loan hypothetical, Ewing Oil owns this exclusive
exploratory right under the Anadarko oil and gas leases. The Oklahoma
courts have characterized this ownership right as a profit a prendre, a right
to go on to the land of another and take from it either some part of the land
or a product of it.' s7 For the purpose of determining how to encumber Ew-
ing Oil's profit a prendre, however, Ewing Oil's interest requires classifica-
tion as either realty or personalty.188
In Oklahoma, however, that classification has proved particularly diffi-
prendre, analogous to a profit to hunt and fish on the land of another. Consid-
ered with respect to duration, if the grant be to one and his heirs and assigns
forever, it is of an interest in fee. An interest of less duration may be granted,
and that for a term of years has been denominated by this court a chattel real.
Such a right is an interest in land.
Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 206-07, 177 P. 86, 89 (1918).
The ownership in place theory contrasts with Oklahoma's nonownership or "exclusive right
to take" theory. 1 E. KuNTz, supra note 181, at § 2.4. In an ownership in place state, like
Texas, the landowner actually owns the oil and gas in place underneath its land. The oil and
gas owner's estate is characterized in these states as a fee simple determinable, an ownership
estate that terminates automatically upon stated occurrences. Of course, the Texas land-
owner's ownership of the oil and gas underneath its land is subject to the correlative rights of
other landowners to capture the oil and gas and bring it to the surface from wells drilled and
bottomed on their own property. Id.; Lowe, Representing the Landowner in Oil and Gas Leas-
ing Transactions, 31 OKLA. L. REv. 257, 259 n.9 (1978) reprinted in PRINCIPLES OF THE OIL
AND GAS LEASE 319 (. Lowe & K. Myles eds. 1985); 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra
note 183, at § 203.3.
186. Professor Kuntz explains:
According to the exclusive right-to-take [nonownership] theory, the land-
owner does not own the oil and gas which underlie his land. He merely has the
exclusive right to capture such substances by operations on his land. Once re-
duced to dominion and control, such substances become the object of absolute
ownership, but, until capture, the property right is described as an exclusive
right to capture.
1 E. KuNrz, supra note 181, § 2.4, at 66.
In short, actual title to the oil and gas vests in the owner (either the mineral estate owner or
the lessee, see supra note 13) only when the oil and gas have been captured and produced. In
oil and gas parlance this concept is known as the "Rule of Capture." See J. LOWE, supra note
181, at 23-24; 1 E. KUNTz, supra note 181, §§ 4.1 - 4.2; 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra
note 183, at § 204.4; Kuntz, The Law of Capture, 10 OKLA. L. REv. 406, 406 (1957); Hard-
wicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as Applied to Oil and Gas, 13 TEx. L. REV.
391, 395-96 (1935).
187. See Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 206-07, 177 P. 86, 89 (1918); 2 E. Kuntz, supra
note 181, § 23.23; J. LOWE, supra note 181, at 153.
188. The type of interest examined here, an interest in an oil and gas lease, is certainly an
interest in land. It entitles the owner/lessee to a share of the proceeds of exploration and
development of the land and grants the owner/lessee authorization to enter upon the land for
particular purposes. See J. LOWE, supra note 181, at 38-41.
An interest in land may be classified as real property (real estate) or as per-
sonal property; at common law, the bases for distinguishing personal from real
interests in land was duration. That is, if the interest had the duration of a
freehold estate, it was real property or real estate; if had the duration of a non-
freehold estate, it was a chattel real, a personal property interest in land.
1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 183, § 212, at 130 (footnote omitted).
The classification of an interest in an oil and gas lease or the proceeds thereof as realty or
personalty is separate from the classification of the owner/lessee's interest as corporeal or in-
corporeal. That is, the realty/personalty distinction does not depend on whether the particular
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cult. 189 The Oklahoma courts have construed the oil and gas lessee's interest
as neither real property nor personal property, but as an interest in both.
As a leasehold estate for a term of years, it is a statutory "chattel real"
state adheres to the ownership or nonownership theory. The realty/personalty distinction
turns instead on the basis of duration. Id. at 130-31; LowE, supra note 182, at 57.
Oklahoma, however, does not follow this logic. See 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra
note 183, at § 214.2 (Oklahoma courts, however, are consistent in their findings); 2 E. KuNTz,
supra note 181, at § 23.23 (discussing realty/personalty distinction in Oklahoma); see infra
note 191 and accompanying text.
189. Professor Lowe asserted that determinations of whether oil and gas rights should be
classified as either real property or personal property tend to be made "by statutory interpreta-
tion rather than by application of common law principles. Thus, in many states, perpetual
leasehold interests are not 'real property' for purposes of the taxing statutes or the judgment
lien statutes although they would be so classified by application of the common law standard."
Lowe, supra note 182, at 57-58.
This seems particularly true in Oklahoma where at various times and for various purposes
oil and gas rights are considered real property in one instance and personal property in an-
other. See Continental Supply Co. v. Marshall, 152 F.2d 300, 305-07 (10th Cir. 1945), cert
denied, 327 U.S. 803 (1946); 2 E. KuNTz, supra note 181, § 23.23, at 192-93. Professor Kuntz
writes:
In classifying the interest created by an oil and gas lease in Oklahoma, it is
necessary to take into account the exclusive right to take theory of ownership
adopted. It is clear that ownership of oil and gas does not vest in the lessee upon
the execution of a lease and such lessee does not acquire an estate in the oil and
gas, even though the granting clause purports to convey title to the oil and gas in
place. Despite statements in earlier cases that the lessee does not acquire an
interest or an estate in the land, although he does not acquire absolute title to
the oil and gas. Such interest in the land is a profit a prendre, an incorporeal
hereditament. Such an interest is said to be classified by statute as a "chattel
real." It constitutes an interest or an "estate" in land for purposes of convey-
ancing, but it is not "real estate" as that term is used in certain statutes. Thus, it
has been held that the execution and the assignment of an oil and gas lease must
comply with the statute of frauds; an assignment of a lease by a corporation is an
instrument affecting real estate and must be executed in the manner prescribed
by statutes for deeds and other instruments affecting real estate; that the lease or
an assignment or a mortgage of a lease must be acknowledged and recorded to
be valid against third persons; that an oil and gas lease on the homestead re-
quires the joint consent of husband and wife; that the owner of a lease who is in
possession may maintain an action in equity to quiet title; that the general rule
of implied warranty in the sale of chattels does not apply to an oil and gas lease;
that a lessee from the state acquires such an interest in the land that he is subject
to municipal regulation although the lessor would not be so subject.
On the other hand, it has been held that the granting of an oil and gas lease is
not a conveyance of real estate by an administrator or executor, or by a guard-
ian; that an oil and gas lease is not "real estate" within the meaning of a statute
providing for a judgment lien, and that such a lien is not created either upon the
rendering and recording of a district court judgment, or upon the filing of the
judgment for record with the county clerk; that a lease is not "real property"
within the contemplation of statutes governing partition; that a lease is not "real
property" with the meaning of statutory provision requiring that foreclosure
suits be filed in the county where the property is located; that an oil and gas
lease is not subject to ad valorem taxation as land; that the granting of an oil and
gas lease is not the granting of a corporeal interest or hereditament in the land
within the meaning of the statutes defining champerty. Probably an oil and gas
lease is not "land" within the meaning of a statute requiring appraisement of
"lands and tenements" before sale on execution.
2 E. KuNTz, supra note 181, § 23.23, at 192-93 (footnotes omitted). See also 1 H. WILLIAMS
& C. MEYERS, supra note 183, at §§ 213-213.9 (discussing consequences of realty/personalty
classification question).
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in Oklahoma... ; it is a hybrid estate deriving its legal characteristics
from both real and personal property, yet it is actually neither.190
Although logic dictates that this "chattel real" be treated as real property, 191
the Oklahoma courts have consistently treated it as personalty. Thus, Ewing
Oil's rights and interests in the Anadarko leases and the oil and gas in place
constitute personal property. 192
b. Extracted Hydrocarbons
Fortunately, once the hydrocarbons are extracted, the analysis becomes
less complicated and Ewing Oil's ownership interest easier to classify. Once
the hydrocarbons come into Ewing Oil's possession at the wellhead, they
definitely constitute personal property. 193 Ewing Oil's interest in the ex-
tracted oil and gas, therefore, represents an ownership interest in tangible
personalty. 194
190. Continental Supply Co. v. Marshall, 152 F.2d 300, 305 (10th Cir. 1945)(Murrah, J.),
cert. denied, 327 U.S. 803 (1946).
In Continental Supply, the lessee/borrower mortgaged to the bank its interest in the lease-
hold and the proceeds of the oil and gas produced and sold. Judge Murrah determined that
the borrower's interest in the oil and gas leasehold estate is an interest in real estate. Id. at 307.
Therefore, the mortgage on that particular interest should be treated as a real estate mortgage.
The same is not true, however, of the mortgage on the oil and gas produced and sold.
The mortgage on the oil and gas and their production proceeds, Judge Murrah held, was a
mortgage on "personalty not yet acquired nor in existence." Id. at 307. The mortgage on
these particular interests, therefore, constituted a chattel mortgage on "after acquired personal
property." Id.
191. As mentioned earlier, see supra note 188, at common law the distinction between
realty and personalty was one of duration. Interests conveyed for "life or longer," in the form
of a life estate or a fee interest, are classified as realty. Interests of a lesser duration are classi-
fied as personalty. Because most oil and gas leases convey interests with the potential for
perpetual duration ("This Lease shall be for a term of X years and so long thereafter as oil or
gas are produced"), these interests should be classified as realty. Lowe, supra note 182, at 57; 1
H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 183, § 215, at 173 (realty classification preferable).
192. See 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 183, § 214.2, at 166-67 ("The
Oklahoma courts have been consistent in treating interests in oil and gas, whether a severed
mineral or royalty interest or an interest arising from an oil and gas lease as personal property
rather than real property."). But see Emery, Real Property Mineral Interests in Oklahoma, 24
OKLA. L. REv. 337, 339 (1971) (stating that "real estate" or "real property" as used in any
Oklahoma statute embraces the right to oil, gas and other minerals).
193. This leaves the question of how the bank perfects its security interest in the lessee's oil
and gas related personal property.
194. Professor Kuntz explains:
Although there are differing views regarding the character of ownership of oil
and gas as they reside in the earth, there is uniformity in the conclusion that
once oil or gas is extracted from the earth, it becomes tangible personal property
and is subject to absolute ownership. Upon capture, the oil or gas becomes the
personal property of the landowner or of the person having the right to capture
the oil or gas. Where an oil and gas lessee captures the oil, it becomes his prop-
erty, unless the landowner is entitled to a specific part of the oil produced, in
which case, the landowner and the lessee own the oil jointly until a division is
made.
I E. KUNTZ, supra note 181, § 2.5, at 68-69 (footnotes omitted) (piting Carpenter v. Shaw, 134
Okla. 29, 272 P. 393, 398 (1928)); see Continental Supply Co. v. Marshall, 152 F.2d 300 (10th
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 803 (1946).
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c. Drilling and Production Equipment195
Drilling and production equipment also constitute personal property. 196
Ewing Oil's ownership interest in these items of collateral, therefore, repre-
sents an interest in personalty.
d. Contractual Agreements
Along with the original oil and gas lease agreements, Ewing Oil probably
entered into a number of other contracts in connection with the exploration
for and the production and sale of oil and gas. 19 7 The joint operating agree-
ment198 and the production sales agreement represent two of the most im-
portant of these contracts.199 Ewing Oil's interests in and rights under these
contractual agreements constitute Article Nine general intangibles. 2o
195. The category "Drilling and Production Equipment" broadly includes casing, pipes,
pumps, gathering systems, drilling rigs, and all other kinds of machinery used in connection
with production, treatment, storage, and transportation of hydrocarbons.
196. This analysis assumes that the items listed in supra note 186 are still equipment and
have not, through use on the leasehold, become fixtures. Unfortunately, the line that is crossed
when an item ceases being equipment and becomes a fixture is not a bright one. Section 9-313
of the U.C.C. offers little help since it defers to non-Code real estate law and state law has
never been particularly clear.
Nonetheless, the assumption that these items are still equipment seems an accurate one,
especially in light of the standard practices of the oil and gas industry. For example, almost all
oil and gas leases permit the lessee to remove all equipment (even the casing). Further, opera-
tors constantly move everything from pumps and separators to drilling rigs from one well to
another. See Ryan, supra note 177, at 409-10; Vagts, supra note 174, at 848-51. None of these
factors supports the idea that the equipment has become fixtures. See infra notes 197-215
(even if items were fixtures, would be secured by oil and gas mortgage).
197. See Houghton, supra note 174, at 335-40.
198. When a leasehold is concurrently owned, as is often the case, the concurrent owners
enter into an operating agreement before beginning exploration and development activities that
governs the relationship among the owners, specifies their rights and liabilities, and designates
an operator. For a discussion of operating agreements, see 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS,
supra note 183, § 503.2; 1 E. Kuwrz, supra note 181, § 17.4; Houghton, supra note 175, at
337-38; Young, Oil and Gas Operations: Who Does What to Whom, For Whom and Who Pays,
How and When, 27 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1651 (1981) (discussing AAPL Form 610 -
Model Form Operating Agreement - 1977); Kinzie & Dancy, The Statutory Oil and Gas Lien
in Oklahoma, 20 TULSA L.J. 179, 187-90 (1984) (discussing lien rights under operating
agreements).
199. See generally 4 H. WILLIAMS, supra note 183, at §§ 720-741; Houghton, supra note
174, at 338-39. Gas purchase contracts, in particular, are a law unto themselves. See, e.g.,
Milligan, Anatomy of a Gas Purchase Contract, 23 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 771 (1977);
Watson, The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and Gas Purchase Contracts, 27 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 1407 (1981); Johnson, Natural Gas Sales Contracts, 34 INST. ON OIL & GAS L.
& TAX'N 83 (1983); Conley, A Reassessment of Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey - A Case of
Temporary Convenience, 20 TULSA L.J. 519 (1985); Note, Market Value and Long Term
Purchase Contracts: Tara Petroleum Corporation v. Hughey, 17 TULSA L.J. 566 (1982); Com-
ment, A New Dimension in the Ratable Taking of Natural Gas in Oklahoma: Enrolled House
Bill 1221, 20 TULSA L.J. 77 (1984).
200. U.C.C. § 9-106 provides:
"General Intangibles" means any personal property, including things in ac-
tion, other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments and
money. All rights to payment earned or unearned under a charter or other
contract involving the use or hire of a vessel and all rights incident to the charter
or contract are accounts.
U.C.C. § 9-106 (OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 9-106 (1985)). Unless otherwise specified, all cita-
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e. Proceeds of Production
When the purchaser takes the oil and gas produced from the leasehold
estate, the lessee has a right to be paid. The U.C.C. classifies this right as an
account.20 1 In effect, the sale of production ripens some of Ewing Oil's gen-
eral intangibles into accounts.20 2
Along with the oil and gas leasehold estate, production proceeds typically
constitute the most valuable item of collateral. 20 3 Hydrocarbons, however,
are a finite resource. As such, their production decreases the reserve base
supporting the loan. Lenders seeking to ensure that these accounts are used
to pay loan debt typically require the borrower to assign to the lender the
right to receive these account payments directly from the purchasers. 2°4 In
that way, Penn Square Bank can ensure that Ewing Oil production proceeds
help retire Ewing Oil's Penn Square debt. 20 5
tions to the Uniform Commercial Code shall be to the U.C.C. as amended by the 1972 Amend-
ments.
Prior to the adoption of the 1972 Amendments, Ewing Oil's interests and rights in the sales
contracts and many other agreements were classified as contract rights. U.C.C. § 9-106 (1961
Code). For example, the producer who is a party to a gas purchase contract has a right to
receive payment when gas is sold. Until the sale occurs, all the producer has are contractual
expectations. The 1972 Amendments, however, deleted the contract rights classification and
thereby incorporated these contractual expectations into the classification of general in-
tangibles. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 22-8, at 893 (2d ed. 1980) (general intangibles is "catchall" category).
201. U.C.C. § 9-106 (OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 9-106 (1985)). Section 9-106 defines an ac-
count as follows:
"Account" means any right to payment for goods sold or leased or for serv-
ices rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper, whether
or not it has been earned by performance.
U.C.C. § 9-106.
202. Ryan, supra note 177, at 396 (lessee's rights change from contract rights into accounts
when gas is sold and delivered).
203. And, therefore, the lessee's interests in and rights to the hydrocarbons in the ground.
204. Through an assignment of production, the borrower assigns to the lender the
oil, gas, and other minerals produced, saved, and sold from the mortgaged prop-
erty and authorizes and directs any purchaser of such production to pay to the
lender the amounts due to be paid for such production. This is not a contingent
assignment which becomes effective only after default but is a currently effective
assignment, the basic premise in oil and gas loans being that the proceeds cur-
rently received by the lender will be available for use and will be used to retire
the loan.
Johnson, Legal Aspects of Oil and Gas Financing, 9 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 141, 158-
59 (1958); Vagts, supra note 174, at 845-46; Hoagland, A Form of Mortgage and Assignment of
Oil and Gas Production, 34 DICTA 226 (1957); Clark & Sachs, supra note 177, at 157 ("The
usual pattern in production payment financing is for the bank to take an assignment of pro-
ceeds of production and to execute transfer and division orders providing for payment of the
specified cash proceeds directly to the bank until the indebtedness is satisfied.").
205. The purchasers of production are usually authorized and instructed to pay the bank
directly. As these payments are received, they are deposited in a collateral collection account.
Monthly, if the amounts in the collateral collection account total or exceed a specified amount,
then the lender transfers to the borrower's deposit account a specified portion (10% to 20%) of
the total proceeds for operating expenses. The remainder of the funds are emptied from the
collateral collection account and applied toward the loan indebtedness. Baker, Real and Per-
sonal Property Aspects of Secured Financing in the Oil and Gas Industry, OKLA. CITY U./CLE
BANKING LAW 45, 52-53 (1982).
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2 Penn Square's Perfection - The Oklahoma UC.C
a. The Realty/Personalty Distinction
After classifying each of these property interests, Penn Square must deter-
mine how to secure this lending transaction. In particular, Penn Square
wants to be certain that it has created and perfected a security interest in the
two most valuable items of collateral: the leasehold estate and the produc-
tion proceeds. Moreover, the bank wants the additional protection of having
the production proceeds paid directly to it and not to the borrower.
As demonstrated above, all the property interests collateralizing the loan,
even the chattel real interest in the oil and gas leases, are personalty. 2°6
Therefore, Article Nine of the U.C.C., which governs the creation and
perfection of security interests in most items of personal property, should
govern all aspects of the Ewing Oil loan transaction. 20 7 That is not the case,
however, in Oklahoma. As previously mentioned, the Oklahoma courts con-
sistently classify the lessee's interests in oil and gas and the production pro-
ceeds therefrom as personalty. 20 For financing purposes, however, they
consistently treat these same interests as realty. 2°9 The courts reason that
the oil and gas leasehold estate and production proceeds are so related to
and identified with real estate that a security interest in that leasehold and an
assignment of those proceeds fall within the scope of those statutes requiring
"interests in" or instruments "relating to" real estate to be recorded as real
estate. 210 As a result, even though all the items of collateral are technically
206. See supra text accompanying notes 181-205 (discussing classification of collateral.
207. U.C.C. § 9-102(1), (2) provides:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-104 on excluded transactions, this
article applies:
(a) to any transaction, regardless of its form, which is intended to create a
security interest in personal property or fixtures including goods, documents,
instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper or accounts; and also
(b) to any sale of accounts or chattel paper.
(2) This article applies to security interests created by contract including pledge,
assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, conditional sale, trust receipt, other
lien or title retention contract and lease or consignment intended as security....
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 9-102 (1) & (2) (1985).
208. See supra in notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Continental Supply Co. v. Marshall, 152 F.2d 300, 307 (10th Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 327 U.S. 803 (1946); Davis v. Lewis, 187 Okla. 91, 100 P.2d 994 (1940). See also
Comment, Uniform Commercial Code - § 9-401 - Perfection of Security Interests in Miner-
als, Including Oil and Gas, Requires Real Estate Filing in Oklahoma, 17 TULSA L.J. 171, 172-
72 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Tulsa Comment].
210. In Continental Supply Co. v. Marshall, 52 F. Supp. 717 (W.D. Okla. 1943), rev'd, 152
F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 803 (1946), the district court held that a
mortgage of a lessee's interest in an oil and gas lease was governed by Oklahoma's mortgage
statute, which required "[e]very instrument purporting to be an absolute or qualified convey-
ance of real estate or any interest therein, but intended to be defeasible or as security for the
payment of money, shall be deemed a mortgage and must be recorded and foreclosed as such."
Id. at 721 (quoting Okla. Stat. tit. 46, § 1 (1941) (statute still in effect) (emphasis added)). On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed this portion of the district court's decision although it ap-
peared to base its conclusion on another Oklahoma statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 16, § 15 (1941),
which provides that "no deed, mortgage, contract, bond, lease or other instrument relating to
real estate.., shall be valid as against third parties unless acknowledged as herein provided."
Id. (emphasis added) (statute still in effect). The Tenth Circuit held that under this statute a
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personalty, the lender has to create and perfect its security interest in the
most valuable items of collateral as if they were realty. 211
Thus, under the U.C.C. (as adopted by Oklahoma in 1961) and non-
U.C.C. state mortgage law, Penn Square had to bifurcate the perfection pro-
cess to secure all the Ewing Oil loan collateral. To perfect its interest in
Ewing Oil's leasehold estate and production proceeds, Penn Square had to
record a mortgage on those interests in the county land records where Ewing
Oil's leasehold estate was located.2 12 To secure the remainder of the collat-
eral, the bank had to file a separate financing statement in the state's central
filing office in accordance with Article Nine.2 13
This dichotomy of perfection under both 1961 U.C.C. and non-U.C.C.
law, particularly as it related to the security interest in the accounts (produc-
tion proceeds) and the assignment to the bank of those accounts, created
doubt about whether Article Nine or state mortgage law governed the crea-
tion and perfection of the security interests in the proceeds and their assign-
ment to the bank.2 14 As a practical solution, most banks filed a combination
mortgage and financing statement in both the county clerk's office and the
state's central filing office. 21 5 Because of this doubt, a bank would not only
make dual filings, recording its security interest in certain items of collateral
in one place and filing its security interest in other items elsewhere, but it
would also perfect its security interest in particular items of collateral by
filing in both places. Oklahoma resolved this doubt when it adopted the
1972 Amendments to the U.C.C.
b. Oklahoma's 1972 Amendments to the U.C.C.
Oklahoma's 1972 Amendments to the U.C.C. greatly simplified the
mortgage of an oil and gas lease must be recorded as a real estate mortgage to give notice to
third parties. 152 F.2d at 306.
Similarly, in an earlier case, Stone v. Wright, 75 F.2d 457, 460 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 295
U.S. 754 (1935), the Tenth Circuit found that an assignment of money to be paid out of the
proceeds of an undivided working interest, although not a conveyance of an interest in real
estate, was so related to real estate as to be a proper instrument for recording under Okla. Stat.
§ 9672 (1931) (now Okla. Stat. tit. 16, § 15 (1985)).
These decisions conform to the Oklahoma Supreme Court's holding in Davis v. Lewis, 187
Okla. 91, 94, 100 P.2d 994, 997 (1940), that an assignment of proceeds of a working interest
was an" 'instrument relating to real estate' and was required to be acknowledged and recorded
in order to be valid as to third persons under the law on the subject of recording." See Tulsa
Comment, supra note 209, at 173-75.
211. See Tulsa Comment, supra note 209, at 173-75.
212. See Ryan, supra note 177; Vagts, supra note 174; Tulsa Comment, supra note 209, at
171-75.
This is equally true of the assignment of production. It must be recorded in the county land
records of the counties where the leasehold estate is located. Normally, the mortgage and the
assignment are combined in one instrument.
213. Tulsa Comment, supra note 209, at 171-75.
214. Ryan, supra note 177, at 417-18; Tulsa Comment, supra note 209, at 174-75.
215. The debtor usually executed a single document denominated as a Mortgage, Security
Agreement, Financing Statement and Assignment that was recorded both locally and cen-
trally. Perhaps because of this prudent practice, no Oklahoma court ever addressed the issue
of whether assignments of production and production payments were governed by the U.C.C.
See id.; see also Baker, supra note 205, at 57 (form of Mortgage, Deed of Trust, Security
Agreement, Financing Statement and Assignment).
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lender's task of securing an oil and gas loan. The Oklahoma U.C.C. 216 now
specifies that the proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest in
all of the above Ewing Oil property interests is where the real estate mort-
gage would be recorded. 217 The Oklahoma U.C.C. further provides:
When a writing constituting a mortgage upon lands, or interests in
lands such as oil and gas leasehold estates, also covers minerals to be
severed from such lands, equipment used in mining, storing, treating
and marketing such minerals and the accounts and proceeds to be de-
rived from disposition of such minerals contains a legal description of
such lands sufficient to comply with [the Oklahoma real estate mort-
gage statutes], has been validly executed, acknowledged and recorded in
the office of the County Clerk for the county in which such lands are
located, such mortgage shall constitute a financing statement covering
such collateral and no other filing or recording shall be required to per-
fect such security interests in such collateral covered by the mortgage.
The mortgage shall remain effective to perfect such security interests
until it shall be released or satisfied of record or its effectiveness as to
lands or other interests in lands described therein shall be otherwise
effectively terminated.218
Under the Oklahoma U.C.C., a mortgage on the borrower's realty inter-
ests219 also perfects the bank's security interest in the borrower's intangible
and tangible personal property ownership interests in extracted oil and gas,
equipment, and accounts. 220
Oklahoma thus simplified perfection by allowing a mortgage of realty to
secure the bank's interest in property that formerly required perfection as
chattels or personalty. 221 Oklahoma no longer requires central filing or dual
filing. The recording of a single document 222 in the county real estate
records perfects the bank's security interest in all of the borrower's oil and
gas related collateral. 223
In effect, the Oklahoma U.C.C. has specified that all oil and gas related
interests are to be treated like realty. Therefore, non-U.C.C. Oklahoma
mortgage law governs the creation and perfection of a lien against or a secur-
216. Commercial Code - Modifications - Transitional Provisions, ch. 194, 1981 Okla.
Sess. Laws (to be codified in scattered sections of Okla. Stat. tit. 12A).
217. U.C.C. § 9-401 (l)(b) provides:
(1) The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as follows:
(b) when the collateral is timber to be cut or is minerals or the like, including
oil and gas, or accounts subject to subsection (5) of section 9-103(1) of this
title... then in the office where a mortgage on real estate would be filed or
recorded.
U.C.C. § 9-401(l)(b).
218. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 9-402(5) (1985). The language of Oklahoma's U.C.C. § 9-
402(5) is somewhat different and therefore more comprehensive than the Model U.C.C.'s § 9-
402(5).
219. Or, at least for perfection purposes, those personal property interests such as the chat-
tel real that are treated like real property interests.
220. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 9-402(5) (1985).
221. Id.; see Tulsa Comment, supra note 209, at 175-77.
222. Typically, that document is a combination Mortgage, Deed of Trust, Security Agree-
ment, Financing Statement and Assignment. Baker, supra note 205.
223. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 9-402(5) (1985).
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ity interest in these realty interests.224
C. Applicability of the U C C - The Participation
Once the parties execute the loan documents, disburse the funds, record
the security documents and sign the participation agreement, the following
questions are raised: Must the Penn Square participant now record its par-
ticipation interest? Does Article Nine apply to the participation transaction?
Has the participant purchased an interest that it must perfect to protect it-
self? Regardless of whether the Penn Square participations were structured
as sales or loans, 225 Article Nine did not apply to the Penn Square energy
loan participation transactions and the participant did not need to perfect its
interest in the loans.
1. The Participation as a Sale
Article Nine governs the creation of security interests; it is completely
inapplicable to sales, including the sale of loans. 226 And for very good busi-
ness reasons, banks, both leads and participants, rarely structure participa-
tions as loans.227 In this respect, Penn Square and its participants followed
the norm. 228
Undeniably, the Penn Square participation transactions constituted out-
right sales of interests in the underlying oil and gas loans. 229 In the Ewing
Oil participation example, Penn Square does not sell Ewing Oil's chattel pa-
per nor does it simply factor Ewing Oil's accounts receivable. Instead, the
Oklahoma bank sells the participant a property interest in the Ewing Oil
loan debt and the collateral pledged to secure that debt.
As official comment Four to U.C.C. § 9-102 states, Article Nine is inappli-
cable "to a sale of the note by the mortgagee [Penn Square], even though the
mortgage continues to secure the note.1230 Article Nine, therefore, does not
224. U.C.C. § 9-104(j) specifies that Article 9 does not apply to "the creation or transfer of
an interest in or lien on real estate, including a lease or rents thereunder." See also Official
Comment 4, U.C.C. § 9-102 (Article 9 inapplicable to creation of real estate mortgage); Vagts,
supra note 174, at 840-41.
225. The Penn Square participations were definitely sales and purchases.
226. See U.C.C. § 9-102 official comment 4.
227. For example, the lead bank does not want to look like a debtor in its financial state-
ments as a result of the participation. Nor does the participant want to compound its risk by
making a loan to one party (the lead) that in turn depends on that party's loan to another (the
underlying loan).
228. It is doubtful that Continental Illinois, when it was purchasing all of its participations,
thought it was making over a billion dollars worth of loans to a small shopping mall bank.
229. Indeed none of the parties involved in the Penn Square litigation characterized the
Penn Square participations as anything other than a sale. The focus of the dispute is on the
nature of the interests sold.
230. Official comment Four to U.C.C. § 9-102 states the following:
The owner of Blackacre borrows $10,000 from his neighbor, and secures his
note by a mortgage on Blackacre. This Article [Article Nine] is not applicable
to the creation of the real estate mortgage. Nor is it applicable to the creation of
the real estate mortgage. Nor is it applicable to a sale of the note by the mortga-
gee, even though the mortgage continues to secure the note.
U.C.C. § 9-102 official comment 4.
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apply to the Penn Square participation transactions nor does it require the
participant to perfect its interest.
2. The Participation as a Loan
Even assuming that the Penn Square participations, instead of being sales
and assignments of interests in the underlying loans, were actually loans
themselves, with the participant's extension of credit to Penn Square based
on Penn Square's pledge of the underlying oil and gas loan as security, the
outcome remains the same. Article Nine still does not apply. The reasoning
for this result is best demonstrated by assuming that Penn Square pledged
the Ewing Oil note and mortgage as collateral for the participation.
All items of the Ewing Oil collateral, both real231 and personal, tangible
and intangible, stem directly from the rights and interests in the oil and gas
lease and the production of oil and gas thereunder. Many of these items of
personalty, existing apart from an Oklahoma oil and gas loan, would require
a filing under Article Nine in order to perfect the participant's interest if
sold, assigned, or pledged to a participant. 232 Under the Oklahoma U.C.C.,
however, the Ewing Oil loan participation transaction does not require an
Article Nine filing.
For perfection purposes, the Oklahoma U.C.C. scheme expressly treats all
the oil and gas related collateral as interests in realty. Thus, recording a
mortgage in the real estate records of the counties where the oil and gas
leasehold estate is located all the collateral.233 By its own terms, Article
Nine does not govern the creation, perfection, or enforcement of security
interests in real property.234 Therefore, Article Nine does not govern the
sale, assignment, and pledge of security interests in real property.235 As a
result, Article Nine does not govern the sale, assignment, or pledge of secur-
ity interests in oil and gas related collateral. Article Nine expressly excludes
the conveyance to the participant of Penn Square's security interest in the
Ewing Oil collateral.236 The participant, therefore, is not the assignee of an
231. Technically, none of the Ewing Oil interests is realty. Nevertheless, Oklahoma's deci-
sional law and Article 9 (§ 9-402(5)) treat many of these interests as realty.
232. The sale, assignment, or pledge of non-oil and gas accounts, for example, requires the
purchaser (the participant) to perfect its interest as against the seller (the lead) by filing a
financing statement evidencing the transaction and the purchaser's interest. See U.C.C. § 9-
405.
233. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 9-402(5)(1985) (discussed supra notes 218-224 and accompa-
nying text).
234. U.C.C. § 9-104). See also Stahl, Loan Participations: Lead Insolvency and Partici-
pants' Rights (Part I), 94 BANKING L.J. 882, 892-93 (1977).
235. U.C.C. § 9-102 official comment 4.
236. Indeed, this is the express result under the Oklahoma U.C.C. § 9-405(2). Again
Oklahoma's § 9-405(2) differs from the Model U.C.C. This Oklahoma U.C.C. section which
requires that all assignments of security interests be evidenced by the filing of a financing
statement adds a second paragraph which provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of the subsection of assignment of record of a
security interest contained in a mortgage as provided in subsection (5) or (6) of
Section 9-402 of this title may be made only by an assignment of the mortgage in
the manner provided by the law of this state other than this act.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 9-405(2) (1985).
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interest that must be recorded in accordance with Article Nine.237
On this point, official comment 4 to U.C.C. § 9-102, which indicates that
Article 9 applies to the security interest created in the note and mortgage,
has misled some commentators, most notable Messrs. Drake and Weems. 238
These commentators argue that, taken together, the pledge of the note and
mortgage of realty interests suddenly becomes a pledge of a general intangi-
ble, which requires Article Nine perfection.239 The proponents of this the-
ory confuse the pledge of a note and mortgage of personalty interests (i.e.,
chattel paper) with the pledge of a note and mortgage of realty.24 ' In addi-
tion to its analytical shortcomings, this argument completely lacks a founda-
tion in light of the U.C.C.'s express disclaimer of any effect on security
interests in real property.241
Over twenty years ago, in an article discussing participations and other
topics on the "outer fringes of Article 9,11242 Messrs. Peter Coogan, Homer
Kripke and Fredric Weiss addressed the issue of whether Article Nine "re-
quires a filing to perfect a pledge of a note secured by a real estate mort-
gage." 243 They reviewed both official comment 4 to U.C.C. § 9-102(3) and
the Drake and Weems' theory considering the overall structure, language
and intent of the U.C.C. and concluded that this view is incorrect. 244
237. See infra notes 238-252 and accompanying text.
238. Drake & Weems, Mortgage Loan Participationm The Trustee's Attack, 52 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 23 (1978).
239. Id. at 46. "The trustee in bankruptcy would contend that the promissory notes and
mortgages given by the original mortgagors taken together constitute a general intangible as
envisioned by Article Nine." Id.
240. Drake and Weems rely heavily on their analogy of the note and real estate mortgage
to chattel paper. This analogy, in my view, should not be made.
241. In short, Drake and Weems misinterpret the U.C.C. Drake and Weems's very percep-
tion of participation transactions and the participation process troubles this author. In their
view, all participations are nothing more than loans by the participant to the lead and the
participation in In re Alda Commercial Corp. represents all participation arrangements in gen-
eral. Drake & Weems, supra note 238. As demonstrated above, Alda certainly does not repre-
sent the participation norm; as demonstrated below, Drake and Weems' interpretation of the
U.C.C. is wrong.
242. Coogan, Kripke & Weiss, The Outer Fringes of Article 9: Subordination Agreements,
Security Interests in Money and Deposits, Negative Pledge Clauses, and Participation Agree-
ments, 79 HARV. L. REV. 229 (1965) reprinted in revised form in 1 C. P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN,
D. VAGTS & J. McDONNELL, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE § 23, at 2345 (1985).
243. 79 HARV. L. REV. at 231.
244. Id. at 270-71. In discussing arguments identical to those raised by Drake and Weems,
Coogan, Kripke, and Weiss state:
Insofar as we understand the argument.., it rests on two separate bases:
(a) The persons demanding clarification argue that, even though Section 9-
104(j) excludes from the Code the transfer of an interest in or lien on real estate,
the matter is not clear because of three facts: the real estate mortgage is itself
personal property, presumably a general intangible; the pledge of the note is
expressly brought under article 9 by Section 9-102(3); and Official Comment 4
to that section specifically states that article 9 is applicable to the security inter-
est created in the note and mortgage. (b) Another argument is that the note
and the real estate mortgage together are something more than they are sepa-
rately. Just as a note and chattel mortgage together constitute a new form of
collateral to which the Code applies the title "chattel paper" and for which it
sets special rules, so the note and real estate mortgage together may constitute a
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The clear intent of section 9-104(j) to exclude transfers of liens on real
estate would be completely nullified if the argument were accepted that
the lien, as a form of wealth, is personal property, a security interest in
which is subject to article 9. Likewise, we feel that the argument that a
note and real estate collateral could, in combination, be a general intan-
gible under the Code is inconsistent with the fact that, when the Code
intended to give special status to a combination of this nature (the chat-
tel paper case) it expressly provided for it. If the [Drake and Weems]
theory ... were sound, it would apparently drag back into the Code all
the other matters excluded by Section 9-104, when transferred with a
note for which they were collateral. There is, in our opinion, no danger
that a court could read the statute in any such fashion. Because of the
express language of Section 9-104(j), we do not feel that Official Com-
ment 4 to Section 9-102 should cause any real confusion or
doubt .... 245
The clear intent of U.C.C. § 9-14() is to exclude the creation and perfec-
tion of security interests in realty.246 The Oklahoma U.C.C. treats oil and
gas rights and interests as realty. To argue that a note secured by an oil and
gas mortgage becomes a general intangible like chattel paper ignores the ex-
press intent and language of Article Nine.
This analysis indicates that even in the unlikely event that the parties ex-
pressly contracted for a loan from the participant to the lead, with an oil and
gas loan as security for the participant's extension of credit, Oklahoma law
does not require the participant to make an Article Nine filing in order to
perfect its security interest in the collateral. More importantly, this analysis
also demonstrates that, in the much more probable event that the lead con-
tracted to sell the participant an interest in the oil and gas loan, as in the
Penn Square transactions, Article Nine still does not apply. In neither case
does the Oklahoma U.C.C. require the participant to make a central filing
evidencing and perfecting its interest in the oil and gas loan debt and
collateral.
The primary focus for determining the character of a participation trans-
action is, and should be, the intent of the parties and the language of the
contract. 247 In the Penn Square participation transactions, both the intent
of the banks and the language of the agreements support the classification of
these participations as sales and assignments of the loan debt and collateral.
Further, a review of the Oklahoma U.C.C. shows that Article Nine does not
"general intangible," which is defined to include all personal property not other-
wise classified, if either of the arguments is sound, a security interest in the
mortgage could be perfected only by filing.
We are satisfied that this view is unduly fearful.
Id. (footnote omitted)(emphasis in original).
245. Id. at 271 (footnotes omitted). The authors note that this view also applies to collat-
eral consisting of real estate leases or rents thereunder, either alone or in connection with a real
estate mortgage. Id. at 271 n.80. I think it fair to conclude, therefore, that their view also
applies to Oklahoma oil and gas leasehold interests and assignments of production. See supra
notes 182-212 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 222-41 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 222-41.
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require the participant to file a financing statement in the state's central filing
records in order to protect its interest. But what happens in the event of the
lead's insolvency? By failing to make a filing, Article Nine or otherwise, 248
can the lead's receiver avoid the participant's interest in the participated
loan? In answering these questions, a review of the result under the Bank-
ruptcy Code proves quite useful.
The Bankruptcy Code by its own terms does not govern the liquidation of
failed banks249 and should not automatically (and unthinkingly) apply to a
failed bank's receivership administration. 250 Even if the courts do not di-
rectly apply the Bankruptcy Code in administering bank insolvencies, how-
ever, they definitely resolve liquidation disputes according to many of the
same notions and principles that provide the theoretical underpinnings for
the Bankruptcy Code. 251 Accordingly, a review of whether the Bankruptcy
Code would require the Penn Square participant to perfect the ownership
interest assigned to it in order to withstand the strong-arm provisions of the
trustee252 proves helpful in answering this question..
D. The Effect of the Bankruptcy Code on Participations
When Penn Square sold a participation in a loan to another bank, it essen-
tially transferred an ownership interest in that loan. Although Penn Square
retained possession of the loan documents and security agreements, it trans-
ferred an equitable ownership interest in the loan debt and collateral to the
upstream bank through the participation. 253 The terms of the participation
contracts specifically required that Penn Square hold for the participant's
benefit its pro rata portion of the loan debt and collateral in return for the
participant's funding.254
Both the intent of the parties and the structure of the contracts indicate
sales and purchases of interests in loans. The participants owned their por-
tions of the loans, thus, Penn Square retained legal title to the entire loan,
but assigned the beneficial ownership of the participated portion of the loan
to the participant. 255 Once the loan is participated, the participated portion
of the loan is no longer an asset of the lead bank, but an asset of the partici-
pant.25 6 At the time of Penn Square's insolvency, Penn Square no longer
248. None of the Penn Square participants ever filed or recorded any document evidencing
its participation in a loan.
249. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1985) (excluding banks from coverage of Bankruptcy Code).
250. See supra notes 22-72 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 52-72 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's decision in
Scott v. Armstrong).
252. This section assumes that the receiver of a national bank (the FDIC) has the avoiding
powers accorded a bankruptcy trustee under the Bankruptcy Code, particularly those of 11
U.S.C. §§ 544 and 547 (1988).
253. See supra notes 73-103 and accompanying text.
254. Id.
255. For support of the proposition that the participant is the beneficial owner of its pro
rata portion of the underlying loan, see notes 73-165, 284-427 and accompanying text. See also
MacDonald, Loan Participations as Enforceable Rights in Bankruptcy - A Reply to the
Trustee's Attack, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 35 (1979).
256. In many participation transactions, for practical business reasons the participated por-
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fully and completely owned the participated portions of the loans. Instead
the participants equitably owned them.257
As a general rule, the trustee or receiver of a debtor succeeds only to the
titles and rights that the debtor possessed at the time of its insolvency. 258
tion of the loan must be characterized in the financial records of both the lead and participant
as an asset belonging to the participant. For example, assume that the total amount of the
underlying loan exceeds the lead bank's legal lending limit. If the lead bank classifies the entire
loan as its asset, then it violates applicable banking laws.
Another more compelling reason for treating participations in general and the Penn Square
participations in particular as assets of the participant concerns both the legal lending and
borrowing limits imposed on Penn Square and the legal lending limits imposed on the partici-
pant banks. Penn Square originated over $2 billion in energy loans. The vast majority of these
loans were participated to upstream banks. Typically, 90% to even 100% of an underlying
loan was sold to a participant. If Penn Square were required to show that it owned a loan
portfolio of over $2 billion on its financial statements, then Penn Square most assuredly would
have violated its lending limits. Further, if Penn Square were required to classify the $2 billion
in participations as money that it borrowed from other banks, then the Oklahoma bank also
would have violated its borrowing limits. Finally, if the participants were required to classify
participations as million of dollars of loans to Penn Square Bank on their financial statements
the, then at least some of the participants, Hibernia National Bank in New Orleans for exam-
ple, would have violated their legal lending limits. It is uncertain whether Continental Illinois
could have loaned over $1 billion to Penn Square Bank without violating its lending limits. I
do know, however, that Penn Square could not have legally borrowed that amount from the
Chicago bank. Moreover, this point about bank lending and borrowing limits complements
and reinforces the expectation of ownership that all the parties, both Penn Square and its
participant banks, brought to the participation relationship.
257. See McDonald, supra note 255, at 37-51 (citing G. GLENN, MORTGAGES § 317 (1943)
at 37 n.7). In discussing mortgage participations, Glenn writes:
We have learned that the mortgagee [Penn Square] can create a trust in his
security in simple form or by way of participation certificates .... To adopt a
broader terminology, we have here the partial assignment of a chose in action;
and our present case is governed by the rules that have been worked out as to
that phenomenon.
The first of these rules was presented above. When one sells a share of inter-
est in a mortgage, two things are apparent as to the intention of the parties.
First, no specific part of debt or mortgage is allocated to the purchase, and so he
gets an undivided share, as tenant in common with the mortgagee-assignor.
Needless to say, this undivided share is a vested right and so it will survive the
bankruptcy of the mortgagee or assignee indefinitely ....
Whatever may be the order of sharing, however, one thing is clear as to the
mortgage and its proceeds. The mortgagee who has transferred an interest in
the security holds the proceeds of collection as trustee of his partial assignee to
the extent of the latter's interest, and is accountable accordingly.
Id. (emphasis in original).
In essence, the participation transactions established a constructive trust for the benefit of
the participant. Penn Square, as lead bank, was obligated to receive and pass along to the
participant, as beneficial owner, the participant's pro rata share of all monies applied toward
payment of the participated loan. See McDonald. supra note 255, at 40-43; 1 A ScoTT, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS § 16, at 162 (3d ed. 1967) (If assignor authorized by assignee to collect entire
claim then turn over to assignee its proceeds, then assignor is express trustee of proceeds,
although no formal trust arrangement). Thus, Penn Square's participants were the equitable
owners of the participated portions of the loans that they purchased from the Oklahoma bank.
258. Professor Scott states:
A partial assignee of a chose in action, like the beneficiary of a trust of a chose in
action, has an equitable interest in the chose in action, and not merely a personal
claim against the assignor. Thus, the partial assignee prevails over the general
creditors of the assignor, and if the assignor becomes bankrupt, the partial as-
signee is entitled to his share of the chose in action and is not relegated to the
position of a general creditor of the assignor.
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Accordingly, Penn Square's receiver succeeded only to the legal title of the
participated portions of the loans since Penn Square owned only that when it
failed. 2 5 9
This represents a well-established rule and, not surprisingly, is codified in
the Bankruptcy Code. Section 541(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
Property in which the debtor holds, as of the commencement of the
case, only legal title and not an equitable interest, such as a mortgage
secured by real property, or an interest in such a mortgage, sold by the
debtor but as to which the debtor retains legal title to service or super-
vise the servicing of such mortgage or interest, becomes property of the
estate under subsection (a)(1) or (2) of this section only to the extent of
the debtor's legal title to such property, but not to the extent of any
equitable interest in such property that the debtor does not hold.26 °
Section 541(d) clearly recognizes the participant's ownership interest in the
underlying loan. Moreover, it states with clarity that the participant's por-
tion of the loan does not comprise a part of the debtor's estate. 261
Indeed, § 541(d)'s legislative purpose involves protecting the secondary
mortgage market,262 which resembles the Penn Square loan participations.
In describing the purpose of § 541(d), Collier's states:
It is expressly provided that the property interests included in the
estate pursuant to subsection (d) include a mortgage secured by real
property, or an interest in such a mortgage, sold by the debtor but as to
which the debtor retains legal title in order to service or supervise the
servicing of the mortgage or interest. Subsection (d), therefore, con-
firms the former status under the [Bankruptcy] Act of bona fide secon-
dary mortgage market transactions as the purchase and sale of assets.
Mortgages or interests in mortgages which are sold in the secondary
market should not be considered as property of the debtor's estate. The
seller may frequently retain mortgage notes and related documents in
the interest of the efficient servicing of the mortgages or interests in
mortgages. And the purchaser might not record his ownership of the
mortgages or interests in mortgages under state recording statutes.
Pursuant to section 541(d) the seller's retention of the mortgage docu-
ments and the failure of the purchaser to record will not impair the
asset sale character of the secondary mortgage market transactions.
Neither of these factors will change any obligation of the trustee to turn
the mortgages or interests in mortgages over to the purchaser. 263
Collier's concludes with the observation that the characterization of the
I A. ScoTT, supra note 257, § 16, at 160. See also W. ALDERSON, A PRACTICAL TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF RECEIVERS 214 (1905).
Penn Square's receivership estate, therefore, excludes the portions of loans participated to
and owned by other banks.
259. Id.
260. 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (1988); see In re Columbia Pac. Mortgage, Inc., 20 Bankr. 259,
261-62 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1981) (holders of participation certificates are beneficial owners of
undivided interest in underlying loan.).
261. 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (1985); see also 4 COLLIER ON BANKRU'TCY § 541.24 (15th ed.
1985); 3 Bankr. - L. Ed., Code Commentary and Analysis § 23:4 (1979).
262. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 541(d) (15th ed. 1985).
263. Id. at 541-105, -106 (footnotes omitted) (discussing legislative intent behind § 541(d)).
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lead-participant relationship is irrelevant because the outcome remains the
same. The participant's ownership interest is unaffected.
The application of § 541(d) to secondary mortgage market transac-
tions will not be affected by the terms of the servicing agreement be-
tween the purchaser and the mortgage servicer. It makes no difference
whether the parties characterize their relationship, for example, as one
of trust, agency, or independent contractor. Whatever the characteriza-
tion adopted by the parties, it will not affect the status in bankruptcy of
bona fide mortgage market purchases and sales.264
Congress understood the purposes and mechanics of participation transac-
tions and recognized the possible damages if the trustee in bankruptcy could
avoid the participants' ownership interests.265 Congress crafted Section
541(d), therefore, with particularity and with the intent of ensuring that the
economically important secondary mortgage market remain undisturbed by
the Bankruptcy Code. The statute and the intent are clear-the Bankruptcy
Code does not affect the participants' interests in the underlying loans.
Whether one views the Penn Square Bank transactions as a sale or as a
loan, Article Nine is inapplicable. The nature of the judicial construction of
Oklahoma oil and gas rights and Oklahoma's adoption of the 1972 amend-
ments to the U.C.C., which aimed to simplify the mechanics of oil and gas
finance, expressly remove the creation, perfection, and assignment of secur-
ity interests in oil and gas collateral from the control of Article Nine. This is
particularly clear when, as in the Penn Square transactions, the parties struc-
ture and intend the participations to be sales and purchases. Article Nine
simply does not apply.
Just as Article Nine has no affect on the participation transaction, the
Bankruptcy Code does not disturb the interests of the participants. Con-
gress clearly intended to protect the participants and the participation mar-
ket. The litmus test indicates that Article Nine does not require energy loan
participants to perfect the interests they purchase from the lead bank. More-
over, even without the benefit of such perfection, the transactions and the
participants' interests withstand the acid test of bankruptcy.
V. THE MADEMOISELLE DECISION
Prior to the Penn Square cases, FDIC v. Mademoiselle of California266
represented the only reported decision concerning borrower/depositor setoff
against participated loans. In Mademoiselle the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the borrower/depositor still had a right of setoff even when
the lead had sold an interest in the loan to a participant.267 But Mademoi-
selle, like Scott, 268 was not grounded on traditional legal principles. Instead,
264. Id. at 541-106 (footnotes omitted).
265. For a portion of the legislative history of § 541(d) See supra note 136.
266. 379 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1967).
267. Id. at 664; see also Essay, supra note 6, at 268.
268. Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U.S. 499 (1892).
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the Ninth Circuit in Mademoiselle based its decision primarily on a number
of equities believed to favor the borrower.
In Mademoiselle San Francisco National Bank loaned Mademoiselle of
California $60,000 and later sold and assigned an eighty percent participa-
tion interest in the Mademoiselle note to Union Bank. 269 Mademoiselle
never learned of the participation 270 and when San Francisco National was
declared insolvent, Mademoiselle sought to set off the amount of its deposit
account at San Francisco National against its indebtedness remaining on the
loan. 27 1 Union Bank sought to prevent the setoff by arguing that its owner-
ship of an undivided portion of the loan debt deprived the debts between
Mademoiselle and San Francisco National of their mutuality.272 While the
court recognized the general principle that a separate debt cannot be set off
against the property of another, it nevertheless concluded that the extraordi-
nary circumstances created by a bank insolvency may necessitate findings
that are not dictated by general legal principles. 273
In upholding Mademoiselle's setoff, the court explained:
269. 379 F.2d at 661. Although the participation certificate did not explicitly state the
legal relationship it created, the parties and the court characterized the participation as a sale
and assignment. Id. at 664. The participation certificate provided as follows:
SAN FRANCISCO NATIONAL BANK, San Francisco, California hereby
certifies that UNION BANK has a participation of $46,400.00 being a portion
of the following described note made payable to the order of SAN FRAN-
CISCO NATIONAL BANK





Interest accruing on the Participation amount from date of this agreement at the
rate of seven percent per annum is due monthly - have deposited with us as
pledgeholder the following collateral in which - has a pro rata interest to the
amount of their participation:
Guarantors: Nancy Wieger and Wendell R. Carlson No withdrawals, substitutions,
releases of collateral or extensions, renewals or. compromises of the note or releases
or substitutions, of co-makers or guarantors will be made without the consent of all
participants.
Id. at 662 n.1.
270. Id. at 661.
271. 379 F.2d at 661-62. When San Francisco National Bank closed, Mademoiselle's de-
posit there totalled $7,473.01. Id. at 662.
272. Id. at 663. For a discussion of the requirement of mutuality of obligations as a prereq-
uisite for setoff, see Loyd, The Development of Set-Off, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (1916) (discuss-
ing historical origins of setoff); Zubrow, Integration of Deposit Account Financing into Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 68 MINN. L. REV. 899,
922-29 (1984). See also the discussion of mutuality in the Seafirst decision.
273. 379 F.2d at 663, 664. As the Ninth Circuit explained, the insolvency of the lead bank
raised several inequities. "'[I]t is well settled that the insolvency of a party against whom a
set-off is claimed constitutes a sufficient ground for the allowance of a set-off not otherwise
available.'" Id. at 664 (quoting People v. California Safe Deposit & Trust Co. 168 Cal. 241,
141 P. 1181, 1185 (1914)).
Like the Scott court, the Ninth Circuit simply stated that depositor setoff is permissible




As assignee of part of the claim, Union takes it subject to any counter-
claims and defenses against it. Therefore, the assignment does not oper-
ate to defeat the maker's claims against the assignor, especially since
Mademoiselle was never notified of the assignment and continued to
make its payments on the note directly to SFNB, and since SFNB re-
tained possession of the note. 274
The court, therefore, concluded that:
So far as Mademoiselle was concerned, the note was due solely to
SFNB, and the unannounced transfer of an interest or sale of a partici-
pation certificate should not dilute the uninformed depositor's ordinary
right of set-off.275
Once the Ninth Circuit determined that the existing circumstances per-
mitted Mademoiselle's setoff, it still had to determine whether the partici-
pant had a preferred claim for its pro rata share of the setoff amount. 276
Recognizing that no statutory preferences explicitly covered the partici-
pant's interest,277 the court stated that "a direct recovery against the receiver
in preference to the general pro rata distribution of assets 'is authorized in
situations where the facts are such that the court must say in equity that the
property is not that of the bank but that of the claimant.' ",278 To establish a
preferred claim, however, the participant bears the burden of identifying "a
specific fund or payment in the possession of the receiver cognizable in eq-
uity as [its] own property. '279
The fact that the fund the participant claimed as its own 28 0 was created by
a deposit setoff troubled the circuit court. If a payment had created the
fund, an infusion of new money, then the participant was definitely entitled
to a pro rata share of such a payment.28 1 But a deposit setoff is neither the
274. Id. at 664 (emphasis added).
275. 379 F.2d at 664 (emphasis added). In the eyes of the Mademoiselle court, depositor
setoff was a justifiable judicial method of reapportioning the burdens caused by a bank failure.
The court apparently believed that Mademoiselle, unaware that a portion of its loan debt was
owned by Union, was shouldering an inequitably large portion of these burdens. Therefore,
Union Bank should bear a greater portion of the loss.
276. Id. at 664.
277. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 194).
278. Id. (quoting from John L. Walker Co. v. Alden, 6 F. Supp. 252, 267 (E.D. Ill. 1934)).
The same result is recognized in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 554.
279. Id. at 665. "In establishing a preferred claim against the bank's assets, the claimant
'has a heavy burden of proof, and unless [it] clearly and certainly identifies the fund [it] must
fail.'" Id. at 664-65 (quoting Converse Rubber Co. v. Boston-Continental Nat'l Bank, 12 F.
Supp. 887, 893 (D. Mass. 1935), aff'd, 87 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1936)).
By allowing the participant the opportunity to establish a preferred claim in identifiable
funds, Mademoiselle has been interpreted by one commentator to suggest "that the partici-
pant's partial and undivided interest in the borrower's note and underlying collateral repre-
sents its security for a loan it really makes to the lead, not for the participation it purchases in
the lead's loan to the borrower." Armstrong, The Developing Law of Participation Agreements,
23 Bus. LAW. 689, 695-96 (1968). Conversely, another commentator has taken the position
that this ability to establish a preferred claim "must follow from the characterization of the
loan participation as a sale of a partial interest in an instrument and recognition of the partici-
pant's ownership." Stahl, Loan Participations: Lead Insolvency and Participants' Rights (Part
1), 94 BANKING L.J. 882, 889 (1977).
280. Actually, Union Bank claimed only its 80% pro rata share of the setoff amount. 379
F.2d at 665.
281. Id. The same is also true, the court stated, in an assignment of the right to receive
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injection nor the creation of new money. Therefore, the court reasoned:
[T]here is... only a shifting of credits within the accounts of [the failed
bank]. The set-off has not augmented the assets in the hands of the
receiver or created a specific fund to which equity will attach property
rights. The use of notes or checks to offset assets or liabilities of the
insolvent bank does not establish a preferred claim. 282
In other words, a setoff merely represents a shifting of credits, nothing more
than a bookkeeping transaction. Since the addition and erasure of other
bookkeeping entries does not add funds to the estate, a deposit setoff creates
nothing that the participant can claim as its own.283
This rationale, however, focuses on the pluses and minuses the setoff ex-
hibits on the failed bank's books. It completely ignores the participant's
ownership interest in the underlying debt. If the funds on deposit in the
failed lead bank reduce the borrower's total indebtedness, including debt
owned by a participant, then arguably a court should recognize those funds
that pay participant-owned debt as belonging to that participant.
The Mademoiselle ruling is anything but definitive in determining the na-
ture of the lead-participant relationship. Scott focused on such easily defina-
ble legal principles as natural justice and universal concessions and the same
notions turned the Mademoiselle court's head. This makes fascinating read-
ing, but certainly does not define a loan participation or bring any measure
of certainty to the marketplace.
Even assuming the permissibility of setoff under the National Bank Act,
Scott and Mademoiselle leave several questions unanswered. For example,
what if parties word the participation certificate differently than in Made-
moiselle? What if the participation contract specifies that all payments re-
ceived on or funds applied to the loan be applied in a pro rata fashion? What
does the participant actually own, if anything? What if the bor-
rower/depositor is not uninformed? What if the borrower/depositor is in
fact informed and solicitous of the participation? What if the setoff deposit
account holds proceeds of collateral securing the loan? What if the deposit
account itself constitutes security for the loan? What about deposit insur-
ance? Does it affect the setoff decision? Should it?
Courts must limit Mademoiselle to its particular facts and circumstances.
Mademoiselle leaves too many questions unasked and far too many unan-
swered for it to possess controlling precedential value in participation trans-
actions that are not identical to those facts presented to the Ninth Circuit.
In this unfortunate swamp of precedential confusion and doctrinal difficul-
ties with the classification of loan participations, the propriety of bor-
future payments typically in the form of accounts receivable. Then the assignor is merely a
collection agent and the proceeds of such payments in the hands of the receiver belong to the
assignee. Id. (citing Estes v. E.B. Estes & Sons, 24 F. Supp. 756 (D. Mass. 1927)).
282. Id.
283. 379 F.2d at 665. The Ninth Circuit simply believed that the setoff did not augment
the insolvent estate. Therefore, no money that the participant could claim as its own was
generated. Not only does this analysis overlook the participant's ownership interest in the
debt, it completely fails to take into account the role of deposit insurance in injecting new
money into the estate.
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rower/depositor setoff, the rights of loan participants, and the implications
of Mademoiselle, the Penn Square courts made their decisions. Finally, a
chance emerged to reevaluate universal concessions and sacred truths in the
light of the Penn Square failure. The Penn Square courts had an extraordi-
nary opportunity to interpret and mold the law surrounding loan participa-
tions in a way that would fulfill and further commercial expectations.
Unfortunately, the Penn Square courts did not seize this opportunity.
VI. THE PENN SQUARE DECISIONS
The six largest Penn Square participants filed separate suits contesting the
FDIC's setoff actions. 284 Although each suit has a procedural life of its own,
several similarities exist. Many of these participants, particularly those that
filed suit within a short time after Penn Square Bank's closing, sought to
enjoin the borrower/depositor setoffs.285 Furthermore, all of the partici-
pants sought to share the benefits of the setoffs. 286 They argued that the
FDIC should pay each participant its pro rata share of the amounts set off
against a borrower's indebtedness. 28 7 The FDIC, challenged the partici-
pants' requests, 288 but it countered by giving the participants receiver's cer-
tificates in the face amount of their pro rata share of each setoff.28 9 The
FDIC also agreed to remit to each participant its pro rata share of all pay-
ments made. by the borrowers on loans in which it had participated. 29°
Each of the participant suits resembles the other in that each involves two
central issues: (1) the propriety of borrower/depositor setoffs against partic-
ipated loans; and (2) the right of the participant to an undiminished pro rata
284. Continental Illinois, Chase Manhattan, Seafirst, Northern Trust, Michigan National,
and Hibernia filed suit. In the two years following Penn Square Bank's closing, thirteen suits
concerning Penn Square participation agreements were filed. Merritt, 465 Suits Related to
Penn Square Bank Filed at Federal Court in Two Years, J. Rec., July 11, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
285. The Chase and Hibernia suits serve as prime examples. See Complaint, Chase Man-
hattan Bank, N.A. v. FDIC, 554 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. Okla. 1983); Complaint, Hibernia Nat'l
Bank v. FDIC, No. CIV-82-1051-R (W.D. Okla. 1983), aff'd, 722 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1984).
286. Id.; See Complaint, Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, No. CIV-82-1385-R (W.D.
Okla. filed Aug. 20, 1982); Complaint, Northern Trust Co. v. FDIC, No. CIV-83-506-R (W.D.
Okla. filed Mar. 15, 1983); Complaint, Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. FDIC, No.
CIV-82-1452-R (W. D. Okla. filed Sept. 10, 1982); Complaint, Michigan Nat'l Bank v. FDIC,
No. CIV-83-366-R (W.D. Okla. filed Feb. 22, 1983).
287. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. FDIC, 554 F. Supp. 251, 253 (W.D. Okla
1983)(FDIC refused Chase's demand letter to pro rate offsets); Brief of Plaintiff, The Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary
Judgment at 12-13, Chase, 554 F. Supp. 251.
For example, if a Penn Square borrower had $500,000 on deposit when the bank closed and
an outstanding loan debt of $1 million, 90% of which had been upstreamed to a participant,
the FDIC setoffs applied the deposit balance toward the loan balance. The participants argued
that, in this example, the participant bank was entitled to receive 90% of the deposit account
($450,000). In order to ascertain the extent of the setoffs, the participants sought an account-
ing of all setoffs from the FDIC. See, e.g., Chase, 554 F. Supp. at 252.
288. The FDIC responded by moving to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment.
289. See, e.g., Chase, 554 F. Supp. at 253. Using the example set forth in supra note 287,
rather than receiving $450,000 in cash from the FDIC, the participant received a receiver's
certificate in the face amount of $450,000. Id.
290. See, e.g., Chase, 554 F. Supp. at 253; Reply Brief of Defendant at 5-6, Chase Manhat-
tan Bank, N.A. v. FDIC, 554 F.Supp 251 (W.D. Okla. 1983).
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share of any such setoff. The two suits filed by Chase Manhattan Bank and
Hibernia National Bank in New Orleans291 forged influential decisions that
proved dispositive of these issues for the Penn Square courts because they
were the first cases decided. The suits fied by Seattle-First National Bank
and The Northern Trust Company also represent important new decisions,
not for their result (in that regard they are identical to Chase and Hiber-
nia 292), but for the hint of outcome-determinative political and economic
factors.2 93
A. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. FDIC294
In Chase the court denied Chase's attempt to enjoin the setoffs.295 Chase
then amended its complaint to allege that the funds set off by the FDIC
constituted collateral for the participated loans and, therefore, Chase had a
preferred claim to its pro rata share of those funds.2 96 Again the FDIC
denied Chase's contentions.2 97 The case thus cleared a procedural path for
the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma to
begin substantive work on the law of participations.
1. Setoffs Against Participated Loans
The determination of the propriety of permitting borrower/depositor set-
offs against participated loan debt constituted the threshold issue. Both
Chase Manhattan and the FDIC briefed and argued this issue extensively.298
Chase attempted to distinguish the Penn Square insolvency from the Scott
and Mademoiselle insolvencies. The Penn Square failure did not present the
equities that dictated the results in Scott and Mademoiselle. To the contrary,
Chase Manhattan urged that the equities present in the Oklahoma bank fail-
ure should not allow borrowers to set off their deposits against their partici-
291. Some of the participants stayed their suits pending a decision in Chase.
292. Unfortunately, the court's reasoning in these two decisions frequently quotes Chase
and Hibernia. Therefore, the Seafirst and Northern analyses often are just as skewed as those
in Chase and Hibernia. See infra notes 400-421 and accompanying text.
293. See infra notes 543-452 and accompanying text, Especially in light of the work that
must be done by the FDIC and the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") in the massive and
expensive savings and loan bailout, political and economic factors will probably become even
more important in deciding who bears the ultimate costs of financial institution failures.
294. 554 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. Okla. 1983).
295. Chase, 554 F.Supp. at 253.
296. Id.; Amended Complaint, Chase, 554 F.Supp. 251'(W.D. Okla. 1983).
297. The FDIC did not deny its setoff actions. Rather, it simply denied that Chase or any
of the other participants had, as a matter of law, any rights in the setoffs or the deposit account
funds. In the FDIC's view, Chase and the others failed to state a claim for relief. See, e.g.,
Brief of Defendant in Support of Its Alternative Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment
and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery and for Expedited Discovery at
6, Chase, 554 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. Okla. 1983).
298. See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiff, The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., in Opposition to De-
fendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment at 23-27, Chase, 554 F. Supp. 251
W.D. Okla 1983; Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Alternative Motion to Dismiss
or to Deny Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint at 8-12, Chase, 554 F. Supp. 251 W.D.
Okla. 1983; Reply Brief of Defendant in Support of its Alternative Motion to Dismiss or for




Like the Ninth Circuit Court in Mademoiselle, Chase Manhattan attached
great importance to whether the borrower had knowledge that an upstream
bank had participated in its loan. As previously discussed,3co a fair reading
of the Mademoiselle opinion indicates that the fact that no one notified Mad-
emoiselle of the participation of its loan concerned the Ninth Circuit. "So
far as Mademoiselle was concerned," the Ninth Circuit stated, "the note was
due solely to [the lead bank], and the unannounced transfer of an interest or
sale of a participation certificate in the note should not dilute the uninformed
depositor's ordinary right of set-off."' 301
In many of the Chase Manhattan participations, however, the transactions
were not unannounced and the depositors were far from uninformed. 30 2 In-
deed, in the large majority of the bank's participations the opposite held
true. In several instances not only did the borrowers know of Chase's in-
volvement, but they actually solicited the New York bank's involvement in
the loan.303 The borrowers often knew that Penn Square could not even
make the requested loan unless Chase or another participant agreed to fund
the transaction. 304 One equity that weighed heavily in favor of setoff in
Mademoiselle was either missing in Chase or, more likely, present but fa-
vored precluding setoff.30 5
299. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Alternative Motion to Dismiss
or to Deny Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint at 8-10, Chase, 554 F. Supp. 251
(W.D. Okla. 1983).
300. See supra notes 266-283 and accompanying text.
301. FDIC v. Mademoiselle of California, 379 F.2d 660, 664 (9th Cir. 1967) (emphasis
added).
302. See Affidavit of Edward G. Moran in Brief of Plaintiff, The Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A., in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment at 2, Chase,
554 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. Okla 1983) ("Most ... borrowers acknowledged that they knew that a
participation in the loan had been sold to Chase.").
303. Id. at 2-3.
Some borrowers even proposed loans to Penn Square to be funded in part by
Chase.... Many borrowers were personally introduced to Chase loan officers
by Penn Square as part of Penn Square's effort to sell loans to Chase. In fact,
Penn Square was widely acknowledged to be largely a loan brokerage operation.
Id.
304. See, e.g., Complaint, The Northern Trust Co. v. FDIC, No. CIV-83-506-R (W.D.
Okla. filed Mar. 15, 1983).
In deciding whether to purchase a given loan participation, Northern Trust
routinely conducted an independent credit evaluation of the borrower based on
financial documentation made available by Penn Square Bank supplemented, in
many cases, by information obtained by Northern Trust through direct contact
with the loan applicant.
Most if not all borrowers whose loans were participated to Northern Trust
knew at the time of negotiating their loans or shortly thereafter that participa-
tion interests in such loans would be or were in fact sold by Penn Square Bank.
Id. 5,6.
305. Chase isolated four other significant differences between these facts presented in Mad-
emoiselle and those in the Penn Square-Chase participations. Brief of Plaintiff, The Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary
Judgment at 14-20, Chase, 554 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. Okla. 1983). First, the Mademoiselle par-
ticipation certificate did not contain a contractual provision that the participants would share
pro rata in the proceeds of any property applied to reduce the loan. Second, the Mademoiselle
participant did not claim that the deposit account was used to hold funds that would be used
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The FDIC responded to this alleged distinction by denying its rele-
vance. 3°6 According to the FDIC, "it is the knowledge of an assignment,
coupled with knowledge of the transfer of a note evidencing indebtedness and
further coupled with knowledge of the proper party to pay, i.e., the assignee,
that could have had a bearing on the [Mademoiselle] court's reasoning if
such knowledge had been shown."'30 7
The characterization of "the 'knowledge' issue" as requiring "knowledge
of the transfer of a note" misinterprets the Mademoiselle opinion. The
Ninth Circuit specifically predicated at least a portion of its decision on
Mademoiselle's ignorance of the participation transaction. 308 The Ninth
Circuit's discussion implicitly recognizes that a borrower's awareness of the
participant's interest and its knowledge of the participation transaction
might dilute the equities in favor of setoff.3°9
As previously noted, several of the borrowers in Chase participated loans
were not ordinary uninformed depositors. 310 Many of the borrowers in
Chase participated loans were Penn Square insiders who understood very
well not only that the funding of a particular loan often depended on an
upstream bank, but that the Oklahoma bank's existence depended com-
pletely on cash infusions from Chicago, Seattle, New York and elsewhere. 3
11
The Ninth Circuit certainly did not have this type of bank insolvency nor
this type of borrower/depositor in mind when balancing the equities in
Mademoiselle.
The district court, however, ignored the borrower's awareness of or in-
volvement in the participation relationship. In applying the Mademoiselle
analysis to the Penn Square participations, the district court emphasized the
to make payments on the loan debt. Third, there was no contention in Mademoiselle that the
funds in the deposit account were the proceeds of collateral securing the borrower's indebted-
ness. Fourth, the setoff in Mademoiselle did not irreparably harm the participant because the
amount set off was less than the lead bank's retained share of the loan. In the Penn Square
participations, however, Chase made all these contentions. Chase, 554 F.Supp. at 253-55.
306. See Reply Brief of Defendant in Support of Its Alternative Motion to Dismiss or for
Summary Judgment at 8, Chase, 554 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. Okla. 1983).
307. Id. at 16 (emphasis in original).
308. The Ninth Circuit held that
[a]s assignee of part of the [lead bank's] claim, [the participant] takes it subject
to any counterclaims and defenses against it. Therefore, the assignment does
not operate to defeat the maker's claims against [the lead bank], especially since
Mademoiselle was never notified of the assignment.... So far as Mademoiselle
was concerned, the note was due solely to [the lead bank], and the unannounced
transfer of an interest or sale of a participation certificate in the note should not
dilute the uninformed depositor's ordinary right of set-off.
379 F.2d at 664 (emphasis added).
309. Id.
310. The awareness of and the involvement of the borrower/depositors in the Penn Square
participations is discussed in supra notes 311-313 and accompanying text. See Affidavit of
Edward G. Moran in Brief of Plaintiff, The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, Chase, 554 F. Supp. 251.
311. See Affidavit of Edward G. Moran in Brief of Plaintiff, Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment at 2-3, Chase, 554
F. Supp. 251 (W.D. Okla. 1983) ("Several of the loans in which participations were sold to




fact that the lead bank continued to hold the note and service the debt.31 2
Just as it unquestioningly accepted the universal truth of Scott,31 3 so the
Chase court misconstrued the true nature of the equities described in Made-
moiselle. The court found that the equities in Mademoiselle would have fa-
vored the participant only if the lead had actually transferred the note to the
participant and instructed the borrower to make all further payments di-
rectly to the participant.314 Such a reading of Mademoiselle, however, is
somewhat mystifying. A fair reading of the Ninth Circuit's opinion simply
fails to support the court's black letter statements, particularly when facts
and equities play such an important role.
On this point,315 the district court's analysis not only is wrong, but also
self-serving. Many of the equities that protect the ordinary uninformed de-
positor in Mademoiselle cut the other way in Chase. Although certainly im-
portant considerations, the equities surrounding the knowledge of the
borrower should not solely determine the propriety of depositor setoff
against a participated loan. Rather, the critical analysis must focus on the
legal relationship between the lead bank and the participant. If the partici-
pant can prove an ownership interest in the debt and the collateral that is
cognizable either in law or equity, then arguably the courts should allow the
participant to either stop the depositor's setoff against that portion of the
312. In discussing the teaching of Mademoiselle, the Chase court indicated what it found to
be the most important part of the Ninth Circuit's opinion when it addressed the competing
interests at stake in that particular setoff:
"Therefore, the assignment does not operate to defeat the maker's claims
against the assignor, especially since Mademoiselle was never notified of the as-
signment and continued to make its payments on the note directly to SFNB, since
SFNB retained possession of the note. So far as Mademoiselle was concerned, the
note was due solely to SFNB and the unannounced transfer of an interest or sale
of a participation certificate in the note should not dilute the uninformed deposi-
tors' [sic] ordinary right to set-off."
554 F. Supp. at 255 (emphasis in original). As the emphasized language indicates, Judge Rus-
sell focused exclusively the holder of the note and the receiver of the payments. See id. at 256
("Most importantly, Penn Square Bank retained the notes themselves which evidenced the
loans and collected the payments on the notes from the borrowers.")
If the underscored language indicates the Chase court's understanding of the equities created
by the borrower/depositor's knowledge or ignorance of the participation, then the district
court's analysis contains no "knowledge issue" at all. The borrower's understanding of, indeed
its involvement in, the participation transaction seems irrelevant. The court considers no equi-
ties, only facts. Who holds the note? Who receives the payments? Once these two factual
questions are answered, there is no need to go further under the district court's understanding
of Mademoiselle. Certainly the Ninth Circuit did not intend this result.
Chase made a telling argument. Judge Russell inexplicably chose, however, to ignore it.
313. "The borrower's right to offset is not in issue." Id. at 254 (citing Scott v. Armstrong,
146 U.S. 499 (1592)).
314. Id. at 255.
According to Mademoiselle, it is the knowledge of an assignment, coupled
with knowledge of the transfer of a note evidencing indebtedness and further
coupled with knowledge of the proper party to pay, i.e., the assignee, that could
have had a bearing on the court's reasoning if such knowledge had been shown.
Chase, 554 F.Supp. at 225. The court held that Chase was powerless to stop the setoffs. It
seems clear, however, that Mademoiselle does not require this result. Moreover, to do all that
the district court requires diminishes, and perhaps defeats entirely, the utility and practicabil-
ity of loan participations.
315. Id.
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debt owned by the participant or to share in an undiminished pro rata
amount of the deposit set off against the debt.316
2. Lead-Participant Relationship
The district court's characterization of the lead-participant relationship
determines the justification of its decision allowing setoffs. After reviewing
the terms of the Chase participation certificates, 317 the district court con-
316. This analysis follows this Article's characterization of the district court's analysis of
the Mademoiselle equities as one not considering equity at all. If a participant owns a property
right in debt, then it should be compensated when that right is taken from it.
This characterization does not imply, however, that the district court correctly believed that
the borrower's awareness of or involvement in the participation arrangement is of no conse-
quence. A proper analysis of the contractual relationship between the lead and the participant.
and recognition of the rights of the participant, translates into a lesser necessity to dwell on
equities. As a result, the contractual definition of participations comes into clearer focus.
317. The Chase certificate of participation provided:
Said participation has been sold on the following terms, to which the partici-
pant, by acceptance thereof, agrees:
1. The Bank [Penn Square] will promptly credit the account of, or remit to, the
participant, the participant's pro rata share of all payments of principal of or
interest on the abovementioned loan (hereinafter called "the loan").
2. The Bank makes no representation or warranty, and shall have no responsibil-
ity, as to the validity or collectibility of the loan or of any note or other instru-
ment evidencing the loan, or of any loan agreement relating thereto or as to the
validity, sufficiency of, or title to, any security therefor, or as to the financial
condition of the borrower. The same care has been exercised by the Bank in
making the loan, and will be exercised in handling the loan and any security, as
the Bank exercises with respect to loans in which no participations are sold, and
the Bank shall have no further responsibility to the participant except as specifi-
cally provided herein.
3. So far as the rights of the participant are concerned, the security, if any, for
the loan shall be deemed to be that hereinabove specifically listed or described,
together with any substitutions therefor, and any additional security specifically
pledged to the Bank to secure the loan. The participant shall have no interest in
any property taken as security for any other loan or loans made to the borrower
by the Bank, or in any property now or hereafter in the possession or control of
the Bank which may be or become security for the loan by reason of the general
description contained in any general loan and collateral agreement or collateral
note held by the Bank, except that if any property or the proceeds thereof shall
be applied in reduction of the loan, then the participant shall be entitled to share
pro rata in such application.
4. The Bank agrees that without the prior consent of the participant, the Bank
will not (a) modify or waive any of the terms of any loan agreement or note or
other instrument relating to or evidencing the loan, or give or withhold consents
or approvals to any action or failure to act by the borrower thereunder, if the
same, participant, the participant's pro rata share of all payments of principal of
or interest on the abovementioned loan (hereinafter called "the loan").
5. The Bank reserves the sole right to enforce the obligations of the borrower,
but so long as the participant's share in the loan, together with any shares the
participant may have in any other loans made by the Bank to the same bor-
rower, is more than 50% thereof in the aggregate, then the Bank will take such
action as may be requested by the participant to enforce the terms of, or to
exercise the rights given in, any loan agreement or note or other instrument
relating to or evidencing the loan or the security therefor, provided the partici-
pant first indemnifies the Bank to the Bank's satisfaction against the partici-
pant's pro rata share of any expense or liability which the Bank may incur in so
doing.
6. The participant shall pay the Bank on demand its pro rata share of any ex-
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cluded that Penn Square neither totally nor partially assigned the partici-
pated loan and collateral to Chase.318 Consequently, Chase merely received
"contractual rights and no property rights in the participated loans or the
collateral securing them. ' 31 9 Although the court admitted that Penn Square
sold a participation to Chase, it failed to elaborate on the nature of the par-
ticipation interest that Chase purchased. The court simply stated that it is
"clear that Penn Square Bank did not assign, either in whole or in part, the
participated loans or the collateral securing such loans to Chase."'320
The district court, therefore, left the issue unresolved. For the purposes of
deciding whether to permit the setoffs, the Chase court deemed it unneces-
sary to define or clarify the relationship created between the Oklahoma bank
and its New York participant. Quite simply, the court found that Chase did
not have property rights that could preclude or affect the results of setoffs.
In the court's view, Chase possessed contractual rights subordinate to the
rights and interests of the depositor.
Briefly, the district court said that Chase's participation relationship with
Penn Square vested the New York bank with nothing more than a contrac-
tual expectation of repayment. The Chase participation actually constituted
the sale of an interest in the underlying energy loan, instead it was actually a
loan itself.321 Accordingly, the Chase court misinterpreted the commercial
relationship between Penn Square and Chase.
3. Participants' Claim to Set Off Deposits
Once the Chase court decided that the Penn Square borrower/depositor
was entitled to set off cash on deposit in Penn Square against debt owing on
participated loans, the final issue was whether the participant had a pre-
ferred claim to an undiminished pro rata amount of the deposit applied to-
ward payment of the debt.322 Once again, however, the district court
misunderstood and misapplied Mademoiselle.
a Augmentation of the Insolvent Estate
Chase attempted to distinguish Mademoiselle on the basis of the dollar
penses or liability incurred by the Bank in connection with the loan and shall
permit the Bank to repurchase said participation at par and accrued interest if
the Bank deems it necessary or desirable.
7. This participation shall not be sub-divided or transferred without the prior
written consent of the Bank.
318. "It is also clear that Penn Square Bank did not assign, either in whole or in part, the
participated loans or the collateral securing such loans to Chase." Chase, 554 F. Supp. at 256.
319. Id. (footnote omitted).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 256.
322. Chase, 554 F.2d at 253. This grouped the participant banks with all other Penn
Square general creditors and meant that the upstream banks would simply share in the divi-
dends periodically paid by the FDIC as receiver.
As of the date of this writing, creditors have received dividends totaling 55 cents on the
dollar. Bank's Creditors to Get Funds, Daily Oklahoman, Dec. 19, 1985, at 35, col. 3; see also
supra note 43. Obviously, the receiver's certificates and the discretionary dividends failed to
make the participants, and all other creditors for that matter, whole.
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amounts set off against the debt.323 In Mademoiselle the portion of the debt
retained by the lead bank exceeded the deposit account balance. 324 There-
fore, the liabilities of the borrower/depositor and the insolvent bank were set
off dollar for dollar.325 The Mademoiselle setoff, Chase argued, merely rep-
resented a "shifting of credits. ' 326 If the balance in the set off account ex-
ceeds the borrower's liability to the lead bank, then arguably a setoff results
in an augmentation of the receiver's estate.
Penn Square Bank carried the loan on its books as an asset. 327 Penn
Square's liability to the borrower/depositor, which is the subject of the set-
off, is the amount of the deposit account. When the deposit account balance
that the lead bank applies toward reduction of the loan debt exceeds the
unparticipated portion of the debt, then the lead bank's estate gains the bene-
fit of reducing its liabilities in an amount greater than the concomitant re-
duction in its assets. This is no mere bookkeeping transaction or shifting of
credits because the setoff augments Penn Square's estate by reducing its lia-
bilities (the deposit) in an amount that exceeds the dollar amount of its assets
(the unparticipated portion of the loan). 328 Again misconstruing Mademoi-
selle, the district court stated, "[the Mademoiselle court] held, as a matter of
law, that an offset of a deposit against a participated loan does not augment
the insolvent estate and therefore does not generate funds which could be-
come the basis for a preferred claim." 32
9
The Chase court dismissed the bank's alleged distinctions between the
323. See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiff, The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., in Opposition to De-
fendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment at 21-23, Chase, 554 F. Supp. 251.
324. In Mademoiselle the participant purchased an 80% participation in a $60,000 loan.
On the date of the lead bank's failure, the balance due on the Mademoiselle loan was $58,000.
Of that total, $46,400 belonged to the participant and $11,600 belonged to the insolvent lead's
estate. Mademoiselle's account balance on deposit in the lead bank when it failed totaled
$7,473.01. 379 F.2d at 661-62.
325. Mademoiselle's deposit account balance ($7,473.01) was set off against the debt still
owed the lead bank ($11,600). Even after the setoff, Mademoiselle was still indebted to the
lead bank's estate. More often than not, the deposit account balances of Penn Square borrow-
ers far exceeded the amount of their debt retained by Penn Square. The FDIC simply used
funds contained in Penn Square deposit accounts to extinguish debt owned not only by Penn
Square, but also by the participant that actually funded the loan.
326. Brief of Plaintiff, The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment at 21, Chase, 554 F. Supp. 251.
327. See, e.g., id.; Reply Brief of Defendant in Support of Its Alternative Motion to Dis-
miss or for Summary Judgment at 21-22, Chase, 554 F. Supp. 251.
328. Brief of Plaintiff, The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment 21-22, Chase, 554 F. Supp. 251.
To illustrate this point, assume the Mademoiselle lead bank debt and deposit account figures
were reversed. That is, exceeds the amount of the deposit account (the lead's liability) the
unparticipated portion of the loan retained by the lead bank (the lead's asset). The lead bank
then retains $7,473.01 of the loan debt and Mademoiselle $11,600 on deposit in the lead. The
participant bank still owns $46,400 of loan debt.
Using these figures, the setoff extinguishes the entire amount of the lead bank-owned debt
and over $4000 of the participant-owned debt. Through the setoff, the insolvent bank's estate
pays an $11,600 liability with a $7,473.01 asset. The setoff allows the lead's estate to extin-
guish a liability by capturing the benefit of a $4000 asset that belongs to the participant. As a
result, the setoff augments the lead's estate by over $4000.
329. Chase, 554 F. Supp. at 254.
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Penn Square setoffs and the Mademoiselle setoff as "without merit. '330 Irre-
spective of how slight a portion of a loan Penn Square retained, how large a
portion Penn Square conveyed to Chase and how large a dollar sum Penn
Square set off against the total debt, the court concluded that setoffs could
not augment the Penn Square estate. The receiver, in the court's view, was
simply carrying out paper transactions that constituted shifting of credits.
"By its very nature," the court stated, "an offset cannot augment the re-
ceiver's estate. '331
The circumstances that led the Ninth Circuit to focus on the question of
augmentation, however, differed from those presented by the Chase partici-
pations. In Mademoiselle the participant bank claimed no prior interest in
the deposit account that was the subject of the setoff.332 More importantly,
the Mademoiselle participant's only basis for a preferred claim was the sim-
ple application of the deposit account against the participated loan. 333
Under circumstances that greatly differed from those in Chase, the Ninth
Circuit thus examined whether the setoff itself augmented the insolvent es-
tate or otherwise generated a trust res over which a constructive trust could
be imposed. 334
Judge Russell's decision on this point of augmentation, 335 therefore, failed
to determine whether Chase was entitled to a preferred claim. Regardless of
whether the setoffs augmented the insolvent estate, Chase argued that its
contractual agreement with Penn Square Bank granted Chase an interest in
the borrower's deposit accounts.336 As stated in Mademoiselle, if a partici-
pant bank identifies a specific fund in which it has an ownership interest
cognizable in equity, that entitles the participant bank to a preferred claim to
those funds.337
b. Rights in Borrowers' Deposit Accounts
Chase's argument on this issue focuses on the nature of the deposit ac-
count and its interest in that deposit account. The bank rested its contention
on two conclusions: one legal, the other factual. First, Chase must prove
330. Id. at 255.
331. Id. at 254. Unfortunately, the district court did not analyze the net effect on the Penn
Square estate when reviewing these "paper transactions."
332. This contrasts with Chase's claim of an ownership interest in the funds contained in
the deposit accounts that were the proceeds of collateral. See infra notes 337-348 and accom-
panying text.
333. Mademoiselle, 379 F.2d at 664-65. As discussed previously, the Mademoiselle setoff
differed from the Chase setoff because the amount on deposit in the failed lead bank was less
than the loan debt retained by the lead. The net effect of the Mademoiselle setoff, therefore,
was neutral. The Mademoiselle setoff did not enhance the insolvent estate because it reduced
the insolvent estate's assets and liabilities by an equal amount. See supra in notes 325-326.
334. Because the Mademoiselle setoff was net neutral in its effect on the lead's estate, no
fund that the participant could claim as its own was generated in the hands of the receiver See
379 F.2d at 665; supra notes 178, 179.
335. The Mademoiselle, decision appears incorrect especially when the setoff actually
yielded a net positive effect on the failed bank's estate.
336. See Brief of Plaintiff, The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment 17-20, Chase, 554 F. Supp. 251.
337. Mademoiselle, 379 F.2d at 665.
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that the participation agreement gave it property rights in the collateral for
Chase to have a preferred claim. Second, it must prove that the deposit
accounts set off against the loans constituted collateral for the loans or con-
tained the proceeds of collateral securing the underlying loans.
This argument, however, parallels and depends upon the nature of the
relationship between Penn Square and Chase.338 On that point, the district
court held that Chase did not have any property rights in the loan and col-
lateral. 339 Also, the court held that Chase had no property rights in the
general deposit accounts of the borrower/depositors. In short, the district
court determined that Chase had no property rights in any account, loan,
debt, or property of the borrower. 34° The court concluded, therefore, that
Chase was not entitled to an undiminished pro rata share of the deposit
amounts set off against the participated loans.341
The participation certificate used for the Chase transactions provides in
pertinent part:
3. So far as the rights of the participant are concerned, the security, if
any, for the loan shall be deemed to be that hereinabove specifically
listed as described, together with any substitution therefore, and any
additional security specifically pledged to the Bank to secure the loan.
The participant shall have no interest in any property taken as security
for any other loan or loans made to the borrower by the Bank, or in any
property now or hereafter in the possession or control of the Bank
which may be or become security for the loan by reason of the general
description contained in any general loan and collateral agreement or
collateral notes held by the Bank, except that if any such property or
the proceeds thereof shall be applied in reduction of the loan, the par-
ticipant shall be entitled to share pro rata in such application. 342
The language of the participation certificate states that the participant's se-
curity for the loans is all property described in the certificate and any addi-
tional security specifically pledged to secure that loan.343 Although Chase
was not the holder of the debt and security instruments, the language of the
participation certificate indicates that Penn Square Bank conveyed to Chase
an interest in the collateral and that Penn Square acted as Chase's agent for
collection.
As part of the typical Penn Square oil and gas financing arrangement,
borrowers executed a form Mortgage, Security Agreement, Financing State-
ment and Assignment granting Penn Square a security interest in all oil and
gas produced from the mortgaged property and in all proceeds thereof.3"
338. See supra notes 317-321 and accompanying text.
339. Chase 554 F. Supp. at 256-57.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 257.
342. Id. at 256.
343. Chase, 554 F. Supp. at 256.
344. Affidavit of Edward G. Moran $ 13 in Brief of Plaintiff, The Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A., in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment at-,
Chase, 554 F. Supp. 251.
[Miany of the accounts being offset by the FDIC are special accounts of the
borrowers specifically maintained for purposes of receiving payments from third
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This represented collateral for the loan and Penn Square listed these mort-
gages in the participation certificates. Moreover, Chase asserted that in sev-
eral instances the oil and gas production proceeds were on deposit at Penn
Square when Penn Square made the setoffs. 345
Furthermore, the contractual agreement between Chase and Penn Square
provided that each bank would share in the benefits of the reduction of the
loan. The participation certificate specifically stated that if the lead bank
applied any collateral or the proceeds thereof to reduce the loan, then "the
participant shall be entitled to share pro rata in such application."' 346 Signif-
icantly, the Mademoiselle participation contract contained no such similar
sharing provision. 347 Here, however, the parties expressly contracted that
they would share the proceeds of the collateral on a pro rata basis. If the
Oklahoma bank had collateral proceeds on deposit were used to reduce the
borrower's loan, then Chase had a right to its pro rata share of those
proceeds.34 8
Chase argued that it possessed a contractually created property interest in
the borrower/depositor's funds to the extent of its participation interest.
349
party oil and gas purchasers in reduction of the borrowers' indebtedness in re-
spect of Participated Loans. Other accounts which may be the subject of offsets
contain proceeds from oil and gas runs which were pledged as collateral for
Participated Loans.
Id.
As this Article explained in Section IV, when structuring an oil and gas loan, it is fairly
common for the lender to require that the revenues generated from the mortgaged properties'
production be paid by the purchaser of production directly to the lender. The lender then
places the funds in a separate collateral collection account. For a detailed explanation of the
mechanics of oil and gas finance and the assignment of production proceeds, see supra notes
166-265 and accompanying text.
Chase argued that the participation contract conveyed to it an interest in the collateral for
the loan (the oil and gas producing properties and their proceeds). The argument follows that
Chase also has an ownership interest in the oil and gas production proceeds held for the bor-
rowers in accounts at Penn Square Bank. In other words, a portion of the production proceeds
equal to Chase's participation percentage belongs not to Penn Square, but to Chase.
345. Section 9-306(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides:
[A] security interest continues in collateral, notwithstanding sale, exchange or
other disposition thereof ... and also continues in any identifiable proceeds
including collections received by the debtor.
Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, § 9-306(2) (1985). Even if Penn Square commingled the proceeds with
other funds in an unrestricted Penn Square account, the original security interest, of which
Chase is a partial owner or beneficiary, remains attached to the production proceeds. Chase's
interest in those funds, therefore, remains intact.
It should be noted, however, that 9-306(4) is applicable in the context of a debtor's insol-
vency and a secured party's continued perfection in commingled proceeds. Under 9-306(4) the
perfected security interest is subject to any rights of setoff.
346. See supra note 342.
347. Mademoiselle, 379 F.2d at 662 (the supra text of the participation agreement is set
forth in full in note 269).
348. For example, assume Chase was a 90% participant in an oil and gas loan to a Penn
Square borrower that had $100,000 in production proceeds on deposit in the Oklahoma bank.
By virtue of the participation terms, Chase had an interest in $90,000 of those funds. If that
$100,000 is then applied toward the borrower's Chase-participated loan, then Chase should
receive $90,000 in cash or in the form of a preferred claim, not a $90,000 general claim against
the Penn Square estate. The effect of the FDIC's setoff practices, therefore, takes Chase's
assets and uses them to retire Penn Square liabilities.
349. The court seemingly thinks pulling back on the question of the collateral collection
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Chase argued that because it owned equitable title to these funds, they con-
stituted a specific fund or trust res over which Chase could impose a con-
structive trust. The FDIC, therefore, had a duty to pay Chase its
undiminished share of these funds.
The district court, however, viewed the issue differently. In spite of the
specific language of the contract, the district court concluded that:
[A]lthough the Plaintiff has attempted to factually distinguish Made-
moiselle from the present action, it is the conclusion of this Court that
the Mademoiselle rationale is controlling with respect to the legal issues
presented in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. First the offsets were
proper. In addition, the offsets being carried out by the FDIC were not
augmenting the assets in the hands of the FDIC as receiver of Penn
Square Bank. By way of offsetting the deposits against indebtedness to
Penn Square Bank, the FDIC was receiving no "funds" but was merely
carrying out "paper transactions" which constituted "a mere shifting of
credits." In short, there was no res to which Chase's claim as a pre-
ferred creditor could attach. Further Plaintiff has no property interest
in the collateral securing the participated loans which might entitle it to
a preferred claim. 350
B. Hibernia National Bank v. FDIC
Hibernia National Bank v. FDIC35 1 represents an important decision for
two reasons. First, the Tenth Circuit endorsed and adopted the results and
rationale of Chase. Second, the artificial distinctions drawn between the two
different groups of Penn Square-Hibernia participations by the district court
below, and again approved by the circuit, highlight the basic problems of the
Chase opinion.
Hibernia National Bank in New Orleans purchased eighty-four loan par-
ticipations from Penn Square Bank for a total exceeding $26 million. Hiber-
nia purchased eighteen of these eighty-four participations pursuant to
certificates of participation substantially similar to those certificates in
Chase. 352 Under the Hibernia certificates, as in Chase, Penn Square retained
all the original loan documentation, continued to service the loans and re-
accounts and whether Chase is entitled to any of the funds on deposit in one of these "special
accounts." Chase, 554 F. Supp. at 256. The court apparently attempted to avoid the question
by stating that the issue was not properly raised and granting Chase leave to file an amended
complaint. Id. But the court's decision that Chase had no property rights in the loans or their
collateral effectively answers the question. Regardless of how, where, or why collateral pro-
ceeds are held, in the district court's view the participant has no property interest in them, nor
does it have right to share in their application to the borrower's loan debt. Id. at 256-57.
350. Id. at 256-57.
351. Order, Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, No. CIV-82-1051-R (W.D. Okla. filed April 5,
1983), aff'd, 733 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1984).
352. The certificate of participation used in the eighteen Hibernia participations provided:
So that you will have a complete description of the subject loan, we are at-
taching hereto a true copy of the note and a true copy or a description of all
security taken by us.
We hereby confirm that in consideration of your payment to us, we are hold-
ing for your account a pro rata interest in the unpaid principal of the subject
note, together with the same proportionate interest in any and all interest to
1990]
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mitted to Hibernia its pro rata portion of all payments made on the loan.35 3
Hibernia purchased the remaining sixty-six loan participations pursuant to
certificates of participation and a Loan Pool Purchase Agreement. 3s4 Penn
Square again continued to hold all loan documentation, service the loan and
remit to Hibernia its share of all payments made on the loans. 355
1. The District Court Opinion
Once again, the borrower/depositor setoff issue faced the district court.
Hibernia asserted that it owned the loans356 and the FDIC countered that
Chase had disposed of this issue. 357 The district court, however, distin-
guished between the two groups of loan participations and agreed with the
FDIC that the first group of eighteen participations, documented only by the
participation certificates, practically mirrored the Chase participations. 35 8
The FDIC could, therefore, set off deposit accounts against loan balances359
and Hibernia was not entitled to a preferred claim to a pro rata share of the
accrue on the note from and after date, and in any and all collateral securing the
same, together with any guaranties thereof.
It is expressly understood that we do not make any representations or assume
any responsibility with respect to the validity, genuineness or collectibility of
said note, or the collateral securing the same, or guaranties thereof, and that we
are entitled... to take or assert under the terms of our note and that, although
we will exercise the same care to protect your interest as we do to protect our
own, we shall not, so long as we exercise such care, be under any liability to you
with respect to anything which we may do or refrain from doing in the exercise
of our judgment or which may seem to us to be necessary or desirable in the
premises. We reserve the right to release collateral and to permit substitutions
of new collateral.
This participation may not be assigned or transferred in whole or in part with-
out our prior written consent. Also it is the understanding that we shall have
the exclusive option and privilege of repurchasing this entire participation at any
time by paying to you your pro rata share of the unpaid principal and accrued
interest or less unearned discount, as the case may be.
We further understand that you will reimburse us in proportion to your par-
ticipation in this loan for all expenses, attorneys fees, and other liabilities in-
curred by us in connection with this loan.
Hibernia, 733 F.2d at 1409.
353. Hibernia, 733 F.2d at 1404-05.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 1405.
356. See, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive Relief and/or Declaratory Judgment at 3, Hibernia
Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, No. CIV-82-1051-R (W.D. Okla. filed July 15, 1982) (participated por-
tions of the loans "were, and at the present time, are the sole and exclusive property of Hiber-
nia .... ").
357. See, e.g., Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 4-5, Hi-
bernia Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, No. CIV-82-1051-R (W.D. Okla. filed June 22, 1983).
358. "After careful examination of the Certificate of Participation form used to memorial-
ize the purchase by Hibernia from Penn Square Bank of participations in the loans, the Court
concludes that the loan participations covered solely by the Certificates of Participation are
controlled by [Chase]." Order, Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, CIV-82-1051-R (W.D. Okla.
filed April 5, 1983) (Russell, J.) [hereinafter Hibernia District Court Order]. See supra note
352.
359. Hibernia District Court Order supra note 358, at 3 ("(In Chase] this Court held that
the depositor in an insolvent bank has the right to offset any deposits against his debt owing to
the bank and that this right extends to situations involving loan participations.").
LOAN PARTICIPATIONS
set off deposits.36° Again, the district court believed that Penn Square had
conveyed its participant ephemeral contract rights, not property rights,
subordinate to the rights of the borrower/depositor. 361
In the district court's construction of the second group of sixty-six loan
participations, however, the district court sided with Hibernia. Despite the
arguments of both Hibernia and the FDIC that the two groups of participa-
tions were indistinguishable, 362 the district court decided that the added fac-
tor of the Loan Pool Purchase Agreement distinguished these participations
from those in the first group. 36 3 The court believed that the terms of the
Loan Pool Purchase Agreement created an agency relationship between
Penn Square and Hibernia. 364 Penn Square, therefore, held the loan docu-
ments and serviced the loans as agent for Hibernia; the Oklahoma bank also
had a fiduciary duty to receive payments on the loans in trust and remit
these sums to Hibernia. 365
The court was further persuaded of Hibernia's ownership interest in these
sixty-six loans because the "loan pool was a special type of transaction in
which Hibernia sent representatives to examine the individual credit files for
the loans. '"366 Moreover, the district court noted that these loans were "car-
ried on Hibernia's books as assets belonging to Hibernia and as loans made
directly to the various borrowers themselves rather than as loans made to
Penn Square Bank."' 367 Judge Russell concluded that most, if not all, of the
borrowers whose loans had been packaged in the loan pool had actual notice
of Hibernia's participation interest.368 Finally, the district court held that
since "Hibernia's showing of probable success on the merits of its claim to
the ownership of the loans within the Loan Pool Purchase Agreement is suffi-
ciently strong, when combined with the relative balance of potential harm to
the parties, ' 369 the FDIC should be enjoined from effecting setoffs against
this second group of loan participations. 370
These purported distinctions, however, simply possess no merit. In one
instance, the district court dismissed Hiberia's claim as on all fours with
that of Chase Manhattan in the Chase decision. In the next instance, how-
ever, the district court discovered additional facts and circumstances that
removed one set of loan participations from the "controlling effect" of Mad-
emoiselle and Chase. Ironically, Chase argued many of the newly revealed
facts and circumstances; this same court expressly ignored or rejected the
360. Id. at 4. The district court once again cited Mademoiselle and Scott v. Armstrong as its
authority for these propositions. Id.
361. See id.
362. Hibernia District Court Order, supra note 358, at 8-9.
363. Id. at 9.
364. Hibernia District Court Order, supra note 358, at 9.
365. Id. at 7, 9.
366. Id. at 9. Whether this participation arrangement was truly "special" is discussed infra
notes 372-379 and accompanying text.
367. Hibernia District Court Order, supra note 358, at 8.
368. Id. at 8-9. The issue of the borrowers' knowledge of Hibernia's involvement is dis-
cussed in notes 362-374 infra and accompanying text.
369. Hibernia District Court Order, supra note 358, at 10 (emphasis added).
370. Id. at 10-12.
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arguments in its Chase opinion.37' This inconsistency appears especially
glaring when the court discusses the nature of the loan pool purchase trans-
action and the Penn Square borrowers' state of mind.
The district court conveyed the impression that all parties, Penn Square
Bank, Hibernia, and the borrower/depositor, jointly labored through inten-
sive, face-to-face bargaining and credit review sessions.372 The court sug-
gests by implication that such contact and familiarity among all three parties
was unique to this transaction. This alleged distinction, however, simply is
not true. In many instances involving loans other than the ones bundled off
to Hibernia in this particular loan participation pool, considerable interac-
tion spanning several years existed among Penn Square Bank, the partici-
pant banks and many Penn Square borrowers. 373 The fact that Hibernia
interviewed some of the borrowers and reviewed their financial statements
prior to buying the participations involved nothing unique.
The district court also stated that most, if not all, of the borrowers had
actual notice that Hibernia was a participant. 374 Again by implication, the
court focused on the uniqueness of this heightened state of mind or borrower
awareness. Again, however, this alleged distinction simply is not true. Penn
Square insiders or entities controlled by insiders who knew all too well that
their loans entirely depended on the involvement of money center banks con-
stituted many of the largest Penn Square borrowers. One chronicler of the
Penn Square failure asserts that in several instances some of Penn Square's
largest and most active borrowers entertained the money center bankers
when they visited Oklahoma and, moreover, often flew to New York, Chi-
cago, and Seattle to solicit and smooth the participation process. 375
Chase Manhattan asserted many of these same arguments in its participa-
tion suit. 37 6 Yet there the same court dismissed these arguments as "without
371. See supra notes 308-316 and accompanying text.
372. The district court explained that "(i]n many cases, Hibernia contacted the borrowers,
interviewed them and reviewed their financial statements prior to making the decisions on the
loans which were ultimately included in the loan pool covered by the supplemental Loan Pool
Purchase Agreement." Hibernia District Court Order, supra note 358, at 9.
373. This point directly parallels and entirely depends on the borrower's awareness of the
participant's involvement. See supra notes 308-316 and accompanying text.
374. Hibernia District Court Order, supra note 358, at 9.
375. P. ZWEIG, supra note 1; see also M. SINGER, supra note 2.
376. See, e.g, Affidavit of Edward G. Moran in Brief of Plaintiff, The Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A., in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment at 2-
3, Chase, 554 F. Supp. 251. Chase asserted:
Most [Penn Square] borrowers [of Chase participated loans] acknowledged
that they knew that a participation in the loan had been sold to Chase. In some
cases, borrowers had been told by Penn Square loan officers that funding of their
loans depended on Penn Square's ability to sell a participation in the loan to
another bank. Some borrowers even proposed loanis to Penn Square to be
funded in part by Chase .... Many borrowers were personally introduced to
Chase loan officers by Penn Square as part of Penn Square's effort to sell loans to
Chase. In fact, Penn Square was widely acknowledged to be largely a loan bro-
kerage operation ....
Several of the loans in which participations were sold to Chase were to Penn
Square's officers or directors, who themselves were responsible of the participa-
tion transactions.
[Vol. 44
1990] LOAN PAR TICIPA TIONS 817
merit. '377 Here, however, the court is beguiled by the mere existence of a
supplemental agreement - the Loan Pool Purchase Agreement. Despite
the fact that both the FDIC and Hibernia insisted that the participations in
the loan pool should not be treated differently because of the agreement, 378
the court nonetheless deemed that a "hidden reason" existed behind the con-
summation of this additional agreement.
The district court, contrary to the parties' express statements, believed
that "[t]he parties must have desired to further define or modify certain as-
pects of the relationship between Hibernia and Penn Square Bank and of the
transactions regarding this group of loans."1379 The district court held, by
implication and contrary to the express intent and statements of both par-
ties, that the parties intended to imbue Hibernia with ownership rights in the
loans and collateral. Because Hibernia owned the loans sold to it in the loan
pool, the FDIC could not set off the borrowers' deposits against the debt
owing on these loans.380
id.
Other indicia of ownership advanced by both Chase and Hibernia in their respective suits
concerned the manner in which the loans were recorded on Penn Square's books. No one, not
even the FDIC, disputed the fact that Penn Square carried only the unparticipated portions of
the participated loans as assets on its books. See id. at 3 (Penn Square carried as asset on its
books only that portion of borrower's indebtedness not sold to Chase). The participated por-
tions of the loans, accordingly, constituted assets of the participant banks. The same is true of
both groups of participations in Hibernia.
Incongruously, the district court found that in one instance (the Chase participations and
the first group of eighteen Hibernia participations) the participations, if not outright loans to
Penn Square, at least did not constitute assets owned by the participants. Yet in the other
instance (the second group of participations contained in the loan pool), the court determined
that the unparticipated portions of the loans represented the unmistakable property of the
participant. As support for this determination, the district court seemed intrigued with the
notion that if it were to conclude otherwise (that the participations were simply loans to Penn
Square Bank), then both Penn Square Bank and Hibernia violated their statutory borrowing
and lending limits. Hibernia District Court Order, supra note 358, at 8. Intriguing though it
may be, this observation defines or distinguishes scarcely contractual relationships. This point
is better understood as an indicia of participant ownership of the participated portion of the
underlying loan.
Hibernia purchased millions of dollars in participations from Penn Square. In light of the
stated intent of both parties, to determine arbitrarily that Hibernia used the participations as a
means to purchase millions in loans while it also used the participations as a vehicle to loan
Penn Square several more million certainly seems inconsistent. Moreover, I doubt that Chase
thought it was lending Penn Square over $200 million when it purchased its participations.
I think this inconsistency is emblematic of where the Penn Square courts' analysis would be
most criticized: The district court's reasoning defies the commercial realities that surround the
transaction. This is discussed at length in Section VII.
377. Chase, 554 F. Supp. at 255.
378. The court stated:
It is recognized by the Court that the attorneys for both Plaintiff and Defend-
ant persistently stated that the [two groups of Hibernia] loans . . . were not
distinguishable and should not be treated differently. However, the Court is
convinced that the express contractual language of the Loan Pool Purchase
Agreement is distinguishable from the language contained in the Certificates of
Participation.
Hibernia District Court Order at 8-9, supra note 358.
379. Id. at 9. "Perhaps a significant distinction between the loans covered solely by Certifi-
cates of Participation and the Loan Pool Purchase Agreement is the mere fact that such a
supplemental agreement was executed." Id. (emphasis added).
380. Hibernia District Court Order, supra note 358, at 10.
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The Hibernia district court confused rather than clarified the issues raised
by the participations. Its distinctions between Hibernia and Chase, particu-
larly those made between the two groups of Hibernia participations, are not
distinctions at all; furthermore, the district court's reasoning is difficult to
follow. Unfortunately, however, the circuit court did not correct the
problems.
2. The Tenth Circuit Opinion381
On appeal Hibernia urged that the same facts, considerations and conclu-
sions that led the district court to determine that Hibernia owned all or part
of the loans packaged in the loan pool equally applied to the eighteen indi-
vidual loan participations. 3 2 The FDIC countered that the Chase rationale
dictated otherwise.38 3 The sole issue raised for the Tenth Circuit's determi-
nation was whether "Penn Square's participation to Hibernia of part or all of
the [eighteen individual] loans transferred ownership in such loans to Hiber-
nia."' 384 The circuit court thus had the opportunity to correct the district
court's inaccurate construction of the loan participations and faulty determi-
nations of the ownership rights conveyed thereby, but the court failed to
seize this opportunity. Instead, the Tenth Circuit complicated matters by
applauding the Chase rationale in the majority opinion while, in a partially
concurring and dissenting opinion, recognizing a participant's ownership of
the participated portion of the loan but permitting borrower/depositor setoff
anyway. 385
a The Majority Opinion
Not only did the circuit court approve the district court's distinctions be-
tween the two groups of Hibernia loan participations, it adopted the Chase
opinion's construction of Mademoiselle. 38 6 In its less than two page majority
opinion, the Tenth Circuit classified the participations as creating "'assign-
381. Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. FDIC 733 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1984).
382. See Appellant's Brief at 16, Hibernia, 733 F.2d 1403.
383. See Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 20, Hibernia, 733 F.2d 1403.
384. Hibernia, 733 F.2d at 1406. During oral argument the FDIC contested the district
court's ruling on the participations packaged in the Loan Pool Purchase Agreement, but that
ruling was not a part of this appeal. Id.
385. See infra notes 387-398 and accompanying text.
386. 733 F.2d at 1048.
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ments without recourse' coupled with agency, ' 387 construed Scott, 38 8 ap-
proved Chase389 and borrower/depositor setoffs against participated
loans, 39° held that setoffs do not augment the insolvent's estate,391 and de-
nied loan participants preferred claims to their share of the deposit amounts
set off against their debt.392 Fortunately, the companion opinion offers a
little more in the way of analysis.
b. The Hibernia Concurrence/Dissent393
In a separate opinion, Judge Logan disagreed with the majority's charac-
terization of Hibernia's rights in the underlying loans. As he saw it, "the
participations constitute assignments of ownership of the loans to Hibernia to
the extent of the percentages it acquired. ' '394 In Judge Logan's analytical
scheme, however, Hibernia's ownership of all or at least a portion of the debt
did not preclude borrower/depositor setoff,395 nor did it entitle the partici-
387. Id. The court stated:
Although nothing in the participation agreement indicates that the participa-
tions were anything other than "assignments without recourse" coupled with an
agency, Hibernia contends that it intended and treated each participation as a
transfer of ownership, and that, accordingly, the FDIC could not offset the...
loan borrowers [sic] deposits against the participated portions of the loans. We
disagree.
Id.
The Tenth Circuit's characterization of the participation as an assignment coupled with an
agency seems reasonable. The terms and intent of the relationship indicate that Penn Square
assigned ownership of the loans to Hibernia and that Penn Square retained the loan documents
and continued to service the loans as the New Orleans bank's agent. The circuit court, how-
ever, never clarified what rights were the subject of this assignment.
The Tenth Circuit's opinion directly conflicts with the Supreme Court in SBA v. McClellan
364 U.S. 446,449 (1960), and the Fifth Circuit in Franklin v. Commissioner, 683 F.2d 125, 126
(5th Cir. 1982).
388. Hibernia, 733 F.2d at 1407.
389. Id. at 1408 ("The district court properly relied on its decision in Chase... wherein it
adopted Mademoiselle .. ").
390. Again the court summarily concluded:
Nothing in the participation agreements... was in derogation of the bor-
rower-depositors' offset rights. The agreement, as we have noted, cannot be
read to transfer the ownership of the loans to Hibernia. Nor are we able to read
into the participation agreements Hibernia's proposition that its treatment and
intent should control on this issue. Hibernia is, in our view, attempting to re-
write the participation agreements in order to afford it the ability to enjoin the
borrower-depositors' established right of offset. We cannot rewrite the partici-
pation agreement for Hibernia's benefit.
Id.
391. Id. Like the district court, the Tenth Circuit subscribed to the notion of a setoff as
"'a mere shifting of credits,'" nothing more than a simple "bookkeeping transaction." Id.
Also like the district court, the circuit court believed that the setoff neutrally affected the
receiver's estate. Id.
392. Id. The circuit court fell into lockstep with the district court's misunderstanding and
misapplication of Mademoiselle. Once the circuit court agreed that Hibernia did not own the
participated portions of the loans, it led, in the court's view, to the inexorable conclusion that
the participant was not entitled to a preferred claim. Id.
393. Hibernia, 733 F.2d at 1409 (Logan, J.) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
394. Id. at 1410 (emphasis in original) (citing SBA v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446, 449 (1960)
and Mademoiselle 379 F.2d. 660, 665 (9th Cir. 1967)).
395. Id. "As the majority recognizes, the borrower-depositor in Penn Square may offset
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pant to a preferred claim to the deposit proceeds set off against the debt it
owns.
3 9 6
If the depositor chooses to offset against a loan in which Hibernia has
participated, the offset should first apply to that portion of the loan re-
tained by Penn Square. If the amount of the offset exceeds the portion
of the loan retained by the insolvent bank, Hibernia does not become a
preferred claimant as to the excess. However, because of Hibernia's
ownership interest in the loan to the extent of its participation, Hibernia
does become a general creditor of Penn Square as to that amount. 397
Judge Logan's conclusion that Hibernia owned its share of the loan debt
contradicts his denial of Hibernia's right to its share of the reduction in debt
generated by the setoff. This inconsistency becomes apparent when evaluat-
ing the setoff of a $100,000 deposit account against a $100,000 loan in which
Hibernia was a ninety percent participant. Under Judge Logan's rationale,
Hibernia owned $90,000 of the debt. Yet when all the deposit account funds
are used to pay the entire amount of the loan debt, including Hibernia-
owned debt, Judge Logan denies Hibernia one of the principal rights for
which it presumably contracted with Penn Square and one of the basic at-
tributes of ownership: the right to receive payment. 398
At least the separate opinion affirmatively stated that a loan participant
actually owns its portion of the total loan debt, but the court articulated no
additional reasoning and thus failed to assist Hibernia. Regardless of the
express terms of the contract and the intent and expectations of the parties,
the Tenth Circuit forced Hibernia and the other Penn Square participants to
content themselves with receiver's certificates for general claims, any divi-
dends to be paid on those certificates at the discretion of the FDIC and,
ultimately, after six or seven years, perhaps sixty cents on the dollar.
C. The Seafirst and Northern Trust Decisions
Not surprisingly, in the decisions in Seattle-First National Bank v.
FDIC399 and Northern Trust Company v. FDIC400 the district court fol-
lowed the same approach used in the earlier participation suits.4° 1 In many
ways, the Northern Trust result was quite predictable. The participation cer-
the balance in his bank account with the insolvent bank against any debt the depositor owes to
the bank." Id.
396. Id.
397. Hibernia, 733 F.2d at 1410 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Judge Logan noted,
however, that any future payments in excess of Penn Square's interest should pass directly to
Hibernia because "Hibernia simply is not a general creditor as to these amounts." Id. (citing
Estes v. E.B. Estes & Sons, 24 F.2d 756, 757 (D. Mass. 1927)).
398. Judge Logan never explains why Hibernia receives no benefit from a setoff that cancels
the entire liability of the estate for an amount far in excess of its $10,000 asset and inures to the
complete benefit of the FDIC as receiver. Judge Logan merely notes that "[i]f the amount of
the offset exceeds the portion of the loan retained by the insolvent bank, Hibernia does not
become a preferred claimant as to the excess." Hibernia, 733 F.2d at 1410 (citing Mademoi-
selle). The courts also failed to recognize the contractual right to share in all proceeds applied
toward payment of the loan.
399. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. 1351 (W.D. Okla. 1985).
400. Northern Trust Co. v. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. 1340 (W.D. Okla. 1985).
401. Although Seafirst and Northern Trust raised different facts and some different argu-
[Vol. 44
1990] LOAN PAR TICIPA TIONS 821
tificate used by Northern Trust mirrored that construed in Hibernia40
2
Consequently, the district court followed the result of its earlier decision and
held that Northern Trust could neither stop the setoffs nor receive a pre-
ferred claim.4o 3
In the Seafirst suit, however, the district court construed yet another form
of a participation agreement, one that seemed even plainer than the Hibernia
Loan Pool Purchase Agreement 4° 4 in conveying to the participant the own-
ership of property rights in the underlying loans. The court, however,
thought otherwise. The result, but not the rationale, was predictable.
Like the other participants, Seafirst claimed that its participation agree-
ments, the FDIC's contentions remained the same and the results of Judge Russell's decisions
predictably paralleled those in Chase and Hibernia.
402. 619 F. Supp. at 1342. The participation certificate used by Northern Trust was a
printed form certificate. Following its earlier findings in Hibernia, the district court held that
Northern Trust had no ownership or property interests in the participated loans. Id.
403. Id. at 1345.
404. See Hibernia Loan Pool Participation Agreement.
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ment40 5 conveyed to it property rights4 or trust estates40 7 in the loans and
their supporting collateral. The court surprisingly agreed. Although the
language of the order does not state unequivocally that the participation
agreement conveyed a property interest to Seafirst, it nonetheless communi-
cates that the court believed that Seafirst owned the participated portion of
the loan 40 8 Such an impression, however, did not suffice to carry the day
405. In pertinent part, the Seafirst participation contract provided as follows:
1. Sale of Participations. Seller [Penn Square] hereby agrees to sell and Pur-
chaser (Seafirst] agrees to purchase participations in the loans described on Ex-
hibit A attached hereto and by this reference incorporated herein. The amount
of the Purchaser's participation is also indicated on Exhibit A .... To the
extent the terms of this Agreement vary from or are in conflict with the terms of
any certificate, the terms of this Agreement shall control.
2. Owner Trustee. To the extent of its participation in the loans, Purchaser shall
be the owner of an undivided fractional interest in each such loan, including, but
not limited to all notes and other instruments evidencing indebtedness of the
borrower, together with all collateral securing such indebtedness. To the extent
of Purchaser's interest therein, including, but not limited to, its pro rata share of
all funds and payments received and/or to be received by Seller from the bor-
rower, Seller shall be a trustee for the benefit of and accountable to Purchaser,
and shall hold all such notes, mortgages, and collateral security instruments
together with all such funds and payments in trust for Purchaser for its sole and
exclusive benefit.
3. Administering and Servicing. Seller shall ... receive and collect all payments
of principal and interest that become due and payable on the loans and shall
immediately place all such funds in a reserve account as soon as the same are
collected, to be held for disbursement as provided below.
Seller agrees that it will consult with Purchaser on any matter that may affect
Purchaser's interest in the loans and agrees that, without Purchaser's prior writ-
ten consent, Seller will not (a) modify or waive any of the terms of the loan
documents or give or withhold consents or approvals to any action or failure to
act by the Borrower; (b) permit substitutions or withdrawals of security, if any,
which would materially reduce the value thereof without a proportionate reduc-
tion in the loan ....
4. Marketing of Records, Inspection. Seller represents, warrants, covenants and
agrees to mark all notes, mortgages, security agreements, trust deeds and other
instruments evidencing the loans and the collateral securing same, in a conspicu-
ous manner so as to clearly identify Purchaser's participation in each loan and
further agrees to mark all credit files, ledgers and/or computer printouts and
other records pertaining to the loans ....
5. Monthly Reports. Not later than ten days following the end of each month in
which Purchaser has a participation interest in any loan hereunder, Seller shall
transmit to Purchaser a computer printout or report on which Seller will indi-
cate with respect to the immediately preceding month:
[List of numerous items about the participated loans such as outstanding bal-
ance and amount of payments received].
6. Payments. Seller will pay to Purchaser its pro rata share of the aggregate
amount of payments of principal and interest paid by the borrower during each
month when received.
10. Instructions. Seller agrees that so long as the Purchaser's share in any loan is
more than fifty percent thereof in the aggregate, then the Seller will take any
action as may be requested by Purchaser to enforce the terms thereof ....
See Seafirst, 619 F. Supp. at 1354-55.
406. 619 F. Supp. at 1355-56.
407. Id. at 1356.
408. Although the district court concluded that the participation "agreement is ambiguous
as to the existence of... property interests," the court nevertheless found that "the agreement
arguably created and conveyed property rights in the participated loans." Id. at 1355 (empha-
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for Seafirst.4 9
The court's denial of Penn Square's fiduciary status presents a particularly
bewildering problem. The district court admitted that a "trust relation is
suggested " 410 by the contract terms declaring that Penn Square "'shall be a
trustee for the benefit of and accountable to' ,411 the Seattle bank for its pro
rata share of the participated loans. This also required Penn Square to hold
Seafirst's share of payments in a separate reserve account and obligated Penn
Square to consult Seafirst before changing the loan terms. 41 2
The court remained unconvinced. It stated:
On the other hand, the first paragraph of section 3 indicates that
Penn Square remains sole manager of the loans and collateral; para-
graph 7 represents Penn Square, not Seafirst, as the sole secured party;
and paragraph 9 indicates that while Penn Square will defer to Seafirst's
requests regarding enforcement or foreclosure of security interests in
participated loans, Penn Square is entitled to indemnity from Seafirst
for "any expense or liability incurred in so doing." These terms suggest
that Penn Square retains the status of primary creditor and secured
party.413
The court apparently failed to comprehend the fact that the terms which
"suggest" that Penn Square retain the status of primary creditor are entirely
consistent with Seafirst's beneficial ownership interest and Penn Square
Bank's duties as trustee. In short, the district court believed that the rights
and duties stemming from Penn Square's fiduciary position necessarily
worked against Seafirst's ownership interests. Once again the analysis is off
the mark.
Even if Seafirst were the unquestionable owner of the participated portion
of the loan or the fact that Penn Square Bank held Seafirst's interest in trust,
the district court continued, that does not necessarily preclude bor-
rower/depositor setoff against the entire loan.41 4 As long as Penn Square's
status as lead creditor survived the loan participation, the district court ex-
plained it could setoff against the participated portion of the loan. 41 5 Suffi-
sis added). Moreover, the court later justified its rationale by stating that the finding of a
property interest vested in Seafirst is not outcome determinative in deciding the validity of
setoffs. Id. at 1356. In both instances the district court camouflaged its finding by using lan-
guage such as "arguably created," "trust relation is suggested" and "possible property inter-
ests." This, nevertheless, contrasts to the same court's harsh pronouncements in Chase.
409. Id
410. Id. at 1356 (emphasis added).
411. Id.
412. Id.; see infra Appendix D.
413. Id
414. The court explained:
The finding of a possible property interest and/or trust relation, however,
does not end the inquiry into offsets; it merely brings us to the second prong of
our consideration, viz, the legal import of such an interest. Even if Seafirst
prevails on its property or trust theory, the Receiver can prevail... if it proves
beyond doubt that the offsets were nonetheless proper.
Id. at 1356-57.
415. The court stated that its "crucial concern is not whether Penn Square's creditor status




cient mutuality of obligations exists for the court to order setoff provided
that the loan debt is owed solely to and owned entirely by Penn Square. In
other words, if the loan debt is owed solely to and owned solely by Penn
Square, then, in the court's view, sufficient mutuality of obligations exists for
the court to order setoff.
Under the terms of the [participation] agreement, Penn Square re-
mained the manager, sole secured party and sole authority for collec-
tion on the loan. There is no evidence of a multi-lender agreement or
any other instrument conferring direct creditor status of Seafirst. The
Court finds as a matter of law that Penn Square retained sufficient cred-
itor status to satisfy mutuality and effect offset. 416
The court excluded Seafirst from the debtor-creditor equation. 417 Once
excluded, the district court simply overlooked Seafirst's property rights,
trust relations and its rights to share in the reduction of the loan debt. The
oversight seems inexplicable because the terms of the Seafirst participation
contract recognized the Seattle bank's ownership interest. The Seafirst
agreement expressly stated that Seafirst owned an undivided fractional inter-
est in each participated loan, all instruments evidencing the loan and all col-
lateral securing it.418 Second, to the extent of Seafirst's pro rata share of
each loan, Penn Square agreed to act as "trustee for the benefit of" and was
to hold all instruments and funds "in trust for Seafirst for its sole and exclu-
sive benefit."' 419 Third, although Penn Square continued to manage and ser-
vice the loans, the agreement required Penn Square to consult with Seafirst
on any matter that would affect Seafirst's interest in the loan.4 20 Fourth, the
agreement specified that before permitting any material changes in the terms
of the underlying loan, Penn Square first had to obtain Seafirst's written con-
sent.421 Fifth, the agreement required Penn Square to mark and identify all
documents to evidence Seafirst's participation in the loan.422 Sixth, the
agreement obligated Penn Square to make detailed monthly reports to
Seafirst and deposit all payments received from borrowers in a reserve ac-
count pending the distribution of the funds to Seafirst. 423 Finally, the con-
tract also provided that so long as Seafirst owned a majority of the loan,
Penn Square had to take any action requested by Seafirst to enforce the
terms of the loan. 424
Although the Seafirst result parallels the Chase and Hibernia non-Loan
416. Id.
417. Although the district court's "guiding precept... continue[d] to be the borrower's
right to offset," the Seafirst setoff analysis took a new direction, one different than that in
Chase. Id at 1358. Mutuality was the key to the Seafirst setoffs; none of the Ninth Circuit's
equities even entered the equation. This different direction is not entirely surprising. In many
respects, it represents the logical extension of the district court's misunderstanding of
Mademoiselle.
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Pool Purchase Agreement results, the plain language of the Seafirst bargain
requires a result identical to that of the Hibernia Loan Pool Purchase Agree-
ment. Seafirst had as much of an ownership interest in its participations as
Hibernia had in its loan pool participations.425 Penn Square Bank was agent
for Hibernia; it was trustee for Seafirst. Penn Square had a fiduciary duty to
collect and remit trust funds in which Hibernia had a beneficial interest;
Penn Square owed an identical duty to Seafirst. The loan participations
purchased by Hibernia became the exclusive assets of the New Orleans bank;
the same was true of the participations purchased by Seafirst.
Never does the district court satisfactorily explain the inconsistencies of
its findings. Instead, the court abruptly concludes:
[T]he "ownership interest" acquired by Seafirst through participation
was merely its share of an expectation generated, managed, enforced
and collected by the lead bank, Penn Square. Seafirst took this interest
subject to the borrower's and the bank's rights of offset. Absent terms
in the participation agreement barring the assertion of such offsets, they
remained enforceable by either the borrower or the bank. 426
Not only did the district court misinterpret the transaction, it also failed
to comprehend the significance of Seafirst's ownership interests. The com-
parison with the Hibernia Loan Pool Purchase Agreement could not have
been much clearer. Seafirst owned its share of the debt and supporting col-
lateral and Penn Square Bank was its trustee.427 The district court, there-
fore, seems to have contradicted itself.
VII. THE PENN SQUARE DECISIONS: COMMENTS, CRITICISMS,
AND CONCLUSIONS
The structure and style of the Seafirst and Northern Trust opinions indi-
cate that after two years of reflection the district court began to doubt its
analytical approach set forth in its previous participation decisions. Perhaps
the court waited to retreat somewhat from its earlier Chase extreme. On the
other hand, the court's apologists, can argue that in the Seafirst and North-
ern Trust decisions the court simply construed other contracts, ones with
different provisions creating different relationships. Nothing in the court's
orders indicates a weakened resolve, a changed mind, or a reconsideration of
past positions. The truth of the matter is, I suspect, most likely somewhere
in between. Yet I am inclined to view the Seafirst and Northern Trust deci-
sions as a step in a new direction; despite the identical results, the approach
has changed. 428
425. Indeed, the language of the Seafirst contract is much more explicit in that regard than
the Hibernia Loan Pool Purchase Agreement. Compare infra Appendix D (Seafirst Agree-
ment) with infra Appendix C (Hibernia Loan Pool Purchase Agreement).
426. Seafirst, 619 F. Supp. at 1358.
427. Moreover, once the borrower/depositor was allowed to set off its deposit balance
against the entire loan debt (including that portion owned by Seafirst), Penn Square Bank, as
trustee, was contractually obligated to remit to the Seattle participant its pro rata share of the
funds used to reduce the loan debt.
428. This statement seems particularly true in the case of the Northern Trust decision. The
participation certificate involved in that case was the Penn Square printed form.
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The Seafirst and Northern Trust decisions indicate that the court, to use its
own words, "must have desired to further define or modify certain aspects of
the relationship between [the participant] and Penn Square." 429 But even if
this assumption is correct, the question arises: How much or in what way
did the district court recast certain aspects of its earlier rulings?
A. The Significance of Seafirst and Northern Trust
Seafirst offers several striking examples of the court's analytical and inter-
pretive errors. In particular, the court ignored the similarities between the
Seafirst contract and the Hibernia Loan Pool Purchase Agreement. The
court purposely disregarded the express language of the Seafirst participa-
tion contract and found that Seaflirst did not own property rights in the un-
derlying loan. Moreover, the court determined that the fiduciary obligations
imposed on Penn Square to care for Seafirst's interest in the participated
loans somehow worked to defeat, rather than protect, Seafirst's ownership
interests .430
These analytical inconsistencies do not represent true departures from the
problems in Chase and Hibernia. The significance of Seafirst and Northern
Trust is the new, seemingly self-contradictory analytical approach taken by
the court to justify its decisions. The district court broke new ground by
rearranging its analysis of the equities of borrower/depositor setoff. The
court frankly states that equity no longer plays a part in the determination of
the propriety of borrower/depositor setoff.43 1 Yet for the first time the court
addresses the competing interests of the parties affected most by the setoff
issue. 432 The court seemingly confessed that something other than strict
legal principles and precedent dictated its decisions.
1. The Departure from Equities
In FDIC v. Mademoiselle433 the Ninth Circuit emphasized that it predi-
cated a large part of its decision on Mademoiselle's ignorance of the sale of
the participation. 434 The borrower in Mademoiselle remained completely
429. Hibernia District Court Order, supra note 358, at 9 (ascertaining intent behind execu-
tion of Loan Pool Purchase Agreement). This assumption unlike the district court in Hiber-
nia, does not have to overcome the difficult obstacle of the express language of a contract and
the stated intent of both of the parties to that contract.
430. The court also committed a grave error in overlooking Seafirst's (as well as the other
participants') rights to share in the benefits of the setoff. The contractual sharing provisions
entitling participants to a pro rata share of the setoffs is discussed infra notes 458-79 and
accompanying text. Moreover, a proper analysis of the rights of the Penn Square participants
recognizes their rights to receive a preferred claim for their share of any setoffs. Id.
431. See the discussion of the new irrelevance of the borrower's knowledge of the participa-
tion transaction in notes 433-65 and accompanying text.
432. See the discussion of the court's balancing of competing interest in infra notes 446-50
and accompanying text.
433. 379 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1967).
434. Id. at 664. The court held:
So far as Mademoiselle was concerned, the note was due solely to [the lead
bank], and the unannounced transfer of an interest or sale of a participation
certificate should not dilute the uninformed depositor's ordinary right of set-off.
Id. (emphasis added).
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uninformed about the participation transaction and had no reason to ques-
tion whether the lead bank had transferred a portion of its loan.435 This lack
of knowledge greatly contributed to the equities that weighed in favor of
Mademoiselle's specific setoff.
In Chase many of the borrowers knew of the participations.436 Yet the
district court inexplicably ignored this shifting of equities in favor of the
participant. Further, the Chase court distorted the Ninth Circuit's analysis
to such an extent that the Penn Square borrower's awareness of the partici-
pation mattered little.4 37
Indeed, in the Chase court's analytical scheme, the equities created by the
borrower's knowledge were irrelevant. The Chase court asked but two fac-
tual questions: Who holds the note and who does the borrower pay? Re-
gardless of the intent and statements of the Ninth Circuit to the contrary, for
Judge Russell these questions represented the extent of the Mademoiselle-
based equities inquiry. 438
In both Seafirst and Northern Trust, as in Chase, the participants alleged
that many of the borrowers understood that an upstream bank actually
funded all or portions of their loans. 439 This time, however, the court did
not justify its decision with a Chase-influenced multi-page misanalysis of
Mademoiselle and its equities. Rather, the court ignored Mademoiselle
entirely. 440
435. See id.
436. See supra notes 295-350 and accompanying text (discussing Manhattan Bank, N.A. v.
FDIC, 554 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. Okla. 1983).
437. Chase, 554 F. Supp. at 256.
438. According to Judge Russell's reading of Mademoiselle:
[I]t is the knowledge of an assignment, coupled with knowledge of the transfer
of a note evidencing indebtedness and further coupled with knowledge of the
proper party to pay, i.e., the assignee, that could have had a bearing on the
court's reasoning if such knowledge had been shown.
Id. at 255. In other words, the equities might have differed if the borrower knew that its
promissory note had been transferred to the participant and it had been paying the participant
directly.
If this represents the true measure of the equities, then the test fails to measure of knowledge
or equities at all. If the note is endorsed and delivered to the participant and the borrower
pays the participant bank directly, then regardless of the borrower's state of mind, the loan
debt is directly owned by, held by, and payable to the participant. In short, a reverse participa-
tion, with the participant becoming the lead and the lead bank becoming the participant, must
occur before the district court's balance of equities tips in favor of the participant and recog-
nizes its ownership interests. Ironically, by misconstruing the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the
participation equities, the district court effectively eliminated equities from the analysis.
439. See, e.g., -Complaint, The Northern Trust Company v. FDIC, No. CIV-83-506-R
(W.D. Okla. filed Mar. 15, 1983).
In deciding whether to purchase a given loan participation, Northern Trust
routinely conducted an independent credit evaluation of the borrower based on
financial documentation made available by PSB supplemented, in many cases,
by information obtained through direct contact with the loan applicant.
Most if not all borrowers whose loans were participated to Northern Trust
knew at the time of negotiating their loans or shortly thereafter that participa-
tion interests in such loans would be or were in fact sold by PSB.
Id.
440. In the Northern Trust opinion the court responded to Northern's arguments concern-
ing the Mademoiselle equities by quoting Chase:
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Without a hint of its earlier reliance on the controlling effect of Mademoi-
selle, 44 the district court held that "[t]he borrower's knowledge of his loan's
participation is irrelevant to his continuing equitable claim [of setoffl." 442
With one sentence the district court elevated its earlier factual distinction443
raised in Chase to a matter of law.44 4 Who holds the note? Who gets the
check? For the district court, these variables and the constant of borrower
setoff comprised the equities equation. 445
In Chase the court attempted to justify its emphasis on these equities as
the focus of Mademoiselle. In Seafirst and Northern Trust the court entirely
dropped this pretext. However, the district court erred in both instances.
Under either analysis the Penn Square participant loses.
2 The Movement Toward Equity
By the time the district court decided Seafirst and Northern Trust, the
Penn Square courts' had continually misinterpreted Mademoiselle. But while
the district court ignored equities specifically, its analysis abstractly moved
toward equity. Once it dropped the Mademoiselle pretext, the district court
attempted to balance the competing interests of the parties.4" The court
explained:
From an equitable standpoint, enforcing an offset against a participated
loan entails balancing benefits and hardships among at least three par-
ties: the borrower, the lead bank, and the participant(s). These permu-
tations are compounded when insolvency is an added factor and the
court readily admits to frustration, and perhaps impossibility, in strik-
ing a balance satisfactory to all parties.447
Three years after Chase and over two years after Hibernia, the district
court admitted that a subjective cost/benefit analysis helped shape its deci-
sions. The court confessed that this analysis yielded difficult and frustrating
results. Nonetheless, the court concluded:
[Tihis court is convinced that the fact that some of the borrowers from Penn
Square Bank had notice that a loan participation had been sold to another bank
... does not shift the equities from the borrowers to the participating bank.
Northern Trust, 619 F. Supp. at 1343 (quoting Chase, 554 F. Supp. at 255).
441. See, e.g., Hibernia District Court Order, supra note 358, at 9 (Mademoiselle is control-
ling authority).
442. Seafirst, 619 F. Supp. at 1358 (emphasis added); see also Northern Trust, 619 F. Supp.
at 1343 ("The borrower's alleged knowledge of the participations does not negate their equita-
ble interests.").
443. The earlier distinction was the fact that the borrower's knowledge of a specific trans-
action did not shift the equities in favor of the Penn Square participant.
444. The matter of law means that the borrower's knowledge is irrelevant in determining
the right to setoff.
445. The district court's decision to ignore the Ninth Circuit opinion represents the logical
extension of the district court's initial misreading of Mademoiselle. Despite the logic of this
extension, the district court's pronouncement in Seafirst and Northern Trust lacks precedential
support. The district court misapplied, to borrow its words, "the controlling effect of
Mademoiselle."
446. See Seafirst, 619 F. Supp. at 1358-59; Northern Trust, 619 F. Supp. at 1343.
447. 619 F. Supp. at 1358. The court used the identical language in the Northern Trust
decision. 619 F. Supp. at 1343.
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[I]t is sufficient to resolve the claims in favor of the borrowers and the
lead bank... leaving participant banks to bear the market risk of their
participation ventures." 8
The court finally admitted that equitable considerations, other than those
specifically described in Mademoiselle, influenced its decision. Moreover,
the court acknowledged the impossibility of making one party whole without
harming another. Thus, the court reasoned that the balance tipped in favor
of allowing borrower/depositor setoffl 9 and letting the participant banks
absorb the inevitable losses,450 which marked a definite change in the Penn
Square courts' approach.
3. The Implications of Seafirst and Northern Trust
From one perspective, Seafirst and Northern Trust only compounded the
district court's previous mistakes. Even worse, its new approach appears
contradictory. In one instance, the court dismissed equities as irrelevant, yet
in the next, equity counted for all.451 This contradiction can be tolerated,
perhaps even rationalized, because of the court's implicit admission that it
looked beyond a single Penn Square participation transaction or the express
terms of any participation agreement. Instead, it considered the implications
of borrower/depositor setoff and participants' rights. The district court's
long view suggests that disregarding the compelling Mademoiselle-type equi-
ties in the specific furthers equity in general.45 2
B. A Purposive Analysis of the Penn Square Problems
The Penn Square courts most likely reached the wrong conclusions in de-
ciding specific questions of law. Most of the Penn Square decisions were
tersely worded, filled with presumptive or conclusory statements and con-
tained little thoughtful analysis. Despite the shortcomings in their decisions,
448. Seafirst, 619 F. Supp. at 1358. See also Northern Trust, 619 F. Supp. at 1343.
That Northern Trust and other upstream banks were disappointed in their
commercial expectations of Penn Square is not disputed, but Northern's disap-
pointment can be termed "inequitable" only if it had an equitable claim, inter-
est, or fund at stake. Such is not the case.
Seafirst, 619 F. Supp. at 1358. The commercial expectations and realities involved in loan
participations are discussed infra notes 474-78 and accompanying text.
449. See Seafirst, 619 F. Supp. at 1358. On this point the Penn Square decisions prompt
emphatic the court's reasoning, but I can support the result. My reasons are discussed at
length in the next sections of this Chapter. See infra notes 462-71 infra and accompanying
text.
450. Ia. at 1358. Northern Trust, 619 F. Supp. at 1343. On this point, however, the court's
result is not required by permitting borrower/depositor setoff, nor is it the contractually cor-
rect result under the terms of the participation contracts. See infra notes 472-79 and accompa-
nying text.
451. Compare the pronouncements in Seafirst and Northern Trust on the irrelevance of the
borrower's knowledge of the participation with the balancing of benefits and hardships caused
by the lead bank's failure in those decisions.
452. See infra notes 462-71 and accompanying text. In light of the insolvency and ultimate
demise of the FSLIC and the problems plaguing the government in its efforts to solve the
savings and loan crisis, this type of approach may be the only approach that focuses on the
preservation of the integrity of the banking system, and may be the only approach that pro-
duces the politically needed result.
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however, the Penn Square courts reached the equitable result on the overall
issue of depositor setoff. The same is not true, however, of the result reached
on the issue of the participants' right to their respective share of the setoff
deposits.
1. A Framework for Analysis
The Penn Square participation controversy narrows into two components:
one strictly legal, the other equitable. The first component, the legal issues,
concerns the legal significance of loan participations. Who owns the partici-
pated portions of the loans? What rights do the participation agreements
create or convey? Does the law permit setoff? Does a mutuality of obliga-
tions become the "legal" subject of setoff?
The second component, the equitable issues, asks: Who do bank failures
hurt the most? Who should the government protect? What is the function
of National Bank Act? Who do loan participations help? Who should own
the participated portions of the loans?
The two components do not exist separately or function independently of
each other. In my estimation, to reach the "proper" decision, the one that
seeks to achieve the greatest equitable goal at the lowest legal cost, the courts
must combine the two components.
If the courts employ such a purposive analysis, then the focus comes
closer to, again in my estimation, commercial reality. Reality in the particu-
lar because the inquiry specifically highlights the predetermined expecta-
tions, assumptions and intent of the parties at the time they struck specific
bargains; reality in general because the inquiry starts with the understanding
that legal results and equitable or political goals cannot and should not exist
at polar extremes. This analytical blend ultimately recognizes that the legiti-
macy of legal principles and equitable purposes depend on each other and
fosters better judicial decisions.
Such a purposive analysis hopes to achieve the rule or decision that best
accommodates the interests, needs and relative positions of all the parties in
light of the commercial realities involved in the Penn Square participation
transactions. The inquiry asks questions that blend legal and equitable anal-
yses. Who should own the participated portions of the loans? Who expected
to own the participated portions? Did the borrower/depositor expect a right
to set off deposit accounts against loan balances? How should proceeds of a
bank liquidation be distributed?
These questions help courts focus on the specific intent, assumptions and
expectations brought to the bargaining table by each party. These questions
also focus on the realities of bank failures and the hardships borne by all
parties. By answering these questions, courts can decide difficult cases like
the Penn Square participations suits on the basis of commercial realities.
Thus, a purposive approach provides a mechanism for appraising, balancing
and furthering the changing needs and interest of the parties.
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2. A Purposive View of Loan Participations
Penn Square Bank conveyed property rights in the participated loans to
the upstream banks. The contractual language in the Hibernia Loan Pool
Purchase Agreement and the SeafLrst Participation Agreement evidence that
conveyance. For inexplicable reasons, the district court recognized this con-
veyance in one instance, yet denied it in the next. A strong argument exists
for the proposition that in law or in fact none of the Penn Square participa-
tions differ from each other.
Evaluating the Penn Square participations in light of the parties' purposes
leads to the conclusion that the participants owned their respective portions
of the loans. Regardless of the form or specific content of the participation
contract, both Penn Square and the participant banks treated the participa-
tions as assignments of ownership. Both parties expected and intended to
transfer ownership of the participated portions of the loans from Penn
Square to the participant. The circumstances created by Penn Square's par-
ticipation transactions reflect the expectation and assumption of participant
ownership.
Penn Square originated over $2 billion in energy loans, an amount that
greatly exceeded the shopping mall bank's lending limits. The law prohib-
ited the bank from originating and continuing to own this amount of loans.
Moreover, if one classified these participations as loans from the upstream
banks to Penn Square then, in addition to violating its lending limits, Penn
Square also violated its borrowing limits by borrowing over $2 billion from
the participants. 453 Furthermore, Continental Illinois did not intend to lend
Penn Square $1 billion. Rather, it intended to purchase ownership of $1
billion in energy loans from the Oklahoma bank.
The books and records of Penn Square and the participants evidenced the
expectation and assumption of participant ownership.454 Penn Square's
records only showed the unparticipated portions of these loans as assets.
The Oklahoma bank purposely failed to list the participated portions of
these loans as assets.455 Instead, each of the participant banks classified its
453. For that matter, the participants would have been required to show the participations
as loans to Penn Square Bank.
454. See, e.g., Complaint, The Northern Trust Co. v. FDIC, No. CIV-83-506-R (W.D.
Okla. filed Mar. 15, 1983).
It was the mutual intent and understanding of Northern Trust and PSB that
each participation agreement conveyed property interests in the underlying loan
and associated collateral and created as between Northern Trust and PSB an
agency and fiduciary relationship whereby PSB would act as loan administrator
on behalf of Northern Trust to the extent of the participation interest sold. Con-
sistent with this intent and understanding, all loan participations purchased
from PSB were listed as assets by Northern Trust and reflected on its books as
direct loans to the individual borrowers.
Id.
455. See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiff, The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., in Opposition to De-
fendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, Chase, 554 F. Supp. 251 (Penn Square
carried as asset on its books only portion of indebtedness which it did not sell to Chase); Reply
Brief of Defendant in Support of Its Alternative Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment
at 21-22, Chase, 554 F. Supp. 251.
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participations as assets and recorded them on its books as direct loans to the
various borrowers. 456 The books and records of all the banks, therefore,
demonstrate the desire to sell and assign ownership of the loans and support-
ing collateral to the participants. Once Penn Square assigned ownership up-
stream, it retained at most legal title to the loans solely to service the
ownership interests of the participants.
In this regard, the district court's decision in Hibernia appears particu-
larly perplexing. The court incongruously found that while Hibernia owned
the loan pool participation, Hibernia did not own the other group of partici-
pations. Hibernia purchased millions of dollars in participations from Penn
Square. Both Hibernia and the FDIC perceived no difference in intent or
expectations between the two groups of participations. Yet the court be-
lieved that the parties intended to convey ownership interests in one group
and not the other. Such a result, however, makes little sense.
Throughout Penn Square and Hibernia's continuing participation rela-
tionship, Penn Square sold and Hibernia purchased millions of dollars of
energy loans. The court's assumption that Hibernia used the participations
as a means to loan millions to Penn Square while it also used the same trans-
actions to purchase millions in loans from the Oklahoma bank lacks com-
mercial sense. Although some of the participation agreements probably
failed to explicitly assign ownership of property interests to the partici-
pant,457 the commercial assumptions, intent and actions of Penn Square and
the participant banks were very explicit. The Penn Square courts unfortu-
nately failed to recognize the rationale behind or the circumstances sur-
rounding the Penn Square participations. If the courts had done so, their
decisions would have recognized parallel commercial expectations. The
Penn Square decisions, however, frustrate commercial reality.
The purposive approach advocated in this Article recognizes commercial
reality behind the participation transactions. It seeks to define legal relation-
ships so as to further the reasons for their creation. A purposive approach to
the Penn Square controversy, therefore, recognizes and protects the owner-
ship interests belonging to the participant. Courts should also use this same
purposive approach to evaluate the propriety of borrower/depositor setoff
because commercial expectations support setoff.
3. A Purposive Approach to Setoff
a The Cost/Benefit Equities of Penn Square
The insolvency of any bank creates an extreme and uncertain situation.45 8
456. See supra note 455.
457. Even if the contracts do not explicitly convey ownership, they also are not explicit in
not conveying ownership, they also cannot be read as not conveying ownership. The agree-
ment in such a case should be "interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the
parties, as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful."
Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 152 (1985). And, "[i]f the terms of a promise are in any respect ambigu-
ous or uncertain, it must be interpreted in the sense in which the promisor believed, at the time
of making it, that the promisee understood it." Id. § 165.
458. See E. KANE, THE GATHERING CRISIS IN FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE (1985);
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The courts predicated the Scott 4 59 and Mademoiselle460 decisions on their
recognition of the difficult circumstances created by bank insolvency. 4" De-
positors constitute the group hardest hit by and least able to withstand the
consequences of bank failures.462 Therefore, they constitute the group most
deserving of equitable considerations and protections.463 The government
created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation precisely for this group
and this reason;4"6 the right of depositor setoff was and should continue to
be recognized. 465
b. The Expectation of Depositor Setoff
In Scott v. Armstrong,466 the Supreme Court believed that natural justice
formed the basis for borrower/depositor setoff.' '467 Here, natural justice
means "common sense and fairness.46 An examination of the situation
presented if the borrower/depositor, rather than the bank, defaults or goes
bankrupt illustrates this point.
At common law and in bankruptcy law, the bank possesses a right of set-
off against the borrower/depositor.4 69 In the event the borrower defaults on
its obligations owed to the bank, the bank has a right to retain the deposit
Isaac, The Role of Deposit Insurance in the Emerging Financial Services Industry, 1 YALE J. ON
REo. 195, 197-99 (1984); Goodman & Shaffer, The Economics of Deposit Insurance: A Critical
Evaluation of Proposed Reforms, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 145, 146-48 (1984).
459. Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U.S. 449 (1892).
460. FDIC v. Mademoiselle of California, 379 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1965).
461. See Mademoiselle, 379 F.2d at 664 (insolvency of lead bank created several inequities).
462. See Isaac, supra note 458, at 200. Isaac notes that one of the principal objectives of
deposit insurance is to protect depositors of modest means from the consequences of bank
failure because:
The loss by the insolvency of banks falls generally upon the farmer, the
mechanic, and the laborer, who are least acquainted with the condition of banks
who, of all others, are most illy able to either guard against or to sustain a loss
by their banks' failure.
Id. quoting New York Assembly Journal 434 (1829).
463. See id.
464. See E. KANE, supra note 458, at 197; Isaac, supra note 458; Randall, The Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation: Regulatory Functions and Philosophy, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRoBs. 696, 699-704 (1966).
465. The commercial expectation of setoff, combined with the hardships borne by the bor-
rower/depositor, ultimately justifies setoff. See infra notes 466-78.
466. Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U.S. 499 (1892).
467. The Scott Court found that
natural justice would seem to require that where the transaction is such as to
raise the presumption of an agreement for a set-off it should be held that the
equity that this should be done is superior to any subsequent equity not arising
out of a purchase for value without notice.
Id. at 508.
468. The Court determined that the parties had an implied agreement of setoff that should
be honored. "The set-off of debts due has been universally conceded. The equity of equality
among creditors is either found inapplicable to such set-offs or yields to their superior equity."
Id. at 511.
469. TeSelle, Banker's Right of Setoff- Banker Beware, 34 OKLA. L. Rv. 40, 40 (1981);
see also 11 USC § 553 (1982).
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balance as payment on the loan debt.470 Thus, a bank that requires its bor-
rower to maintain a collateral collection account or compensating account
balance at the bank in effect extracts additional security for the debt from
the borrower. If the borrower defaults on its loan obligations, a fund of the
borrower's cash is already in the bank and subject to the bank's setoff.
Fairness dictates that if the depository bank fails the borrower/depositor
should be allowed the same setoff rights as the bank.471 Simply because the
borrower/depositor exercises the right of setoff does not change the mutual-
ity of the obligations; nor should setoff change the expectations or assump-
tions of the parties. Commercial reality dictates that if one party implicitly
possesses the right of setoff, then the other party should as well.
It does not make sense to presume that in a commercial context, where
two parties are each obligated to the other,472 that one of the parties should
have the right of setoff and the other should not.473 This presumption com-
prises the Scott Court's natural justice of setoff. Although neither borrower
nor bank expressly granted the other the right of setoff, fundamental fairness
demands that both parties should have the right to set off mutual obliga-
tions. Moreover, such natural justice comports with the expectations of the
parties and the commercial realities of the relationship created by the
transaction.
4. Participated Loans and the Equity of Setoff
a The Undisclosed Participation
A direct legal relationship exists between a lead bank and its bor-
rower/depositor. This direct debtor-creditor relationship creates mutual ob-
ligations and thus supports the expectation of setoff. The relationship
between that same borrower/depositor and the participant bank, however,
is, at best, indirect and, at worst, nonexistent. The borrower/depositor with
no notice of the participation transaction possesses no control over the sub-
sequent dealings of its bank. The undisclosed participation, therefore,
neither allows the borrower no opportunity to fully evaluate the entire lend-
470.
The banker's right to setoff is the common law, equitable right of a bank to
apply the general deposits of a depositor against the matured debts of the deposi-
tor. This right grows out of the contractual debtor-creditor relationship created
between the depositor and the bank at the time the account is opened, and it
rests upon the principle that it would be inequitable to permit the debtor-deposi-
tor to carry an open account that induces the bank to extend credit, and then
allow the debtor to apply the funds to other purposes because he had not ex-
pressly agreed to apply them to the debt.
TeSelle, supra note 469, at 40 (footnote omitted).
471. See Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U.S. 499 (1982).
472. When the borrower maintains a deposit account at its lending bank, a mutual debtor-
creditor relationship is created between the borrower/depositor and the lending/depository
bank.
473. See First Nat'l Bank v. Malone, 76 F.2d 251, 254 (8th Cir. 1935). "Where no superior
equities intervene, the set-off of a deposit against the debt upon an unmatured note is allowed
upon the theory that in good conscience one ought not to pay his debt to his creditor if he
cannot ultimately compel his creditor to pay the debt due him." Id.
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ing transaction, nor informs the borrower that the bank has unilaterally al-
tered the mutuality of their debtor-creditor relationship.
More than likely, the failure of its depository bank hurts this bor-
rower/depositor. 474 Requiring that person or entity, which presumably
reached an implicit agreement with its depository bank that granted each
party the right of setoff, to bear the economic burden of paying the full
amount of its loan and waiting years to recover a fraction of the lost deposit
amount seems inequitable. 475 The borrower/depositor becomes aware of
nothing that would change its expectations and assumptions about the lend-
ing transaction and its relationship with its lending/depository bank.476 The
courts, therefore, should not deprive the uninformed borrower/depositor of
its ordinary right of setoff by the unknown and unsolicited actions of its
bank.
Upholding the validity of the uninformed borrower/depositor's implied
agreement of setoff with its lending/depository bank possesses an undeniable
appeal. Setoff comports with the commercial expectations surrounding these
types of commercial relationships: the court should not permit lend-
ing/depository bank to unilaterally alter these presumptions. A palpable
sense of fairness surrounds the Mademoiselle decision that the uninformed
borrower/depositor retains the right of setoff against a participated loan.
The same does not hold true in the disclosed participation transaction.
b. The Disclosed Participation and the Symmetry of Setoff
As with the undisclosed participation transactions, the disclosed participa-
tion reallocates the borrower/depositor's debt obligations among two or
more banks. Mutuality of obligations, the recognized basis of setoff, is no
longer complete. The critical difference between the disclosed and undis-
closed participation transactions revolves around expectations, understand-
ings and assumptions brought to the bargain by each party.
Quite unlike the Mademoiselle borrower, the alleged majority of Penn
Square borrower/depositors were informed about the involvement of other
banks in making energy loans; indeed, they not only solicited the partici-
pants' involvement with Penn Square, but in many instances knew that Penn
Square's ability to make the loan depended on upstream funding. These bor-
rowers knew that another bank often advanced the loan funds and, more-
over, that the bank would own most of the loan debt.
The Penn Square participations, unlike the undisclosed Mademoiselle par-
ticipation, did not constitute subsequent, unilateral attempts to alter the un-
derstanding and expectations of the parties. The Penn Square borrowers
474. See P. ZWEIG, supra note I (discussing the problems caused for depositors by the
failure of Penn Square); M. SINGER, supra note 2.
475. Permitting both the bank and the depositor the right of setoff, a right for which they
both, according to Scott, implicitly bargained, provides symmetrical treatment of their respec-
tive obligations. If the bank has a right of setoff in the event of the borrower's insolvency, then
the borrower's right of setoff should also be recognized in the event of the bank's insolvency.
476. As far as the borrower is concerned, nothing has changed the mutuality of their re-
spective obligations or altered the symmetry of their relationship.
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expected and needed the involvement of the participant banks in the lending
transactions. All the parties, the borrower, Penn Square, and the partici-
pant, entered the transaction knowing that ownership of the loan debt, and
thus ownership of the borrower's debt obligations, would be divided between
Penn Square and the participant bank. The Penn Square participations,
therefore, involved different expectations and understandings than those in
undisclosed participations.
Arguably, these expectations and understandings might include an im-
plied agreement to refrain from setoff. In short, the participants can argue
that the Penn Square borrower/depositors, aware of the participants' owner-
ship of their debt obligations, should not be allowed to cancel their debt
obligations owned by one bank (the participant) with funds on deposit in
another (Penn Square). This argument, however, ignores the origin of the
setoff remedy and the symmetry of the debtor-creditor relationship.
Although the borrower's debt is owned jointly, the borrower has one debt
obligation. The mutuality of obligations changes somewhat, because the non
depository bank now owns a portion of the debt, but the symmetry of the
debtor-creditor relationship remains intact.
A better method of analyzing this issue focuses on the symmetry of the
debtor-creditor relationship and the ownership rights of the participant. The
participant owns property rights in the loan; moreover, it certainly has a
property interest in all payments made on the loan.477 As an owner, the
participant is entitled to receive its share of all payments made on or reduc-
tions in the loan debt.478 Courts should use this premise as a basis to further
both the borrower's expectations of setoff and the participant's expectation
of payment. The logical result, therefore, permits borrower/depositor setoff
against all'loans, ignoring the participant's involvement, 479 and treats each
setoff as a payment on the loan debt. This approach allows the participant
to receive its undiminished pro rata share of the payment.
5. The Participants' Right to a Preferred Claim
In permitting borrower/depositor setoff against all participated loans, the
477. In certain instances, the participant bank may even have a property interest in the
funds in a borrower's account(s) at Penn Square. This is particularly true of a collateral collec-
tion account that holds the proceeds of production from mortgaged oil and gas properties.
478. Penn Square acted as the participants' servicing agent or, in the case of Hibernia and
Seafirst, trustee. It was obligated to receive payments from the borrowers, hold the payments
for the participants and then remit the funds to them in accordance with their respective agree-
ments.
The example of the defaulting or insolvent borrower clarifies the effect of the setoff and the
rights of the participants.
If a defaulting borrower has $50,000 on deposit in Penn Square and $100,000 in outstanding
loan debt (90% of which is owned by an upstream bank), then Penn Square has a right to
apply the funds in the deposit account against the loan debt. But Penn Square does not have a
right to retain the entire $50,000. Instead, a contractual obligation requires it to treat the
setoff as a payment. Therefore, the ninety percent participant has a property interest in and a
right to receive $45,000 of those funds.
479. This analysis assumes that the participant and the borrower reached no express agree-
ment that precludes setoff.
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courts must protect the ownership interests of the participants and recognize
the effect of the setoff on the insolvent lead's estate. The setoff represents a
payment on the loan; it reduces the amount of indebtedness owing on the
loan. In canceling Penn Square's deposit liabilities, the Penn Square setoffs
also cancelled debt owned by the participants. As the owners of property
interests in these loans and loan debt, the participants have ownership inter-
ests in the funds canceling that debt. Moreover, the contractual relationship
created by the participations made Penn Square the participants' servicing
agent for receiving payments on the loans. The Oklahoma bank, therefore,
operated under an obligation to hold a pro rata portion of all payments on or
reductions in the loan debt for the benefit of the participants. Each partici-
pant thus should receive its undiminished pro rata portion of these pay-
ments, particularly when the setoff actually increases the value of the
insolvent estate. The following example demonstrates this point:
At the time Penn Square is closed, Borrower's outstanding loan bal-
ance is $100,000. Ninety percent of the loan is owned by an upstream
participant. As a result, Borrower has a $100,000 liability; correspond-
ingly, Penn Square owns a $10,000 asset and the participant owns a
$90,000 asset.
Borrower also has $50,000 on deposit in Penn Square. Therefore,
Borrower owns a $50,000 asset; Penn Square owns a $50,000 liability.
The application of the deposit account funds ($50,000) against the total loan
debt, completely extinguishes the deposit liability of Penn Square. Yet, the
only asset that Penn Square's estate owns is $10,000 of Borrower's loan.
Through the setoff, Penn Square's estate appropriates and cancels $40,000 of
value that belongs to the participant and enhances its estate because it avoids
a $50,000 liability at a $10,000 cost.
Under the Penn Square liquidation scheme, the participant receives the
benefit of the setoff in the form of a receiver's certificate for a general claim
in the amount of $40,000. At the time of this writing, that receiver's certifi-
cate has a value of just slightly over half of its face amount. The insolvent
estate thus captured $40,000 of value belonging to the participant for which
it paid that participant only $20,000 over a period of almost four years. The
estate, therefore, profited by over $20,000.480
The bookkeeping nature of the setoff confused the Penn Square courts:
the courts simply saw a cancellation of assets and liabilities, a mere shifting
of credits and failed to recognize the participant's ownership of a $90,000
asset. The courts, therefore, misunderstood whose credits were being
shifted. Then, the courts failed to see the value that Penn Square's estate
derived from the setoff and compounded their error.
The participants owned their respective portions of the loans. Moreover,
480. Given the finance stress and strain on the regulatory system and the insurance fund, in
the present environment it is very likely that anything - legal principle or otherwise - would
be rejected if it was perceived to increase the cost of managing bank and savings and loan
failures. With a very difficult and expensive job ahead of them, it can be expected that the
FDIC and RTC will claim every advantage and opportunity that they may have to keep down
the costs of liquidations that will be borne by the taxpayers.
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Penn Square was obligated to act as the participants' servicing agent or fidu-
ciary. Penn Square's estate, therefore, should not retain the $40,000 real
dollars created by the setoff in the above example, thereby reducing the total
loan indebtedness and extinguishing property rights owned by the partici-
pant, and pass along to the participant $40,000 discounted dollars in the
form of a general claim. The participant and no one else, particularly Penn
Square or the FDIC, owns the $40,000. $40,000 of the credits being shifted
in the setoff belong to the participant, not to Penn Square. The asset that
belongs exclusively to the upstream bank should not be extinguished without
fully compensating the participant.
Moreover, the Penn Square courts ignored the effect of the setoffs in in-
creasing the estate. As the above example demonstrates, the setoff increases
the estate in the hands of the receiver by $40,000. That $40,000 constitutes a
specific fund to which the participant, who owns that asset, can attach a
preferred claim.48s
The Penn Square courts correctly stated that "[n]o term in the participa-
tion certificate precluded passing on an offset to the upstream bank."'482 The
courts, however, to pass on to the upstream bank the full benefit and effect of
the setoff. As a result, the setoffs took participant property rights at a price
far less than their value and thus retained the benefit for the estate. The
commercial expectations and understandings of the parties do not support
this result.
The Penn Square decisions deny the very reasons, expectations and under-
standings that represent the basis for loan participations in general and the
Penn Square participations in particular. A better approach to these types of
commercial controversies seeks to define the legal rights and relationships
that are created in accordance with their commercial purposes. If the Penn
Square courts had used this type of purposive analysis, then their analysis
would make commercial sense.
VIII. FINAL OBSERVATIONS
The language chosen by the parties in their agreements and certificates
may have had commercially perilous consequences, and indeed these
may be perilous times for banks generally; but the solution lies in better
draftsmanship of participation certificates. 48 3
If indeed financial institutions face perilous times, then the Penn Square
courts have done very little to help. In fact, their findings and their analyses
481. It should be noted that this Article was written prior to the enactment of the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcemnt Act's restructuring of the entire banking regu-
latory and liquidation environment. This Article expresses no opinion on the rights, powers
and duties of the FDIC and RTC under FIRREA.
Given the increasing projections about the astronomical costs involved in cleaning up the
savings and loan industry and the political questions about who will pay for it all, it is highly
doubtful that loan participations will be universally able to obtain preferred claims to the assets
of insolvent financial institutions. As stated in this Article, the relative equities and economies
may well continue to justify that outcome.
482. Northern, 619 F. Supp. at 1343-44.
483. Id at 1343.
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are inconsistent and often conflicting. Perhaps the cynical would say that
the Penn Square decisions' real lesson about loan participations is: Don't.484
Often the language, intent, actions, understandings, and expectations of
Penn Square Bank and the participant banks were clear. Given the "equi-
ties" at work, one wonders what kind of better draftsmanship would have
changed the results of the Penn Square decisions.
484. The risk of this kind of setoff is best avoided by avoiding participations. Whenever
possible, the transaction should be structured as an agented credit with each bank holding a
note from the borrower in an amount equal to its pro rata share of the loan. See Essay, supra
note 6, at 271. But when separate notes are not practicable, bank counsel should give careful
thought to the terms of the participation agreement.
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